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Abstract
During recent decades the monetary policies of central banks have shown similar
patterns - mostly led by the policy changes of large economies such as the US
and the Eurozone. These large economies care little for other countries’ monetary
policies, while other economies have concerns about the fluctuations of international
variables such as currency values and capital flows. This results in asymmetric
relationships between the central bank policies across countries. The major central
banks’ quantitative policies also have significant effects on the other economies by
way of changes to cross-border capital flows.
The first chapter presents (i) a theoretical framework that explains the asym-
metric policy relationships and (ii) empirical evidence for those relationships. In the
two-country model analysis, home welfare is approximated as a function of interna-
tional variables. These variables also influence optimal home inflation and output.
The optimal home policy rate is affected by the foreign policy rate, and the effect
becomes stronger as home openness is greater. Therefore, when the degrees of open-
ness are significantly different between countries, there can be an asymmetric policy
rates relationship. The empirical analysis investigates the policy rate relationships
between two large economies (the US and the Eurozone) and other economies. In
the probit model analysis, 12 out of 14 countries have leader and follower relation-
iii
ships with at least one of the US and the Eurozone. The VAR analyses indicate
that 11 countries have one-way relationships with the large economies.
In the second chapter, the leader-follower policy relationship between central
banks is investigated based on a small open economy model. The asymmetric re-
lationship is strengthened by economic globalization. When the foreign policy rate
is lowered, the home currency appreciates. This leads to a decrease in net exports
via the expenditure switching effect, thus reducing home output. The lower import
price reduces home inflation. In response to the changes in home output, inflation
and the real exchange rate, the home central bank lowers its policy rate. The policy
relationship becomes stronger when (i) the international assets holding cost is lower,
(ii) home openness is higher, (iii) the home central bank adopts more aggressive in-
flation targeting, and (iv) the home monetary policy responds to currency value
changes. The banking friction also strengthens the policy relationship.
The third chapter models the international effects of quantitative easing (QE)
in terms of cross-border capital flows. A two-country model is set up with financial
frictions. The foreign central bank conducts QE. As the amount being loaned to
home agents by foreign banks increases, capital stock, investment and the asset price
of the home economy rise, accompanied by a currency appreciation. The fall in the
foreign interest rate lowers the home interest rate through a decline in the home
capital return. The financial accelerator strengthens the foreign QE effects. The
rise in the asset price boosts home borrowers’ net worth, and eventually investment
and capital stock increase more. The international effects of QE are stronger with (i)
a greater assets adjustment cost in the foreign economy, (ii) a lower home investment
adjustment cost, and (iii) a higher degree of home financial openness.
Declaration
The material contained in this thesis has not been submitted in support of an ap-
plication for another degree or qualification in this or any other institution.
Copyright c© 2017 by Yongdae Lee.
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be
published without the author’s prior written consent and information derived from
it should be acknowledged.
iv
Acknowledgements
Completing this thesis, I have greatly benefited from Professor Parantap Basu and
Dr. Leslie J. Reinhorn. They always provided me with insightful criticisms during
my research, and I sincerely acknowledge their advices. The meetings we had to-
gether and the regular workshops during the terms were really helpful. With their
support and excellent supervision, I was able to submit my thesis on time.
I would like to acknowledge the support of my family. I wish to express my
deep thanks to my wife, Jaeyeong Kim. Because we were together, our life in the
UK and my research at Durham were meaningful. A pleasant distraction has been
provided by my new born daughter, Jayne Lee. I also owe the profound gratitude
to my parents, Samjoo Lee and Gabduk Byun, for their strong encouragement to
complete my study.
The financial support from the Bank of Korea and the University of Durham is
also to be greatly acknowledged. The experience at the Bank of Korea was helpful in
modeling the economy. I also obtained beneficial suggestions and knowledge from the
workshops and the conferences I have attended: the 47th and the 48th Money, Macro
and Finance (MMF) Conferences, the 2nd RES Symposium of Junior Researchers,
RES Easter School 2014, and University of Surrey DSGE workshop.
Finally, I thank Professor Martin Ellison in Oxford and Dr. Sara Eugeni in
Durham who have taken the time to examine the thesis and make constructive
comments.
v
Dedicated to
My Parents and Jaeyeong
Contents
Abstract ii
Declaration iv
Acknowledgements v
1 Asymmetric Policy Relationships between Central Banks: Theo-
retical and Empirical Evidence 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Optimal Monetary Policy in Open Economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.2 Model Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.3 Open Economy Welfare and Optimal Policy . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.4 Implication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4 Empirical Evidence: Asymmetric Policy Relationship . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4.2 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4.3 Ordered Probit Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4.4 Vector Auto-regression (VAR) Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
vii
Contents viii
1.A.1 Derivation of the Welfare Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.A.2 Proofs of Lemma 1.A.1 and Lemma 1.A.2 . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.A.3 Data Sources, Test Results and Lag Selection . . . . . . . . . 50
1.A.4 Seasonal Adjustment using X-12 ARIMA . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.A.5 Two-step Procedures of Ordered Probit Analyses . . . . . . . 54
2 Globalization and the Leader-Follower Relationship between Mon-
etary Policies 57
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.3 A Small Open Economy Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.3.1 Model Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.3.2 Intermediate Goods Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3.3 Final Goods Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3.4 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.3.5 Financial Intermediaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.3.6 Capital Producing Firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.3.7 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.3.8 Central Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.3.9 Market Clearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.3.10 Exogenous Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.3.11 National Income Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.3.12 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.3.13 Solution Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.4 Parameters Calibration and Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.4.2 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.4.3 Bayesian Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.5 Impulse Responses: Foreign Policy Rate Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Contents ix
2.5.1 Bayesian Impulse Response Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.5.2 Comparative Statics of Impulse Responses . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.5.3 Variance Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.A.1 Steady State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.A.2 Log-linearized Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.A.3 Derivation of the Sticky Price Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2.A.4 Data Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
2.A.5 Bayesian Estimation Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.A.6 Bayesian Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.A.7 Comparison between Implied Interest Rate and Data . . . . . 110
3 Cross-border Capital Flows and International Effects of Quantita-
tive Easing 111
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.3.1 Model Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.3.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.3.3 Home Entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.3.4 Capital Producing Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.3.5 Foreign QE and Lending Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.3.6 Intermediate Goods Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.3.7 Final Goods Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
3.3.8 Central Bank Policy Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
3.3.9 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
3.3.10 Market Clearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
3.3.11 Exogenous Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Contents x
3.3.12 National Income Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.3.13 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
3.3.14 Solution Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.4 Parameters and Steady States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
3.4.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
3.4.2 Bayesian Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
3.5 Impulse Responses: Foreign QE Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
3.5.1 Bayesian Impulse Response Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
3.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
3.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
3.A.1 Steady State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
3.A.2 Log-linearized Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
3.A.3 Entrepreneurs’ Optimization and Leverage Ratio . . . . . . . 169
3.A.4 Model Description without Home Financial Friction . . . . . . 170
3.A.5 Data Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
3.A.6 Bayesian Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Bibliography 174
List of Figures
1.1 Central Bank Policy Rates during 2000-2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Impulse Responses to Foreign and Home Policy Shocks with the US . . . 40
1.3 Impulse Responses to Foreign and Home Policy Shocks with the Eurozone 41
2.1 Policy Rates since 2000: US, Eurozone, and other economies . . . . . . . 58
2.2 Flow of Funds after Production; Intermediate Good Producer (i) . . . . . 63
2.3 Responses to Foreign Policy Shock: Baseline Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.4 Responses to Foreign Policy Shock: Different Foreign Assets Holding Costs 91
2.5 Responses to Foreign Policy Shock: Different Openness . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.6 Effect of Aggressive Inflation Targeting and Modified Taylor Rule . . . . . 94
2.7 Responses to Foreign Policy Shock: Effects of Financial Friction . . . . . 95
3.1 QE of Major Central Banks and Capital Flows into EMEs . . . . . . . . 112
3.2 Home and Foreign Economies: Goods and Funds Flows . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.3 Entrepreneur i’s Business at time t: Flows of Funds and Capital . . . . . 123
3.4 Foreign Central Bank QE and Flows of Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.5 Sterilized Government FX Intervention and Foreign Reserves . . . . . . . 143
3.6 Effects of Foreign Country’s QE: Bayesian Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . 156
3.7 Foreign Country’s QE with/without Home Financial Friction . . . . . . . 159
3.8 Foreign QE with Different Foreign Assets Adjustment Costs . . . . . . . . 160
3.9 Effects of Foreign QE with different Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
3.10 Identification and Convergence Diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
xi
List of Tables
1.1 Trade Shares (%) with the US and the Eurozone (EZ) . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 The Policy Relationships with the US (Ordered probit model) . . . . . . . 31
1.3 The Policy Relationships with the Eurozone (Ordered probit model) . . . 32
1.4 Short-term Rate Relationships with the US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.5 Short-term Rate Relationships with the Eurozone (EZ) . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.6 Datastream Codes for VAR and Probit Model Analyses . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.7 Unit Root Test Results: t-statistics of ADF Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.8 Time Lag (p) Selection at the SVAR Analysis: Based on AIC . . . . . . . 51
1.9 Identification of ARIMA Model Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.10 Rational Expectation Estimation Results: significant coefficients . . . . . 55
1.11 Rational Expectation Test Results: t-values of coefficients . . . . . . . . . 56
2.1 Calibrated Values of Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.2 Parameter Estimates using Bayesian Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.3 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (%) of Home Policy Rate (R) . . . 97
2.4 List of Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.1 Portfolio and Other Investment Position/GDP Ratio (%, 2014) . . . . . . 113
3.2 Parameters and Steady State Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3.3 Parameter Estimates using Bayesian Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
xii
Chapter 1
Asymmetric Policy Relationships
between Central Banks:
Theoretical and Empirical
Evidence
1.1 Introduction
Over recent years, the policy decisions of many central banks have followed similar
patterns, as illustrated by Figure 1.1. Indeed, the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) states
that monetary policy responds to domestic output and inflation changes. However,
according to Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012), the policy rates in many countries
have been below the levels recommended by the Taylor rule for more than a decade.
He and McCauley (2013), and Taylor (2013) indicate that the deviation from the tra-
ditional rule is related to the central banks’ concerns about international variables,
such as the exchange rate and the terms of trade.
For some large economies, however, the importance of external variables is rel-
atively small due to their low levels of openness. Moreover, international variables
1
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Figure 1.1: Central Bank Policy Rates during 2000-2015
are considerably affected by the policies of the large economies. This can possibly
lead to asymmetric policy relationships, where only the large economies’ monetary
policies affect other economies’ policies. In many countries, the policy rate adjust-
ments have been driven by the policy changes of major central banks, such as the
US Federal Reserve (Fed) and the European Central Bank (ECB)1. Taka´ts and Vela
(2014) also find that the US monetary policy causes emerging economies’ policies to
deviate from what domestic factors suggest.
This chapter provides (i) a theoretical framework that explains the asymmetric
policy relationships and (ii) empirical evidence supporting those relationships. In
the theoretical analysis, an open economy model based on Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler
(CGG, 2002) is presented. There are two countries: home and foreign.
The model analysis demonstrates that the home economy’s welfare is a function
of international variables, such as the foreign output gap and the terms of trade.
Therefore, these external variables affect optimal inflation and the optimal output
gap in the home economy. Moreover, the home policy rate is influenced by the
foreign policy rate, and the foreign policy effects become more substantial as home
openness is greater. Therefore, the policy rate relationship between two countries
1In the early 2000s, many central banks lowered interest rates right after the rapid monetary
expansion of the US Fed. There were similar patterns in the mid 2000s. Also, in response to the
policy rate cut of the US in 2007:Q3 the UK and Canada lowered policy rates immediately. In
2008:Q4, many other central banks began expansionary policies.
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can be asymmetric when the degrees of openness are significantly different from each
other.
This contradicts CGG (2002), which argue that the central bank’s policy problem
in an open economy is isomorphic to the one in a closed economy. In CGG (2002),
the foreign output gap is not regarded as a variable while approximating home
welfare. However, in this two-country open economy model, the foreign output gap
is a variable that affects the home economy. Thus, regardless of exogeneity of foreign
variables, the foreign output gap should be considered in the home welfare function.
Taking the foreign output gap as a variable, in this chapter, the home welfare is also
affected by the foreign variable.
The result is in line with earlier New Keynesian studies on optimal open econ-
omy monetary policy. In the model, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption is not unity, while the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods is unity. This is related to the non-negligible role of in-
ternational variables in the home welfare function. Benigno and Benigno (2006)
indicate that, the terms of trade effect on welfare disappears only when the multi-
plication of the intratemporal and intertemporal elasticity of substitution becomes
unity. Gali and Monacelli (2005) also argue that stabilizing domestic variables is
optimal when the intratemporal and intertemporal elasticity of substitution is both
unity. According to Corsetti and Pensenti (2001), international variables’ effects
are determined by the relative size of the intratemporal and intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. In De Paoli (2009), exchange rate targeting outperforms domestic
variables targeting for a sufficiently large elasticity of intratemporal substitution.
The asymmetric degrees of bilateral openness can be observed between some
large economies and other economies. Table 1.1 reports some selected countries’
trade shares (%) with the US and the Eurozone (EZ)2. Many countries have strong
2There are 19 countries in the Eurozone: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal,
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Table 1.1: Trade Shares (%) with the US and the Eurozone (EZ)
Home Country for US US for Home Home Country for EZ EZ for Home
Australia 1.2 7.5 Chile 0.4 12.1
Canada 20.9 65.3 Czech 4.3 62.6
Chile 0.8 16.0 Malaysia 0.7 8.2
Indonesia 0.9 7.0 Norway 2.0 42.9
Malaysia 1.4 8.1 Sweden 3.3 45.6
South Korea 3.6 10.6 Switzerland 5.3 54.2
Switzerland 1.7 10.0 Thailand 0.6 6.8
Thailand 1.2 8.5 UK 11.9 46.7
Data: IMF eLibrary (Direction of Trade by Country, 2014)
trade links with these large economies. However, for the US or the Eurozone the
trade share with an individual country is relatively small. This can be a plausible
reason for asymmetric policy rate relationships between those economies.
Following the theoretical approach, the empirical analysis investigates the asym-
metric relationships between policy rates. In this section, the policy relationships
between two large economies (the US and the Eurozone) and 14 other economies are
verified. Those ‘other economies’ are as follow: Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech,
Denmark, Malaysia, Norway, India, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden,
Thailand and UK. There are two methodologies in the empirical section. First,
given that policy rates are not continuous and not frequently adjusted, ordered pro-
bit models are used, as in Bergin and Jorda` (2004) and Scotti (2011). After this, the
results of structural VAR (Vector Auto-regression) analyses are presented following
the related literature, such as Kim (2001), and Sousa and Zaghini (2008).
In the probit model analysis, 12 out of 14 countries have leader and follower
relationships with at least one of the US and the Eurozone. Four of these countries
have asymmetric relationships with both large economies. The VAR analyses indi-
cate that 11 countries have one-way relationships with the US or/and the Eurozone
with respect to the short-term interest rates. Combining the results of these two
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.
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kinds of tests, nine economies have asymmetric relationships with at least one of the
large economies in both the probit and the VAR models analyses.
The empirical study in this chapter has novelty in some features. First, it anal-
yses both home and foreign models investigating the policy relationships. Many
previous empirical studies consider only one-way models, such as ‘the US → other
economies’ (Bergin and Jorda`, 2004; Kim, 2001). Secondly, the identification pro-
cedure of the structural VAR analysis is based on the theoretical framework in the
present chapter. This kind of model-based approach is similar to Giordani (2004)
and Sims and Zha (2006). Finally, the sample period reflects the recent changes in
global circumstances - such as the start-up of the ECB (1999) and inflation targeting
of many central banks3. Moreover, the data include the global financial crisis in the
late 2000s, when many central banks abandoned the inward looking policy rule4.
This chapter continues as follows. The relevant literature is illustrated in Section
1.2. A simple two-country model and the welfare analysis are presented in Section
1.3. Section 1.4 describes the empirical investigation of the asymmetric relationships
between central banks. Section 1.5 makes conclusion.
1.2 Literature Review
There are plenty of studies that discuss the optimal monetary policy in an open
economy. One of the earliest papers is Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995a), which indicate
that targeting the real exchange rate is as problematic as a fixed nominal exchange
rate regime. There also exist remarkable studies denying the benefits of stabilizing
international variables. Some papers compare the welfare loss of each monetary pol-
3Inflation targeting was firstly adopted by New Zealand in 1989. During the first half of 1990s
five more countries, and during 1997-2002, 15 more countries adopted inflation targeting.
4Reserve Bank of New Zealand cut its policy rate from 8% to 5% during 2008:Q3-Q4 even
though CPI inflation rose from 1.8% to 5.1% during Jul 2007-Sep 2008. Bank of Korea maintained
its policy rate during Aug 2007-Jul 2008 while CPI inflation increased from 2.0% to 5.9%.
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icy rule and conclude that domestic inflation targeting is optimal (Batini, Harrison
and Millard, 2003; Gal´ı and Monacelli, 2005; Kollmann, 2002). Clarida, Gal´ı and
Gertler (2002) also indicate that the form of the optimal open economy policy rule
is identical to that of the optimal closed economy rule.
By contrast, De Paoli (2001) argues that the monetary policy needs to consider
international variables, since the terms of trade directly affect domestic welfare. Ball
(1998) explains an exchange rate channel of transmission of the monetary policy
shock. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005) also emphasize the effect of the inter-
national relative price - influencing consumers’ purchasing power. As discussed in
Edwards (2006) and Pappa (2004), the reality is that most central banks consider
currency value fluctuations while making policy decisions. Mohanty and Klau (2004)
also find that real exchange rates perform significant roles in 11 out of 13 countries
while central banks make policy decisions.
A stream of empirical literature investigates the monetary policy relationships
between countries. Mac´kowiak (2006) and Taka´ts and Vela (2014) find that the
US monetary policy has significant effects on the policies of emerging economies.
These results are similar to Gray (2013) which indicates that the US short-term
rate plays a significant role in other countries’ policy functions. Bergin and Jorda`
(2004) show European countries’ responses to the US and German monetary policies
before 1998. Moreover, Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1998) highlight the influence of
German policy on the policies of the UK, France and Italy. In a recent study,
Kucharcˇukova´, Claeys and Vasˇ´ıcˇek (2014) identify the immediate policy changes of
non-EU European countries following the ECB’s policy decisions. However, Kim
(2001) finds that the US monetary policy has no transmission effect on the policies
of non-US G6 countries.
There are studies which focus on the relationship between the US Fed and the
ECB. Some of them find a one-way relationship, indicating that the ECB has fol-
lowed the policy of the US Fed (Ullrich, 2003; Belke and Gros, 2005; Belke and Cui,
1.2. Literature Review 7
2009). Taylor (2007) also estimates a significant coefficient of the US federal funds
rate in the ECB’s policy rate function. On the other hand, Scotti (2011) denies the
leader-follower relationship between them.
There is a substantial body of literature which attempts to identify the plausible
reasons for the asymmetric monetary policy relationships between countries. Ac-
cording to Taylor (2013) and He and McCauley (2013), central banks tend to cut
policy rates to avert their currencies’ appreciations when another central bank lowers
its policy rate. Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012) and Rey (2015) emphasize the cen-
tral bank’s concern about the fluctuations of cross-border capital flows. Taka´ts and
Vela (2014) suggest that stronger inflation targeting makes the policies of emerging
economies more linked to the US policy.
Investigating the cross-border transmission channel of monetary shocks, various
kinds of empirical methods are used. First, structural VAR models are adopted
in many studies (Kim, 2001; Sousa and Zaghini, 2008; Kucharcˇukova´, Claeys and
Vasˇ´ıcˇek, 2014). In order to address the variables’ instability problem, Judd and
Rudebusch (1998) and Ulrich (2003) use VECM (vector error correction model) to
examine Taylor-type policy rules. However, some papers such as Bergin and Jorda`
(2004) argue that VAR and VECM methodologies are not proper for the policy
analysis since policy rates have unusual statistical properties: (i) a low frequency of
variations and (ii) discrete amounts of changes. Therefore, some researches adopt
ordered probit model to verify the interdependent relationships between monetary
policies (Bergin and Jorda`, 2004; Scotti, 2011).
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1.3 Optimal Monetary Policy in Open Economies
1.3.1 Overview
In this section, a theoretical framework supporting the asymmetric policy rate rela-
tionships between countries is presented; a simple two-country model is established
based on the New Keynesian framework of Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (CGG, 2002).
The model consists of two countries: home and foreign. Deriving the welfare func-
tion and the optimal monetary policy rule of each country, the reason for the leader
and follower relationship is verified.
There are households, and final and intermediate goods producers in the home
and the foreign economies. In each country, the central bank maximizes the sum
of domestic households’ welfare, choosing the optimal output gap and the inflation
gap. The policy rate is determined endogenously. The mass of the home households
is 1 − α and that of the foreign households is α. The parameter α also denotes
the shares of foreign produced goods in aggregate consumption in the home and
the foreign countries; α represents the degree of openness of the home economy and
1−α denotes foreign openness. Assuming the law of one price (LOOP) and identical
consumption baskets in both economies, the purchasing power parity holds.
1.3.2 Model Description
Households
There are representative households in the home and the foreign economies. Each
household consumes a basket of home and foreign produced goods. Assuming that
the combinations of home and foreign goods in the home and the foreign countries
are identical, aggregate consumption per capita in the home (Ct) and the foreign
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(C∗t ) economies are illustrated as follow:
Ct = C
1−α
H,t C
α
F,t C
∗
t = C
∗1−α
H,t C
∗α
F,t (1.3.1)
where α represents the weight of the foreign goods in each consumption basket,
which means the degree of openness of the home economy. CH,t and CF,t denote the
home and the foreign goods in the home consumption basket, respectively. Likewise,
C∗H,t and C
∗
F,t are the home and the foreign goods in foreign aggregate consumption.
These variables are all in per capita terms. The aggregate prices in the home (Pt)
and the foreign economies (P ∗t ) are then
Pt = m
−1P 1−αH,t P
α
F,t P
∗
t = m
−1P ∗1−αH,t P
∗α
F,t (1.3.2)
where m = αα(1− α)1−α. PH,t and PF,t denote the aggregate home currency prices
of the home and the foreign goods in the home economy, respectively. Also, P ∗H,t
and P ∗F,t represent the foreign currency prices of those goods in the foreign economy.
Defining St = PF,t/PH,t as the terms of trade, the aggregate prices can be rewrit-
ten as follow:
Pt = m
−1PH,tSαt P
∗
t = m
−1P ∗F,tS
α−1
t . (1.3.3)
The optimal consumption allocations in the home and the foreign economies suggest
PH,tCH,t = (1− α)PtCt PF,tCF,t = αPtCt (1.3.4)
P ∗H,tC
∗
H,t = (1− α)P ∗t C∗t P ∗F,tC∗F,t = αP ∗t C∗t . (1.3.5)
Between the markets, the law of one price holds which means PH,t = EtP ∗H,t and
PF,t = EtP ∗F,t, where Et denotes the nominal exchange rate.
Defining Nt as the representative home household’s labour supply to the produc-
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tion sector, the household in the home economy maximizes
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τEτ [U(Ct)− V (Nt)] (1.3.6)
where
U(Ct) =
C1−σt
1− σ V (Nt) =
N1+φt
1 + φ
. (1.3.7)
The flow budget constraint is given by
PtCt + Et (Qt,t+1Bt+1) = WtNt +Bt +Dt (1.3.8)
where Bt+1 denotes risk-free bonds purchased at time t. Qt,t+1 is the nominal
stochastic discount factor between t and t + 1, and Et (Qt,t+1) = R
−1
t where Rt
is a risk-free gross nominal interest rate. Wt is the nominal wage and Dt is the divi-
dends from home intermediate goods producers. Also, no-Ponzi scheme is assumed,
which means lim
t→∞
t∏
s=1
R−1s Bt+1 = 0. The first-order conditions imply
βRtEt
{
(Ct+1/Ct)
−σ (Pt/Pt+1)
}
= 1 and Wt/Pt = N
φ
t C
σ
t , (1.3.9)
and from the equation (1.3.3),
βRtEt
{
(Ct+1/Ct)
−σ (PH,t/PH,t+1) (St/St+1)
α} = 1. (1.3.10)
Define C∗t and R
∗
t as foreign consumption and the risk-free interest rate, respectively.
Assuming symmetric households preference in the foreign economy5,
βR∗tEt
{(
C∗t+1/C
∗
t
)−σ (
P ∗F,t/P
∗
F,t+1
)
(St/St+1)
α−1
}
= 1. (1.3.11)
5With symmetric utility maximization of foreign households,
βR∗tEt
{(
C∗t+1/C
∗
t
)−σ (
P ∗t /P
∗
t+1
)}
= 1 and W ∗t /P
∗
t = N
∗φ
t C
∗σ
t .
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Since state-contingent securities can be traded internationally, the home and the
foreign (Q∗t,t+1) stochastic discount factors have a relationship as follows: Q
∗
t,t+1 =
Et+1
Et Qt,t+1. With a suitable normalization of initial conditions, then Ct = C
∗
t every
period.
Intermediate Goods Producers
The mass of home intermediate goods producers is unity. Each home intermediate
good firm i produces a differentiated good (1 − α)Yt(i) with labour inputs (1 −
α)NGt (i). Yt(i) and N
G
t (i) are in per capita terms, given the home households’ mass
(1− α)6. The production function is illustrated as:
Yt(i) = AtN
G
t (i). (1.3.12)
where At denotes productivity.
Each home intermediate good producer receives a subsidy τ ∈ (0, 1) of the wage
bills. Thus, the real marginal cost of home intermediate goods production can be
illustrated as:
MCt =
(1− τ)(Wt/PH,t)
At
=
(1− τ)(Wt/Pt)Sαt
mAt
(1.3.13)
where MCt is in units of home produced goods. From equation (1.3.9), the equation
(1.3.13) can be rewritten by:
MCt = (1− τ)m−1A−1t Nφt Cσt Sαt . (1.3.14)
Symmetrically, in the foreign economy
MC∗t =
(1− τ ∗)(W ∗t /P ∗F,t)
A∗t
=
(1− τ ∗)(W ∗t /P ∗t )Sα−1t
mA∗t
(1.3.15)
6Since the individual home household’s labour supply is identical (Nt) across households, labour
market clearing suggests: (1− α)Nt =
∫ 1
0
(1− α)NGt (i)di.
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which can be rewritten by:
MC∗t = (1− τ ∗)m−1A∗−1t N∗φt C∗σt Sα−1t (1.3.16)
where MC∗t and N
∗
t denote the foreign marginal cost and the labour supply, respec-
tively. The parameters φ and σ are common in both economies.
Following Calvo (1983), the home intermediate good producer can reset its price
each period with a probability 1− θ; with a probability θ it maintains the previous
price. If the intermediate good producer i can reset the prices at t, it chooses the
optimal price P oH,t that maximizes
∞∑
τ=0
θτEt
{
Qt,t+τYt+τ (i)
[
P oH,t − PH,t+τMCt+τ
]}
(1.3.17)
subject to the demand function which is presented later. Qt,t+τ is the stochastic
discount factor for the nominal cash flows at time t+ τ . Since all the producers are
owned by the home households, Qt,t+τ = β
τ (Ct+τ/Ct)
−σ(Pt/Pt+τ ). The solution of
the optimization problem is then as follows:
∞∑
τ=0
θτEt
{
Qt,t+τYt+τ (i)
[
P oH,t − (1 + µP )PH,t+τMCt+τ
]}
= 0 (1.3.18)
where µP (= 1/(ε − 1)) represents the mark-up in the intermediate goods market,
and ε denotes the elasticity of substitution between individual intermediate goods.
By the law of large numbers, then the home price index of the home intermediate
goods is given by
PH,t =
[
θP 1−εH,t−1 + (1− θ)(P oH,t)1−ε
]1/(1−ε)
. (1.3.19)
Price stickiness is symmetric in the foreign economy.
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Final Good Producer
In the home economy, there exists a final good producer which produces the final
good (1− α)Yt following the technology as below:
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
(ε−1)/εdi
)ε/(ε−1)
(1.3.20)
where Yt is aggregate home output per capita. Given the intermediate goods prices,
cost minimization subject to the equation (1.3.20) yields the following demand func-
tion for the intermediate good i:
Yt(i) =
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−ε
Yt (1.3.21)
which is used in deriving the equation (1.3.18). The aggregate home price of the
home intermediate goods (PH,t) is
PH,t =
(∫ 1
0
PH,t(i)
1−εdi
)1/(1−ε)
. (1.3.22)
In the foreign economy the final goods production and the demand functions are
symmetric.
Equilibrium
The goods market clearing conditions in the home and the foreign economies are
given by
(1− α)Yt = (1− α)CH,t + αC∗H,t (1.3.23)
αY ∗t = (1− α)CF,t + αC∗F,t. (1.3.24)
Y ∗t denotes per capita final goods production in the foreign economy, where the
households’ mass is α. Given the purchasing power parity and Ct = C
∗
t , the equa-
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tions (1.3.4) and (1.3.5) imply the zero trade balance in each country7, which means
PH,tYt = PtCt P
∗
F,tY
∗
t = P
∗
t C
∗
t . (1.3.25)
Combining the equations (1.3.3) and (1.3.25) yields
Yt = m
−1CtSαt Y
∗
t = m
−1C∗t S
α−1
t (1.3.26)
and these lead to
St = Yt/Y
∗
t . (1.3.27)
Also, from the equations (1.3.26) and (1.3.27), home and foreign consumption can
be expressed as a function of home and foreign output as follows:
Ct = C
∗
t = mY
1−α
t Y
∗α
t . (1.3.28)
The home labour market clearing condition suggests
Nt =
∫ 1
0
NGt (i)di =
Yt
At
∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
Yt
di =
Yt
At
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−ε
di, (1.3.29)
and defining Vt =
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−ε
di, the equation (1.3.29) is rewritten by
Nt = A
−1
t VtYt. (1.3.30)
Also, combining the equations (1.3.14), (1.3.27), (1.3.28) and (1.3.30) yields
MCt = (1− τ)mσ−1A−(1+φ)t Y κt Y ∗ηt V φt (1.3.31)
7The equation (1.3.23) implies (1 − α)PH,tYt = (1 − α)PH,tCH,t + αPH,tC∗H,t. From (1.3.5)
and PH,t = EP ∗H,t, this can be rewritten by (1− α)PH,tYt = (1− α)2PtCt + (1− α)αEtP ∗t C∗t . The
purchasing power parity (Pt = EtP ∗t ) then suggests PH,tYt = PtCt.
1.3. Optimal Monetary Policy in Open Economies 15
where κ = (1 + φ) + (σ − 1)(1− α) and η = α(σ − 1).
Assuming σ is larger than unity8, as the home economy becomes more open
(higher α) the effect of foreign output (η) on the home marginal cost increases, while
that of home output (κ) becomes weaker. Similarly, from the equation (1.3.16) in
the foreign economy
MC∗t = (1− τ ∗)mσ−1A∗−(1+φ)t Y ∗κ
∗
t Y
η∗
t V
∗φ
t (1.3.32)
where κ∗ = (1 + φ) + (σ − 1)α and η∗ = (1− α) (σ − 1).
When the price is flexible for the home intermediate goods (P oH,t/PH,t = 1), the
home real marginal cost is constant (MCt = MCe) and MCe = 1/(1+µ
P ). Flexible
price output can be expressed as Ye,t = AtNe,t where Ne,t denotes the flexible price
labour input. From the equation (1.3.31) and Ve = 1, then,
Ye,t =
[
m1−σA1+φt Y
∗−η
t
(1− τ)(1 + µP )
]1/κ
. (1.3.33)
Linearized Model
The equations of the home economy are linearized around the steady state. Define
the log deviation form Xˆt = lnXt− lnX¯, where X¯ denotes the steady state value of
Xt. The equations (1.3.10), (1.3.26) and (1.3.27) are then linearized as
9
Cˆt = Et(Cˆt+1)− 1
σ
[
Rˆt − Et(ΠˆH,t+1)− αEt(∆Sˆt+1)
]
(1.3.34)
Yˆt = Cˆt + αSˆt (1.3.35)
Sˆt = Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t (1.3.36)
8Most RBC literature assumes that the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(σ) is larger than unity (Smets and Wouters, 2003).
9In the foreign economy, Cˆ∗t = Et
(
Cˆ∗t+1
)
− σ−1[Rˆ∗t − Et(Πˆ∗F,t+1) + (1 − α)Et(∆Sˆt+1)] from
the equation (1.3.11), and from (1.3.26) Cˆ∗t = Yˆ
∗
t + (1− α) Sˆt.
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where ΠH,t+1 = PH,t+1/PH,t.
Combining the optimal home price setting equations (1.3.18) and (1.3.19) yields
ΠˆH,t = δM̂Ct + βEt(ΠˆH,t+1) (1.3.37)
where δ = [(1− θ)(1− βθ)] /θ. From the equation (1.3.33), the log-deviation of the
flexible price home output from the steady state can be represented by
Yˆe,t = κ
−1[(1 + φ)Aˆt − ηYˆ ∗t ]. (1.3.38)
Defining Y˜t = Yˆt − Yˆe,t as the home output gap, from the equations (1.3.31) and
(1.3.38) the following equation holds10:
M̂Ct = κ
(
Yˆt − Yˆe,t
)
= κY˜t. (1.3.39)
Also, combining the equations (1.3.34) and (1.3.35), and using Yˆe,t formula,
Y˜t = Et(Y˜t+1)− σ−10
[
Rˆt − Et(ΠˆH,t+1)− rˆN,t
]
(1.3.40)
where σ0 = σ − η and rN,t represents the home natural real interest rate, where
rˆN,t = σ0Et(∆Yˆe,t+1) + ηEt(∆Yˆ
∗
t+1). (1.3.41)
Combining (1.3.37) and (1.3.39) yields the following Phillips-type equation:
ΠˆH,t = λY˜t + βEt(ΠˆH,t+1) where λ = δκ. (1.3.42)
10The equation (1.3.31) is linearized as M̂Ct = −
[
(1 + φ) Aˆt − ηYˆ ∗t
]
+κYˆt +φVˆt where Vˆt = 0.
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1.3.3 Open Economy Welfare and Optimal Policy
This section firstly clarifies the welfare functions of the home and the foreign economies.
The output gap, the inflation gap, and the policy rate that maximize domestic wel-
fare in both countries are then derived. Eventually, the reason for the asymmetric
policy rate relationship is verified.
Open Economy Welfare Function
As in the non-cooperative equilibrium of Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (CGG, 2002),
each central bank maximizes domestic welfare. The steady state equilibrium of the
home economy is illustrated first. Assuming that the foreign economy is at its steady
state, the optimality condition of the home economy is illustrated by
V ′(N¯)N¯ = (1− α)U ′(C¯)C¯, (1.3.43)
which is the result of maximizing U(C¯) − V (N¯) subject to C¯ = mY¯ 1−αY¯ ∗α and
Y¯ = N¯ . Also, from the equation (1.3.14), at the steady state
MC =
1
1 + µP
= (1− τ)N¯φC¯σm−1S¯α = (1− τ)V
′(N¯)
U ′(C¯)
m−1S¯α. (1.3.44)
From the equations (1.3.26) and (1.3.43), the optimal subsidy (τ) satisfies11
(1− τ)(1 + µP )(1− α) = 1. (1.3.45)
Using a Taylor series expansion of the variable Xt, the second-order approximation
of the deviation from the flexible price equilibrium (Xe,t) can be represented by:
11Optimality in (1.3.43) implies V ′(N¯)/U ′(C¯) = (1 − α)C¯/N¯ , which implies (1 + µP )−1 =
(1− τ) (1− α) C¯N¯−1m−1S¯α. From (1.3.26), at the steady state C¯Y¯ −1m−1S¯α = 1, and Y¯ = N¯ .
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Xt −Xe,t
Xe,t
= X˜t +
1
2
X˜2t + o
(‖a‖3) (1.3.46)
where o (‖a‖n) denotes the terms that are of order higher than (n− 1)th and X˜t =
Xˆt − Xˆe,t. In this model, (i) Xˆt = lnXt − lnX¯, (ii) Xˆe,t = lnXe,t − lnX¯, and (iii)
X˜t = lnXt − lnXe,t.
Home welfare is represented by the sum of the home households’ utilities given
by the equation (1.3.6). Contrary to CGG (2002) which take foreign output (Y ∗t )
parametrically, in this approximation Y ∗t is a variable that responds to the changes
in other economic variables. Using a second-order approximation around the flexible
price equilibrium, the home economy’s welfare function can be derived12 as
WHτ = −(1− α)
Λ
2
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τEτ
[
Πˆ2H,t + ψY˜
2
t +
ψ
κ
Γ
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t , Cˆe,t
)]
(1.3.47)
where
Γ
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t , Cˆe,t
)
=
(
α
1− α
)
Y˜ ∗t
{
(σ − 1)
[
αY˜ ∗t + 2(1− α)Y˜t + 2Cˆe,t
]
− 2
}
, (1.3.48)
ψ = δκ/ε and Λ = ε/δ. Cˆe,t represents the log deviation of flexible price consumption
from the steady state level (Cˆe,t = lnCe,t − lnC¯). Using S˜t = Y˜t − Y˜ ∗t from the
equation (1.3.27), the home welfare function (1.3.47) can be rewritten by
WHτ = −(1− α)
Λ
2
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τEτ
[
Πˆ2H,t + ψY˜
2
t +
ψ
κ
Γ
(
Y˜t, S˜t, Cˆe,t
)]
(1.3.49)
where
Γ
(
Y˜t, S˜t, Cˆe,t
)
=
(
α
1− α
)
Y˜ ∗t
{
(σ − 1)
[
(2− α)Y˜t − αS˜t + 2Cˆe,t
]
− 2
}
. (1.3.50)
The result of the approximation suggests that home welfare is a function of
not only home variables but also international variables such as the foreign output
12The derivations of the equations (1.3.47) and (1.3.51) are illustrated in the appendix 1.A.1.
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gap and the terms of trade. This contradicts the argument of CGG (2002) which
indicate that, in a non-cooperative equilibrium, the central bank’s policy problem
is isomorphic to the one in a closed economy. Therefore, the optimal home policy
needs to consider the effect of the foreign variable changes on home welfare.
It is noteworthy that the effect of the international variables on the home econ-
omy’s welfare is greater as home openness is higher. As the parameter α increases,
the coefficient α
1−α becomes larger. The consumer’s risk aversion parameter σ is
assumed to be larger than unity.
The welfare function of the foreign economy can be represented by
W Fτ = −α
Λ
2
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τEτ
[
Πˆ∗2F,t + ψ
∗Y˜ ∗2t +
ψ∗
κ∗
Γ∗
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t , Cˆ
∗
e,t
)]
(1.3.51)
where
Γ∗
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t , Cˆ
∗
e,t
)
=
(
1− α
α
)
Y˜t
{
(σ − 1)
[
(1− α)Y˜t + 2αY˜ ∗t + 2Cˆ∗e,t
]
− 2
}
, (1.3.52)
with κ∗ = (1 + φ) + (σ − 1)α and ψ∗ = δκ∗/ε.
Open Economy Optimal Policy
The home central bank determines the optimal output gap and the inflation gap,
maximizing domestic welfare subject to the Phillips-type equation (1.3.42). In the
optimization problem, the expected values of the variables are taken as given. The
first-order condition is then derived as follows13:
λΠˆoH,t + ψY˜
o
t +
ψ
κ
α(σ − 1)Y˜ ∗t = 0, (1.3.53)
13λ = δκ where δ = [(1− θ) (1− βθ)] /θ. Also, κ = (1 + φ) + (σ − 1)(1− α) and ψ = δκ/ε.
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which can be rewritten as follows:
ΠˆoH,t +
1
ε
Y˜ ot +
1
εκ
α(σ − 1)Y˜ ∗t = 0 (1.3.54)
where ΠˆoH,t and Y˜
o
t denote the optimal inflation gap and the output gap, respectively.
Since κ = (1 +φ) + (σ− 1)(1−α) > 0 assuming σ > 1, the coefficient of the foreign
output gap is increasing in home openness (α). As α is higher, the home central
bank should allow greater fluctuations of home inflation and output in response to
a change in the foreign output gap. The optimal foreign policy rule is as follows:
λ∗Πˆ∗oF,t + ψ
∗Y˜ ∗ot +
ψ∗
κ∗
(1− α)(σ − 1)Y˜t = 0 (1.3.55)
which can be rewritten by
Πˆ∗oF,t +
1
ε
Y˜ ∗ot +
1
εκ∗
(1− α)(σ − 1)Y˜t = 0 (1.3.56)
where λ∗ = δκ∗. Given κ∗ = (1 + φ) + (σ − 1)α, the coefficient of the home output
gap is increasing in foreign openness (1− α).
From (1.3.42) and (1.3.54), the optimal home inflation dynamics is as below:
ΠˆoH,t = β
(
1
1 + λε
)
Et
(
ΠˆH,t+1
)
− ν
(
1
1 + λε
)
Y˜ ∗t , (1.3.57)
where ν = αδ(σ − 1). Solving forward yields the following reduced form solutions
for the optimal inflation gap and the output gap in terms of the foreign output gap:
ΠˆoH,t = −ν
(
1
1 + λε
) ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
(
1
1 + λε
)τ−t
Et(Y˜
∗
τ ) (1.3.58)
Y˜ ot = −εΠˆoH,t −
α
κ
(σ − 1)Y˜ ∗t (1.3.59)
Since α/κ is increasing in α, the effect of the foreign output gap on the optimal home
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output gap is larger as home openness is higher. In the foreign economy, following
a similar procedure and from ν∗ = (1− α)δ(σ − 1)
Πˆ∗oF,t = −ν∗
(
1
1 + λ∗ε
) ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
(
1
1 + λ∗ε
)τ−t
Et(Y˜τ ) (1.3.60)
Y˜ ∗ot = −εΠˆ∗oF,t −
1− α
κ∗
(σ − 1)Y˜t. (1.3.61)
In a closed economy, the welfare function includes only domestic variables. With-
out any exogenous shock, then the optimal output gap and the inflation gap would
be zero. However, in the optimal policy rules represented by the equations (1.3.60)
and (1.3.61), the optimal output gap and the inflation gap can be non-zero when
international variables deviate from the flexible price levels.
The optimal home policy rule helps the monetary policy in stabilizing interna-
tional variables. When the foreign output gap is expected to increase, the terms
of trade are expected to decline following the equation (1.3.27)14. According to the
policy rule (1.3.58), the home central bank targets a lower level of inflation, which
corresponds to a higher output gap in the equation (1.3.59). The higher home out-
put gap has upward pressure on S, and consequently the expected fall in the terms
of trade would be mitigated.
Combining the equations (1.3.59) and (1.3.61), the non-cooperative equilibrium
of this two-country model can be derived as follow:
Y˜ ot = −
ε
Ω
[
ΠˆoH,t −
α
κ
(σ − 1)Πˆ∗oF,t
]
(1.3.62)
Y˜ ∗ot = −
ε
Ω
[
Πˆ∗oF,t −
1− α
κ∗
(σ − 1)ΠˆoH,t
]
(1.3.63)
where Ω = 1− α(1−α)(σ−1)2
κκ∗ and 0 < Ω < 1
15.
14The anticipated rise in foreign production lowers the expected foreign goods price - putting
downward pressure on PF /PH (= S).
15κκ∗−α(1−α)(σ−1)2 = [(1 + φ)2 + (1 + φ)(σ − 1) + α(1− α)(σ − 1)2]−α(1−α)(σ−1)2 =
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Policy Rate Relationship
Without the Taylor-type monetary policy rule, the optimal home policy rate (R) is
endogenously determined by the central bank such that both welfare maximization
(1.3.54) and the consumer’s efficiency condition (1.3.34) are satisfied. Firstly, the
flexible price equation (1.3.38) suggests
Et(∆Yˆe,t+1) = κ
−1[(1 + φ)Et(∆Aˆt+1)− ηEt(∆Yˆ ∗t+1)]. (1.3.64)
From the equations (1.3.40) and (1.3.41), the equilibrium interest rate in the home
economy can be rewritten by
Rˆt = Et
(
ΠˆH,t+1
)
+ σ0
[
Et
(
Y˜t+1
)
− Y˜t+1
]
+ η
(
1− σ0κ−1
)
Et
(
∆Yˆ ∗t+1
)
+ σ0dt
(1.3.65)
where dt = κ
−1(1+φ)[Et(Aˆt+1)−Aˆt], η = α(σ−1) and σ0 = σ−η. Correspondingly
in the foreign economy,
Rˆ∗t = Et
(
Πˆ∗H,t+1
)
+ σ∗0
[
Et
(
Y˜ ∗t+1
)
− Y˜ ∗t
]
+ η∗
(
1− σ∗0κ∗−1
)
Et
(
∆Yˆt+1
)
+ σ∗0d
∗
t
(1.3.66)
where d∗t = κ
∗−1(1 + φ)[Et(Aˆ∗t+1)− Aˆ∗t ], η∗ = (1− α) (σ − 1) and σ∗0 = σ− η∗. Also,
using the equations (1.3.34) and (1.3.35), and from the corresponding equations of
the foreign economy, the home and the foreign consumers’ efficiency conditions can
be rewritten by
Et
(
∆Yˆt+1
)
= σ−1
[
Rˆt − Et
(
ΠˆH,t+1
)
+ ηEt
(
∆̂St+1
)]
(1.3.67)
Et
(
∆Yˆ ∗t+1
)
= σ−1
[
Rˆ∗t − Et
(
Πˆ∗F,t+1
)
− η∗Et
(
∆̂St+1
)]
. (1.3.68)
Define Rˆot and Rˆ
∗o
t as the optimal policy rates in the home and the foreign
(1 + φ)(σ + φ) > 0
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economies, respectively. These optimal rates depend on the optimal output gaps
determined by the central banks (Y˜ ot and Y˜
∗o
t ). Combining the equations (1.3.65),
(1.3.66), (1.3.67) and (1.3.68) then yields
Rˆot = Et(ΠˆH,t+1) + σ0
[
Et(Y˜t+1)− Y˜ ot
]
+ ρ
[
Rˆ∗t − Et(Πˆ∗t+1)− η∗Et(∆̂St+1)
]
+ σ0dt (1.3.69)
Rˆ∗ot = Et(Πˆ
∗
H,t+1) + σ
∗
0
[
Et(Y˜
∗
t+1)− Y˜ ∗ot
]
+ ρ∗
[
Rˆt − Et(Πˆt+1) + ηEt(∆̂St+1)
]
+ σ∗0d
∗
t (1.3.70)
where
ρ = η(1− σ0κ−1)σ−1 ρ∗ = η∗(1− σ∗0κ∗−1)σ−1, (1.3.71)
and alternatively,
ρ = φ
(
σ − 1
σ
)[
α
α + φ+ σ(1− α)
]
ρ∗ = φ
(
σ − 1
σ
)[
1− α
1− α + φ+ ασ
]
.
(1.3.72)
The coefficients ρ and ρ∗ are all positive assuming σ > 1, and 0 < ρ < 1 and
0 < ρ∗ < 1; the home (foreign) optimal interest rate is positively affected by the
foreign (home) interest rate. The coefficient ρ is increasing in α, and ρ∗ is decreasing
in α. This implies that the optimal home (foreign) interest rate is more significantly
affected by the foreign (home) rate as the degree of openness is higher.
The analysis in this section suggests that the different level of openness of each
country can lead to asymmetric relationships between the optimal interest rates.
The asymmetry of openness can be also significant in terms of the bilateral trade
relationship - especially between a small and a large economies. For instance, al-
though the US is an important trade partner for an emerging market country, for
the US the trade share with the emerging country would be fairly small (Table 1.1).
In this case, the leader and follower relationship can be observed between the policy
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rates of the US and the emerging economy.
When the degree of home openness is extremely high and that of the foreign
economy is close to zero (i.e. α → 1), there would be only a one-way relationship
between interest rates; only the home policy rate is affected by the foreign policy.
Woodford (2007) explains that, as one country’s openness approaches to unity in
a two-country model, the simulation results reflect the small open economy case.
When α→ 1 in this model, the equations in (1.3.72) imply
ρ ' φ
1 + φ
σ − 1
σ
and ρ∗ ' 0. (1.3.73)
Also, as α approaches to unity σ∗0 → σ and η∗ → 016. Ignoring the terms dt and d∗t ,
the optimal policy rates in the home and the foreign economies are illustrated by
Rˆot ' Et(ΠˆH,t+1) +
[
Et(Y˜t+1)− Y˜ ot
]
+ ρ0
[
Rˆ∗t − Et(Πˆ∗t+1)
]
(1.3.74)
Rˆ∗ot ' Et(Πˆ∗H,t+1) + σ
[
Et(Y˜
∗
t+1)− Y˜ ∗ot
]
(1.3.75)
where ρ0 =
φ
1+φ
σ−1
σ
and 0 < ρ0 < 1 assuming σ > 1. In this α → 1 case, only
the home policy rate is affected by the foreign rate. Furthermore, from the equation
(1.3.56), the foreign optimal output gap (Y˜ ∗ot ) in the equation (1.3.75) is not affected
by the home output gap (Y˜t) when α→ 1.
Finally, combining the home and foreign best response functions (1.3.69) and
(1.3.70), the equilibrium home policy rate can be derived as follows:
Rˆot = Et(ΠˆH,t+1) +
σ0
1− ρρ∗
[
Et(Y˜t+1)− Y˜ ot
]
+
ρ
1− ρρ∗
{
σ∗0
[
Et(Y˜
∗
t+1)− Y˜ ∗ot
]
− (η∗ − ρ∗η)Et(∆̂St+1)
}
+ %t(1.3.76)
where %t = (σ0dt + ρσ
∗
0d
∗
t ) /(1− ρρ∗).
16η∗ = (1− α) (σ − 1) and σ∗0 = σ − η∗.
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1.3.4 Implication
The welfare analysis suggests that the home economy’s welfare is also affected by
the foreign output gap and the terms of trade, which contradicts CGG (2002). This
is because the model in this chapter takes the foreign output gap as a variable while
CGG (2002) does not. Therefore, the optimal monetary policy rule in an open econ-
omy is not isomorphic to the one in a closed economy. Optimal monetary policy
in open economies should respond to not only domestic variables, but also interna-
tional variables such as the foreign output gap and the terms of trade. This implies
that stabilizing domestic variables is not enough to maximize domestic welfare. The
effect of the international variables on home welfare is greater as the degree of home
openness is higher.
The optimal home (foreign) policy rate is positively affected by the foreign
(home) interest rate, and the effect becomes stronger as openness of the home (for-
eign) economy is higher. Therefore, when the degrees of bilateral trade openness of
a small and a large economy are significantly different from each other, the policy
rates relationship between these two economies would be asymmetric.
1.4 Empirical Evidence: Asymmetric Policy Re-
lationship
1.4.1 Overview
Following the theoretical approach that clarifies the reason for asymmetric policy
rate relationships, in this section those relationships are empirically evidenced by
data analyses. There are two large foreign economies in the empirical models: the
US and the Eurozone. This section then investigates the monetary policy relation-
ships between these large economies and 14 other economies - home economies :
Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech, Denmark, India, Indonesia, South Africa, South
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Korea, Malaysia, Norway, Sweden, Thailand, and UK. Using both the home and the
foreign model equations, the effect of the foreign (home) policy rate changes on the
home (foreign) policy rate is verified.
The empirical study adopts two methodologies. First, given that policy rates
are not continuous and also not frequently adjusted, ordered probit models are used
as in Bergin and Jorda` (2004) and Scotti (2011). Following this, as in the studies
of Kim (2001), Sousa and Zaghini (2008) and Kucharcˇukova´, Claeys and Vasˇ´ıcˇek
(2014), structural VAR analyses are carried out using the short-term interest rates.
The structural scheme is based on the two-country model of Section 1.3.
1.4.2 Data Description
For the empirical analysis, monthly data from 2001:M2 to 2015:M12 are used17.
The data include the output gap, the inflation rate, the short-term interest rate,
and the monetary policy rate. Since monthly output data are not provided, as in
Kim (2001), industrial production (IP) data are used - replacing the output gap
data. For the inflation rate, the period to period inflation data are used. In the
probit model analysis, CPI inflation data are used, while the VAR analysis uses PPI
inflation data. This is because the structural VAR identification is based on the
model of Section 1.3. Also, net inflation (pi) is used instead of the gross inflation
rate (Π) in the probit model analysis. Most of the short-term interest rates (i) are
interbank rates, and some of them are either treasury bill yields or money market
interest rates. For US dollar (ED) and euro (EE) exchange rates, the nominal values
of the foreign currencies (US dollar or euro) denominated by home currencies are
used. All the data are provided by Datastream18.
Detecting the order of integration of the data, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
17Given the length of the available data, the sample period of Malaysia is 2005:M7-2015:M12,
and for India the sample period is 2005:M4-2015:M12.
18Data sources are reported in the appendix 1.A.3.
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tests are carried out. Difference data are used for some of the data having unit
roots: short-term interest rates and nominal exchange rates. The appendix 1.A.3
illustrates the ADF test results for the level and the difference data. Some of in-
dustrial production data are transformed via the seasonal adjustment (SA) if those
data are not adjusted; X-12 ARIMA19 method is used, which was developed by the
U.S. Census Bureau (Findley et al., 1998)20.
1.4.3 Ordered Probit Model
Model Description
The probit model is useful when dependent variables are discrete; it adopts latent
continuous variables which replace the original ones. Furthermore, the ordered pro-
bit model can also take the magnitude of the discrete variables into account. There
are extant studies which use the ordered probit model to investigate the factors
that affect policy rate changes (Bergin and Jorda`, 2004; Hamilton and Jorda`, 2002;
Scotti, 2011). Including foreign interest rates in the ordered probit model equations,
they estimate the influence of the foreign monetary policy on domestic policy rate
changes.
The conventional amounts of policy rate changes are not identical across coun-
tries. Therefore, in this model, the magnitudes of the policy rate changes are classi-
fied into five categories: (i) strong tightening (30bp ≤ ∆R), (ii) normal tightening
(0bp < ∆R < 30bp), (iii) no change (∆R = 0bp), (iv) normal expansion (-30bp
< ∆R < 0bp), and (v) strong expansion (∆R ≤ -30bp). Bergin and Jorda` (2004)
and Scotti (2011) use similar classification.
The observed discrete policy rate changes are then transformed into a series of
ordered variables, zt ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2}. In this series, ‘2’ represents strong tighten-
19Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average
20Details of the adjustments are illustrated in the appendix 1.A.4.
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ing, ‘-2’ is for strong expansion, and ‘0’ means no policy change21. As long as the
series of the numbers consistently reflects the actual order (ranking) of the origi-
nal dependent variables, any nominal numbers in the series are appropriate for the
analysis. It is then hypothesized that the discrete policy rate change (zt) is related
to the continuous latent variable z∗t according to
zt = f(z
∗
t ) =

−2 (= s1) if z∗t ∈ {c0(= −∞), c1}
−1 (=s2) if z∗t ∈ {c1, c2}
...
2 (=s5) if z∗t ∈ {c4, c5(=∞)}
(1.4.1)
where c0 < c1 < c2 < c3 < c4 < c5. Given the decision making process of the central
bank, the latent variable z∗t is assumed to be determined by economic variables such
as inflation and output. These variables are then represented by a vector Xt in the
following equation with coefficients (β) and error terms (εt):
z∗t = X
′
tβ + εt. (1.4.2)
The model establishment depends on the assumption of the probability distribu-
tion of the error term εt. The ordered probit model is based on the assumption of
normality of εt, while the logit model assumes a logistic distribution. The probability
of each policy stance change (sj) is then given by
Pr(zt = s
j) = Pr(cj−1 < z∗t ≤ cj) = F (cj −X
′
tβ)− F (cj−1 −X
′
tβ), (1.4.3)
where F (·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
21Regarding the federal funds rate target in the US, Hamilton and Jorda` (2002) use a series of
{· · · , -0.50, -0.25, 0, 0.25, 0.50,· · · }. In Bergin and Jorda` (2004) the ordered variables are {-0.50,
-0.25, 0, 0.25, 0.50}, and Scotti (2011) uses {-50, -25, 0, 25, 50}.
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Define l(zt; β, c) as the log-likelihood function of observing zt conditional on β and
c (= {c1, · · · , c4}). The solution of the maximum likelihood estimation of the pa-
rameters is then illustrated as follows:
{βˆ, cˆ1, · · · , cˆ4} = argmax
{β,c1,··· ,c4}
T∑
t=1
l(zt; β, c). (1.4.4)
The cross-border effect of the monetary policy is represented by the role of the
other country’s short-term rate (i) in the domestic policy decision. The estimated
equations based on a standard Taylor-type rule incorporate interest rate smooth-
ing. As in Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1998) and Taylor (2013)22, the foreign (home)
rate is included in the home (foreign) rate equation. Since current period data are
not observable while making policy decisions, the policy decision responds to the
expected current period values of the output gap and domestic inflation23. The
analysis then tests the significance of the coefficients of the other economy’s interest
rates in Taylor-type rule equations. In order to avert the unit root problem, differ-
ence variables are used for short-term rate data24. The ordered probit model (1.4.2)
is then illustrated as follow:
zH∗t = β1i
H
t−1 + β2E
(
piHt | ΩHt
)
+ β3E
(
Y˜ Ht | ΩHt
)
+ β4i
F
t−1 + ε
H
t (1.4.5)
zF∗t = β1i
F
t−1 + β2E
(
piFt | ΩFt
)
+ β3E
(
Y˜ Ht | ΩFt
)
+ β4i
H
t−1 + ε
F
t (1.4.6)
where superscript F is for foreign and H is for home variables. ΩHt and Ω
F
t represent
the available information sets at time t, which consist of the t− 1 and t− 2 data of
CPI inflation, PPI inflation, the output gap and the nominal exchange rate. Under
22Taylor (2013) illustrates a home policy rate rule, i = z + αi∗, where i and i∗ denote the
home and the US rates, respectively. z represents domestic factors such as inflation and GDP, and
0 < α < 1.
23This is similar to Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1998), where the central bank responds to the
expected value of the current period output gap, based on an available information set.
24The appendix 1.A.3 reports the unit root test results.
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the rational expectations hypothesis, the equations (1.4.5) and (1.4.6) are estimated
using two-step procedures. The estimation procedures and rationality test results
are illustrated in the appendix 1.A.5.
Results of the Probit Model Analysis
The significance of the coefficient β4 indicates the influence of the previous foreign
(home) policy changes on the home (foreign) policy rate decision. If β4 in the home
policy equation is significant and it is not in the foreign country’s equation, it is
categorized as an one-way relationship, namely the ‘leader and follower relationship’
between central banks. This kind of approach is similar to Ullrich (2003) which
verifies the asymmetric relationship between the US Fed and the ECB using VECM
type Taylor rule tests.
Table 1.2 illustrates the results of the probit model analyses which indicate each
home economy’s policy relationship with the US - the foreign economy. The for-
eign rate coefficients (β4) of eight countries’ models are significant. Seven of these
economies have one-way relationships: Australia, Chile, Czech, India, South Korea,
Malaysia, and the UK. Marginal probability effects (MPE)25 indicate that when the
interest rate of the US is raised by 30bp, the probability of the home rate increase
rises by 10-34% in these economies. However, the US monetary policy is not af-
fected by the short-term rate changes of these economies. Canada reveals a two-way
relationships, because the economies of the US and Canada are highly integrated.
Six other economies do not have any significant policy relationships with the US:
Denmark, Indonesia, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, and Thailand.
Regarding the relationships with the Eurozone, 11 home economies’ policy deci-
25Marginal probability effects (MPE) are calculated as
MPEj,i =
δPr
[
zt = s
j | X]
δxi
=
[
f
(
cj−1 −X ′tβ
)
− f
(
cj −X ′tβ
)]
βi,
where f (·) is the standard normal distribution function, following Boes and Winkelmann (2006).
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Table 1.2: The Policy Relationships with the US (Ordered probit model)
Foreign → Home Home → Foreign
Relationship Home Country β4 z-statistic MPE* β4 z-statistic MPE*
Australia 3.78 1.96 0.16 -1.24 -0.66 -
Chile 5.32 2.88 0.28 0.22 0.41 -
Czech 4.13 2.09 0.10 -1.23 -0.37 -
One-way (7) India 6.72 3.08 0.34 0.89 0.85 -
South Korea 4.50 2.27 0.14 4.13 1.68 -
Malaysia 7.17 2.13 0.14 8.33 1.91 -
UK 9.50 4.75 0.21 1.53 0.69 -
Two-way (1) Canada 5.45 2.79 0.21 6.46 2.35 0.23
Denmark 1.60 0.79 - 5.41 1.58 -
Indonesia 1.75 0.85 - 0.25 1.76 -
None (6) Norway 1.49 0.86 - -0.11 -0.06 -
South Africa 0.75 0.35 - -1.65 -1.01 -
Sweden 0.68 0.38 - -0.60 -0.27 -
Thailand 1.64 1.02 - 1.35 0.72 -
* Probability increase of raising policy rates when the other country raises its rate by 30bp
sions are affected by the foreign short-term rate changes (Table 1.3). Among them,
nine countries exhibit leader and follower relationships: Chile, Denmark, India, In-
donesia, Malaysia, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, and the UK. Marginal probability
effects (MPE) indicate that when the interest rate of the Eurozone is raised by 30bp,
the probability of the home rate increase rises by 5-67% in these economies. Norway
reveals the highest probability increase (67%). Australia and Canada have two-way
relationships, possibly because the ECB considers some of advanced central banks’
decisions. Czech, South Korea and Thailand do not have any relationships with the
Eurozone.
Combining these two test results, 12 out of 14 countries have leader and follower
relationships with at least one of the large foreign economies. Four of these countries
have the asymmetric relationships with both large economies: Chile, India, Malaysia,
and the UK. Only one country, Thailand, does not have any significant relationship
with the US and the Eurozone.
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Table 1.3: The Policy Relationships with the Eurozone (Ordered probit model)
Foreign → Home Home → Foreign
Relationship Home Country β4 z-statistic MPE* β4 z-statistic MPE*
Chile 6.68 2.28 0.35 -0.35 -0.64 -
Denmark 13.89 2.64 0.36 1.56 0.32 -
India 9.69 2.98 0.48 0.64 0.56 -
Indonesia 6.11 2.41 0.24 -0.11 -0.71 -
One-way (9) Malaysia 9.24 2.23 0.25 -1.19 -0.26 -
Norway 14.00 3.99 0.67 3.33 1.51 -
South Africa 7.28 2.56 0.05 1.66 1.01 -
Sweden 8.61 2.53 0.48 5.93 1.82 -
UK 16.14 3.05 0.40 -7.04 -1.78 -
Two-way (2) Australia 5.26 1.97 0.24 5.13 2.70 0.12
Canada 7.89 2.72 0.30 5.71 2.13 0.14
Czech 4.57 1.56 - -6.12 -1.56 -
None (3) South Korea 7.21 1.65 - -1.18 -0.39 -
Thailand 4.53 1.65 - 0.68 0.29 -
* Probability increase of raising policy rates when the other country raises its rate by 30bp
1.4.4 Vector Auto-regression (VAR) Model
Model Description
This section proposes an open economy structural VAR model to analyse the leader
and follower relationship between central banks. Consider an n-dimensional vector
Zt, which is approximated by a vector auto-regression of finite order p. The reduced
form equation is given by
Zt = B1Zt−1 +B2Zt−2 + · · ·+BpZt−p + ut (1.4.7)
where ut denotes the reduced form disturbance and E(utu
′
t) = Σ.
Regarding the choice of the vector Zt, there are some indicative examples in
literature (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1996; Kim,2000; Sousa and Zaghini,
2008). For instance, investigating the spill-over effect of a foreign monetary policy
shock, Kim (2001) establishes a vector Zt that consists of industrial production, the
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CPI, M2, commodity prices, the exchange rate, and the US federal fund rate (foreign
interest rate). Analysing the foreign liquidity effect on the Euro area economy, Sousa
and Zaghini (2008) use foreign liquidity, real GDP, the CPI, M3, the short-term
interest rate, and the exchange rate.
The structural VAR (SVAR) scheme indicates the relationship between the re-
duced form disturbance (ut) and the structural shock (εt) as follows:
A0ut = εt (1.4.8)
where E(εtε
′
t) = Λ which is diagonal. This means that the shocks are mutually
uncorrelated. The structural matrix A0 can be calculated by:
A0ΣA
′
0 = Λ. (1.4.9)
Identifying the structural VAR scheme, there can be some restrictions on con-
temporaneous transmission of shocks. One example is a recursive structure where
the structural matrix A0 is a lower triangular matrix, as proposed by Sims (1980).
Another method is to assume a non-recursive structure by imposing individual re-
strictions on the elements of the matrix A0. Many studies such as Kim (2001) and
Sousa and Zaghini (2008) use this method analysing international transmission of a
monetary policy shock; this chapter also adopts a non-recursive structure of VAR.
The impulse responses to an economic shock can be calculated by the structural
VAR scheme. Suppose there is a shock on the j-th element in the error term. In
the first period then the impulse response of Zt would be
Γj(1) = A
−1
0 ej (1.4.10)
where ej is an n-dimensional vector where the j-th element is unity and the other
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elements are all zero. In the second and third periods, the impulse responses become
Γj(2) = B1A
−1
0 ej (1.4.11)
Γj(3) = B1B1A
−1
0 ej +B2A
−1
0 ej. (1.4.12)
Identification
Since the monetary policy relationships across countries depend on the international
transmission channel of shocks, the identification of the structural matrix A0 is im-
portant in this analysis. The identification in this section is based on the model
framework in Section 1.3. This kind of model-based identification is similar to Gior-
dani (2004) which uses the simple New-Keynesian framework of Svensson (1997).
Sims and Zha (2006) also use a model-based identification method. In this section,
the central bank conducts the monetary policy following a Taylor-type rule instead
of maximizing domestic welfare. Also, various shocks are added to the equation
system in order to verify the structural matrix A0.
First, from the linearized equations (1.3.34) and (1.3.35), the dynamic IS equa-
tion can be rewritten by:
Yˆt+1 = Yˆt +
1
σ
[
Rˆt − ΠˆH,t+1
]
+
α
σ
(σ − 1) ∆̂St+1 + εy,t+1 (1.4.13)
where εy,t+1 denotes the home output shock at t + 1. From the definition of the
terms of trade St = EtP ∗F,t/PH,t,
∆̂St+1 = ∆̂E t+1 − ΠˆH,t+1 + t.i.p, (1.4.14)
where t.i.p represents terms independent of policy that includes the foreign goods
inflation rate in the foreign market (Πˆ∗F,t+1). Also, the uncovered interest rate parity
(UIP) holds as follows:
∆̂E t+1 = Rˆt − Rˆ∗t + εx,t+1 (1.4.15)
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where εx,t+1 denotes the UIP shock, which is also illustrated in Kollmann (2002).
From Yˆt = Y˜t + t.i.p
26, combining the equations (1.4.13), (1.4.14) and (1.4.15) leads
to the equation as below:
Y˜t+1 = Y˜t+Ω1
[
Rˆt − ΠˆH,t+1
]
−α
σ
(σ − 1) Rˆ∗t+εy,t+1+
α
σ
(σ − 1) εx,t+1+t.i.p. (1.4.16)
where Ω1 = [1 + α(σ − 1)]/σ.
The equation (1.3.42) indicates the New Keynesian Phillips curve which can be
rewritten by
ΠˆH,t+1 = −λ
β
Yˆt +
1
β
ΠˆH,t + εpi,t+1 (1.4.17)
where εpi,t+1 represents the inflation shock. Combining the equation (1.4.17) with
the equation (1.4.16) then yields
Y˜t+1 =
(
1 +
λ
β
Ω1
)
Y˜t − 1
β
Ω1ΠˆH,t + Ω1Rˆt − α
σ
(σ − 1) Rˆ∗t
− Ω1εpi,t+1 + εy,t+1 + α
σ
(σ − 1) εx,t+1 + t.i.p. (1.4.18)
Based on the home welfare approximation in the equation (1.3.49), the home
central bank’s Taylor-type policy rule includes the fluctuation of the terms of trade
(∆St). At time t+ 1, the home monetary policy rule is given by
Rˆt+1 = φpiΠˆH,t+1 + φyY˜t+1 + φs∆̂St+1 + εR,t+1 (1.4.19)
where εR,t+1 is the home policy rate shock at t+1. Combining the equation (1.4.19)
with the equations (1.4.15), (1.4.17) and (1.4.18) then yields
Rˆt+1 = Ω2Y˜t + Ω3ΠˆH,t + (φyΩ1 + φs) Rˆt − Ω4Rˆ∗t
+ (φpiβ − φyΩ1) εpi,t+1 + φyεy,t+1 + εR,t+1 + Ω4εx,t+1 + t.i.p (1.4.20)
26In the equation Yˆt = Y˜t + Yˆe,t, the flexible price output gap (Yˆe,t) is not controlled by the
policy. In this model, Yˆt = lnYt − lnY¯ , Yˆe,t = lnYe,t − lnY¯ , and Y˜t = lnYt − lnYe,t.
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where
Ω2 = φy
(
1 +
λ
β
Ω1
)
− φpiλ (1.4.21)
Ω3 = φpi − φy
β
Ω1 (1.4.22)
Ω4 = φy
α
σ
(σ − 1) + φs. (1.4.23)
Openness of the foreign economy is assumed to be very low, and thus the foreign
monetary policy rule does not include the terms of trade. At time t + 1, with the
foreign policy rate shock (ε∗R,t+1), the foreign policy rule is given by:
Rˆ∗t+1 = φ
∗
piΠˆ
∗
F,t+1 + φ
∗
yY˜
∗
t+1 + ε
∗
R,t+1. (1.4.24)
Plugging the foreign New Keynesian Phillips curve27 into the equation (1.4.24),
Rˆ∗t+1 =
1
β
Rˆ∗t + ε
∗
R,t+1 + t.i.p. (1.4.25)
where t.i.p includes the foreign output gap.
The equations based on the modified CGG (2002) model in this section are used
for deriving a structural VAR scheme (A0) - the relationship between structural
shocks and the reduced form disturbances. There are five structural shocks; home
output, inflation, the UIP, and the home and the foreign monetary policy shocks.
Ignoring all t.i.p, the five key equations (1.4.15), (1.4.17), (1.4.18), (1.4.20) and
(1.4.25) provide the following VAR representation:
Zt+1 = BZt +Dεt+1 (1.4.26)
27Πˆ∗F,t+1 = −λ
∗
β Y˜
∗
t +
1
β Πˆ
∗
F,t where λ
∗ = βκ∗ = β[σ − α(σ − 1) + φ]
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where Zt = [Rˆ
∗
t , ΠˆH,t, Y˜t, Rˆt, ∆̂E t]′ , εt+1 = [ε∗R,t+1, εpi,t+1, εy,t+1, εR,t+1, εx,t+1]′ , and
D =

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 −Ω1 1 0 ασ (σ − 1)
0 φpiβ − φyΩ1 φy 1 Ω4
0 0 0 0 1

. (1.4.27)
Given that E(εt+1ε
′
t+1) is a diagonal matrix, D corresponds to the inverse of the
structural matrix A0. With the zero-element restrictions, A0 has a form of
A0 =

a11 0 0 0 0
0 a22 0 0 0
0 a32 a33 0 a35
0 a42 a43 a44 a45
0 0 0 0 a55

. (1.4.28)
The first row in the matrix A0 implies the exogeneity of the foreign policy rate
shock. The second row means that, on the home inflation rate, there is no contem-
porary effect of the financial sector disturbances such as the exchange rate, home
and foreign interest rates shocks. Contrary to Sousa and Zaghini (2008), in this
model there is a contemporary effect of the nominal exchange rate change on the
output gap, which is represented by the third row. This is because the home output
gap is also a function of the terms of trade which is affected by the nominal exchange
rate changes. Following Sims and Zha (2006) and Kim (2001), it is assumed that
the monetary policy does not respond to the inflation rate and the output shocks
contemporaneously, since current period data are not observable (delayed informa-
tion). Thus, in the forth row, there is an additional constraint, α42 = α43 = 0. The
last row illustrates the exogenous UIP shock on the nominal exchange rate.
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Table 1.4: Short-term Rate Relationships with the US
US→ Others US→ Others
Countries Others →US Result Countries Others →US Result
Australia × × - Malaysia O × One-way
Canada O × One-way Norway O × One-way
Chile × × - South Africa × × -
Czech O × One-way South Korea O × One-way
Denmark O × One-way Sweden × × -
India O × One-way Thailand O × One-way
Indonesia × × - UK O × One-way
Note: Within 6 months, movements in the same direction at 5% level of significance
Results of the Impulse Response Analysis
In this SVAR analysis, the relationships between one of the large economies (the US
and the Eurozone) and 14 other economies are investigated. Following the equation
(1.4.26), the vector Z consists of five elements: (i) the foreign gross short-term rate
(R∗), (ii) the home PPI inflation rate (ΠH)28, (iii) home industrial production (Y ),
(iv) the home gross short-term rate (R) and (v) the nominal exchange rate change
(∆E). In order to avoid the unit root problem, difference variables are used for the
short-term rate and the output gap. The lag (p) of each country’s autoregressive
equation is determined based on Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC).
Table 1.4 illustrates the relationships between 14 other economies’ short-term
interest rates and the US rate. When there is a positive one-standard deviation
(SD) shock on the US short-term rate, in 9 countries, short-term rates rise within
6 months at the 5 percent level of significance. On the other hand, the US interest
rate does not respond to other countries’ shocks. Thus, 9 out of 14 countries have
one-way (leader and follower) relationships with the US policy changes: Canada,
Czech, Denmark, Inida, Malaysia, Norway, South Korea, Thailand, and the UK.
28For Australia, Chile, India and South Africa, the CPI data are used. The PPI data of Chile
are from Jan 2009 and the South African data are from Jan 2012. Australia provides only the
quarterly PPI data.
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Table 1.5: Short-term Rate Relationships with the Eurozone (EZ)
EZ→ Others EZ→ Others
Countries Others →EZ Result Countries Others →EZ Result
Australia O O Two-way Malaysia O × One-way
Canada O O Two -way Norway O O Two -way
Chile O × One-way South Africa O × One-way
Czech O × One-way South Korea O × One-way
Denmark O × One-way Sweden O O Two -way
India O × - Thailand O × One-way
Indonesia × × - UK × × -
Note: Within 6 months, movements in the same direction at 5% level of significance
The other five economies do not exhibit any significant policy relationships with
the US: Australia, Chile, Indonesia, South Africa, and Sweden. Figure 1.2 presents
individual impulse responses.
When the Eurozone short-term rate rises by one SD, 12 other economies’ short-
term rates significantly respond to the shock (Table 1.5). Among them, 8 coun-
tries have one-way relationships with the Eurozone: Chile, Czech, Denmark, India,
Malaysia, South Africa, South Korea and Thailand. Compared to the relationships
with the US Fed, the ECB considers more advanced central banks’ policy decisions:
Australia, Canada, Norway and Sweden. Indonesia and the UK do not exhibit any
relationship. It is noteworthy that the UK short-term rate is affected by the US
rate, but not by the Eurozone rate. Figure 1.3 illustrates the individual response of
each country.
Combining the results of the VAR analyses suggests that 11 out of 14 coun-
tries have leader and follower relationships with at least one of the large economies
- with respect to the short-term interest rate. Among these economies, six coun-
tries have one-way relationships with both large economies: Czech, Denmark, India,
Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand. Only one country, Indonesia, does not have
any relationship with them.
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Figure 1.2: Impulse Responses to Foreign and Home Policy Shocks with the US
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Figure 1.3: Impulse Responses to Foreign and Home Policy Shocks with the Eurozone
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1.5 Conclusion
Many central banks’ policy decisions are affected by the policy changes of major
central banks, such as the US Fed and the ECB. In many cases, the relationships
between central banks look asymmetric, which can be described as the leader and
follower relationship. This chapter presents a simple model that can explain the
reason for the asymmetric monetary policy relationships and provides supporting
empirical evidence.
The theoretical analysis based on a two-country model suggests that the home
economy’s welfare is a function of international variables, such as the foreign output
gap and the terms of trade. Therefore, optimal inflation and the output gap are
influenced by these external variables. Moreover, the home policy rate is affected
by the foreign policy rate, and the foreign policy effects become stronger as home
openness is greater. As a consequence, there can be an asymmetric policy rate
relationship between two countries when the degrees of openness are significantly
different from each other.
The empirical study uncovers the asymmetric policy rate relationships based
on data analyses. In the probit model analyses, 12 out of 14 economies exhibit
leader and follower relationships with at least one of the US and the Eurozone. The
VAR analyses indicate that 11 countries have one-way policy relationships with the
US or/and the Eurozone. Combining the results of these two kinds of tests, nine
economies have asymmetric relationships with at least one of the large economies in
both the probit and the VAR models analyses.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Derivation of the Welfare Function
Home Economy’s Welfare
DefiningXe,t as the flexible price equilibrium value ofXt, X˜t denotes the log deviation from
the flexible price equilibrium (X˜t = lnXt − lnXe,t). Also, Xˆt denotes the log deviation of
the variable Xt from the steady state X¯t (Xˆt = lnXt− lnX¯). The deviation of the flexible
price equilibrium from the steady state is then Xˆe,t = lnXe,t − lnX¯.
From the second-order approximation, the utility of consumption U(Ct) around the
flexible price equilibrium (Ce,t) can be approximated by
U(Ct) = U(Ce,t) + U
′(Ce,t)(Ct − Ce,t) + 1
2
U ′′(Ce,t)(Ct − Ce,t)2 + o
(‖a‖3) . (1.A.1)
Using the equation (1.3.46), then (1.A.1) can be rewritten by
U(Ct) = U(Ce,t) + U
′(Ce,t)Ce,t
[
C˜t +
1
2
(1− σ)C˜2t
]
+ o
(‖a‖3) . (1.A.2)
Contrary to Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2002), the foreign output is taken into account
while approximating welfare. From the equation (1.3.28) C˜t = (1 − α)Y˜t + αY˜ ∗t , and
accordingly (1.A.2) can be rewritten by
U(Ct) = U(Ce,t) + U
′(Ce,t)Ce,tΨ
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t
)
+ U(Ce,t) + o
(‖a‖3) (1.A.3)
where
Ψ
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t
)
= (1− α)Y˜t + αY˜ ∗t +
1
2
(1− σ)
[
(1− α)2Y˜t + 2α(1− α)Y˜tY˜ ∗t + α2Y˜ ∗2t
]
.
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Also, the linearization of U ′(Ce,t)Ce,t around the steady state suggests
U ′(Ce,t)Ce,t = U ′(C¯)C¯ +
[
U ′′(C¯)C¯ + U ′(C¯)
]
C¯
(
Ce,t − C¯
C¯
)
+ o
(‖a‖3)
= U ′(C¯)C¯
[
1 + (1− σ)Cˆe,t
]
+ o
(‖a‖3) .
At the flexible price equilibrium, the real marginal cost (MCe,t) is 1/(1 + µ
P ) which
is a constant. Therefore, the equation (1.3.14) leads to Aˆe,t = σCˆe,t + φNˆe,t +αSˆe,t. Also,
the equations (1.3.12) and (1.3.26) imiply Yˆe,t = Aˆe,t + Nˆe,t = Cˆe,t + αSˆe,t. From these,
the following equation holds:
(1− σ)Cˆe,t = (1 + φ)Nˆe,t (1.A.4)
and U ′(Ce,t)Ce,t can be re-approximated as
U ′(Ce,t)Ce,t = U ′(C¯)C¯
[
1 + (1 + φ)Nˆe,t
]
+ o
(‖a‖3) . (1.A.5)
Plugging (1.A.5) into (1.A.3) then yields
U(Ct) = U
′(C¯)C¯
[
1 + (1 + φ)Nˆe,t
]
Ψ
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t
)
+ t.i.p+ o
(‖a‖3) . (1.A.6)
Following this, the approximation of U(Ct) can be derived as follows:
U(Ct) = (1−α)U ′(C¯)C¯
[
Y˜t +
1
2
(1− σ)(1− α)Y˜ 2t + (1 + φ)N˜e,tY˜t −
1
2
Γ
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t , Cˆe,t
)]
+t.i.p+o
(‖a‖3)
(1.A.7)
where
Γ
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t , Cˆe,t
)
=
(
α
1− α
)
Y˜ ∗t
{
(σ − 1)
[
αY˜ ∗t + 2
(
(1− α)Y˜t + C˜e,t
)]
− 2
}
. (1.A.8)
In a similar way, the disutility of the labour supply (V (Nt)) can be approximated
around the flexible price equilibrium by
V (Nt) = V (Ne,t) + V
′(Ne,t)Ne,t
[
N˜t +
1
2
(1 + φ)N˜2t
]
+ o
(‖a‖3) , (1.A.9)
and V ′(Ne,t)Ne,t can be linearized as
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V ′(Ne,t)Ne,t = V (N¯)N¯ + V ′(N¯)N¯
[
1 + (1 + φ)Nˆe,t
]
+ o
(‖a‖3) . (1.A.10)
Plugging (1.A.10) into (1.A.9) then yields
V (Nt) = V
′(N¯)N¯
[
1 + (1 + φ)Nˆe,t
] [
N˜t +
1
2
(1 + φ)N˜2t
]
+ t.i.p+ o
(‖a‖3)
= V ′(N¯)N¯
[
N˜t +
1
2
(1 + φ)N˜2t + (1 + φ)Nˆe,tN˜t
]
+ t.i.p+ o
(‖a‖3) .
From the equation (1.3.30), N˜t = Y˜t + vt where vt = lnVt. This implies Nˆe,tN˜t =
Nˆe,tY˜t − N˜e,tvt = Nˆe,tY˜t + o
(‖a‖3). From this, the approximated labour disutility can be
rewritten by:
V (Nt) = V
′(N¯)N¯
[(
Y˜t + vt
)
+
1
2
(1 + φ)Y˜ 2t + (1 + φ)Nˆe,tY˜t
]
+ t.i.p+ o
(‖a‖3) . (1.A.11)
Lemma 1.A.1. Define ρt (=
∫ 1
0 (lnPH,t(i)− lnPH,t)2 di) as the cross-sectional dispersion
of prices. Up to a second-order approximation, then vt w ε2ρt.
Proof. See the appendix 1.A.2.
From the equation (1.3.43) and the Lemma 1.A.1, the equation (1.A.11) implies
V (Nt) = (1− α)U ′(C¯)C¯
[
Y˜t +
ε
2
ρt +
(1 + φ)
2
Y˜ 2t + (1 + φ)Nˆe,tY˜t
]
+ t.i.p+ o
(‖a‖3) .
(1.A.12)
Subtracting (1.A.12) from (1.A.7) then yields
U(Ct)− V (Nt)
U(C¯)C¯
= −(1− α)
[
ε
2
ρt +
1
2
κY˜ 2t +
1
2
Γ
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t , Cˆe,t
)]
. (1.A.13)
where κ = (1 + φ) + (σ − 1)(1− α) > 0.
Defining WHτ as the approximated value of home welfare
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τ
(
U(Ct)−V (Nt)
U(C¯)C¯
)
,
WHτ = −(1− α)
Λ
2
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τ
{
δρt + ψY˜
2
t +
ψ
κ
Γ
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t , Cˆe,t
)}
(1.A.14)
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where δ = (1− θ)(1− βθ)/θ, Λ = ε/δ and ψ = δκ/ε.
Lemma 1.A.2. Define ρt =
∫ 1
0 (lnPH,t(i)− lnPH,t)2 di. Then, δ
∞∑
t=0
βtρt =
∞∑
t=0
βtΠˆ2H,t
where δ = (1− θ)(1− βθ)/θ.
Proof. See the appendix 1.A.2.
From the Lemma 1.A.2, the welfare function (1.A.14) can be rewritten by
WHτ = −(1− α)
Λ
2
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τ
{
Πˆ2H,t + ψY˜
2
t +
ψ
κ
Γ
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t , Cˆe,t
)}
.
Foreign Economy’s Welfare
From the equations (1.3.28) and (1.A.2), C˜∗t = (1− α)Y˜t + αY˜ ∗t and
U(C∗t ) = U(C
∗
e,t) + U
′(C∗e,t)C
∗
e,tΨ
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t
)
+ U(C∗e,t) + o
(‖a‖3) . (1.A.15)
Also, as in the home economy case,
U ′(C∗e,t)C
∗
e,t = U
′(C¯∗)C¯∗
[
1 + (1 + φ)Nˆ∗e,t
]
+ o
(‖a‖3) . (1.A.16)
Plugging (1.A.16) into (1.A.15) then yields
U(C∗t ) = U
′(C¯∗)C¯∗
[
1 + (1 + φ)Nˆ∗e,t
]
Ψ
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t
)
+ t.i.p+ o
(‖a‖3) . (1.A.17)
The equation (1.A.17) can be rewritten by:
U(C∗t ) = αU
′(C¯∗)C¯∗
[
Y˜ ∗t +
1
2
(1− σ)αY˜ ∗2t + (1 + φ)N˜∗e,tY˜ ∗t −
1
2
Γ∗
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t , Cˆ
∗
e,t
)]
+t.i.p+o
(‖a‖3)
(1.A.18)
where
Γ∗
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t , Cˆe,t
)
=
(
1− α
α
)
Y˜t
{
(σ − 1)
[
(1− α)Y˜t + 2
(
αY˜ ∗t + C˜
∗
e,t
)]
− 2
}
. (1.A.19)
Similarly, around the flexible price equilibrium the disutility of the labour supply
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(V (N∗t ) is approximated by
V (N∗t ) = V
′(N¯∗)N¯∗
[
N˜∗t +
1
2
(1 + φ)N˜∗2t + (1 + φ)Nˆ
∗
e,tN˜
∗
t
]
+ t.i.p+ o
(‖a‖3) (1.A.20)
and from N˜∗t = Y˜ ∗t + v∗t where v∗t = lnV ∗t and V ∗t =
∫ 1
0
(
P ∗F,t(i)
P ∗F,t
)−ε
di,
V (N∗t ) = V
′(N¯∗)N¯∗
[(
Y˜ ∗t + v
∗
t
)
+
1
2
(1 + φ)Y˜ ∗2t + (1 + φ)Nˆ
∗
e,tY˜
∗
t
]
+ t.i.p+ o
(‖a‖3) .
(1.A.21)
Defining ρ∗t =
∫ 1
0
(
lnP ∗F,t(i)− lnP ∗F,t
)2
di, the Lemma 1.A.1 of the foreign economy implies
v∗t w ε2ρ∗t . The equation (1.A.21) can be rewritten by:
V (N∗t ) = U
′(C¯∗)C¯∗
[
Y˜ ∗t +
ε
2
ρ∗t +
(1 + φ)
2
Y˜ ∗2t + (1 + φ)Nˆ
∗
e,tY˜
∗
t
]
+ t.i.p+ o
(‖a‖3) .
(1.A.22)
Subtracting (1.A.22) from (1.A.18) then yields,
U(C∗t )− V (N∗t )
U(C¯∗)C¯∗
= −α
[
ε
2
ρ∗t +
1
2
κ∗Y˜ ∗2t +
1
2
Γ∗
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t , Cˆ
∗
e,t
)]
, (1.A.23)
where κ∗ = (1 + φ) + (σ − 1)α > 0.
Defining WFτ as the approximated value of foreign welfare
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τ
(
U(C∗t )−V (N∗t )
U(C¯∗)C¯∗
)
,
WFτ = −α
Λ
2
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τ
{
δρ∗t + ψ
∗Y˜ ∗2t +
ψ∗
κ∗
Γ∗
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t , Cˆ
∗
e,t
)}
(1.A.24)
where δ = (1 − θ)(1 − βθ)/θ, Λ = ε/δ and ψ∗ = δκ∗/ε. From the lemma 1.A.2, then the
welfare function of the foreign economy can be illustrated as
WFτ = −α
Λ
2
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τ
{
Πˆ∗2F,t + ψ
∗Y˜ ∗2t +
ψ∗
κ∗
Γ∗
(
Y˜t, Y˜
∗
t , Cˆ
∗
e,t
)}
. (1.A.25)
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1.A.2 Proofs of Lemma 1.A.1 and Lemma 1.A.2
Lemma 1.A.1
The proof of the Lemma 1.A.1 follows Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005). Defining
ˆˆ
PH,t(i) =
lnPH,t(i)− lnPH,t,
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)1−ε
= exp
[
(1− ε) ˆˆPH,t(i)
]
= 1 + (1− ε) ˆˆPH,t(i) + (1− ε)
2
2
ˆˆ
PH,t(i)
2 + o
(‖a‖3) .
Also, from the definition of PH,t, 1 =
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)1−ε
di. Therefore,
∫ 1
0
ˆˆ
PH,t(i)di =
ε− 1
2
∫ 1
0
ˆˆ
P 2H,tdi. (1.A.26)
Furthermore, by a second-order approximation,
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−ε
= 1− ε ˆˆPH,t(i) + ε
2
2
ˆˆ
PH,t(i)
2 + o
(‖a‖3) (1.A.27)
and combining (1.A.26) and (1.A.27) yields
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−ε
di = 1− ε(ε− 1)
2
∫ 1
0
Pˆ 2H,tdi+
ε2
2
∫ 1
0
ˆˆ
PH,t(i)
2di+ o
(‖a‖3)
= 1 +
ε
2
∫ 1
0
ˆˆ
PH,t(i)
2di.
From this, the followign equation holds:
ln
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−ε
di = vt w
ε
2
∫ 1
0
(lnPH,t(i)− lnPH,t)2 di. (1.A.28)
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Lemma 1.A.2
The proof of the Lemma 1.A.2 follows Woodford (2001). From Calvo (1983) pricing, with
an optimal price P 0H,t
lnΠH,t = lnPH,t − lnPH,t−1 = (1− θ)
(
lnP 0H,t − lnPH,t−1
)
(1.A.29)
and with a zero steady state inflation rate lnΠH,t = ΠˆH,t.
Defining ρt =
∫ 1
0 (lnPH,t(i)− lnPH,t)2 di,
ρt = vari (lnPH,t(i)− lnPH,t) = vari (lnPH,t(i)− lnPH,t−1) (1.A.30)
and ρt can be rewritten by
ρt = Ei
[
(lnPH,t(i)− lnPH,t−1)2
]
− [Ei (lnPH,t(i)− lnPH,t−1)]2
= θEi (lnPH,t−1(i)− lnPH,t−1)2 + (1− θ)
(
lnP 0H,t − lnPH,t−1
)2 − (lnPH,t − lnPH,t−1)2 .
From (1.A.29),
ρt = θρt−1 +
θ
1− θ Πˆ
2
H,t (1.A.31)
and solving backward yields
ρt = θ
tρ0 +
θ
1− θ
t∑
s=0
θt−sΠˆ2H,s. (1.A.32)
Since
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
t∑
s=0
θt−sΠˆ2H,s
)
=
(
Πˆ2H,0 + βθΠˆ
2
H,0 + · · ·
)
+ β
(
Πˆ2H,1 + βθΠˆ
2
H,1 + · · ·
)
+ · · ·
=
1
1− βθ
∞∑
t=0
βtΠˆ2H,t,
ignoring ρ0, eventually the following equation holds:
∞∑
t=0
βtρt =
θ
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
∞∑
t=0
βtΠˆ2H,t =
1
δ
∞∑
t=0
βtΠˆ2H,t. (1.A.33)
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1.A.3 Data Sources, Test Results and Lag Selection
Table 1.6: Datastream Codes for VAR and Probit Model Analyses
Country CPI PPI IP Short rate
Australia AUCCPIP%E - AUCIND..G S32523
Canada CNCCPIP%E CNPROPRCF CNIPTOT.D CNI60B..
China CHCCPIP%E - - CHYINTER
Chile CLCCPIP%E - CLIPMAN.H CLI60...
Czech CZCCPIP%E CZPROPRCF CZCIND..G CZINTER3
Denmark DKCCPIP%E DKPROPRCF DKCIND..G DKESSFON
India INCCPIP%E - INCIND..G INGBILL
Indonesia IDCCPIP%E IDPROPRCF IDCIND..G IDINTER3
South Korea KOCCPIP%E KOPROPRCF KOCIND..G KODPNNCD
Malaysia MYCCPIP%E MYPROPRCF MYIPTOT.H MYINTER3
New Zealand NZCCPIP%E - - NZINTER3
Norway NWCCPIP%E NWPROPRCF NWCIND..G NWINTER3
South Africa SACCPIP%E - SACIND..G SAMIR076R
Sweden SDCCPIP%E SDPROPRCF SDCIND..G SDINTER3
Thailand THCCPIP%E THPROPRCF THCIND..G THIBK30D
UK UKCCPIP%E UKPROPRCF UKCIND..G UKAAMIJ.R
US USCCPIP%E USPROPRCE USCIND..G USGBILL3
EU EMEBCPALE EKPROPRCF EKIPTOT.G EMINTER3
Country Policy rate ExR(USD) ExR(Euro)
Australia AUPRATE. AUXRUSD. BDAUDEURM
Canada CNPRATE. CNXRUSD. BDCADEURN
China CHPRATE. - -
Chile CLPRATE. CLXRUSD. CLXREUR.
Czech CZPRATE. CZXRUSD. CZXREUR.
Denmark DKPRATE. DKXRUSD. DKXREUR.
India INPRATE. INXRUSD. INXREUR.
Indonesia IDPRATE. INXRUSD. BDIDREURC
South Korea KOPRATE. KOXRUSD. BDKRWEURC
Malaysia MYPRATE. MYXRUSD. BDMYREURC
New Zealand NZPRATE. - -
Norway NWPRATE. NWXRUSD. BDNOKEURC
South Africa SAPRATE. SAXRUSD. BDZAREURA
Sweden SDPRATE. SDXRUSD. BDSEKEURC
Thailand THPRATE. THXRUSD. BDTHBEURC
UK UKPRATE. UKXRUSD. S96458
US USPRATE. - -
EU BDSU0200A - -
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Table 1.7: Unit Root Test Results: t-statistics of ADF Tests
Country ∆R IP ∆ED ∆EE ΠCP ΠPP
Australia -10.06 -6.22 -9.12 -13.08 -3.93 -
Canada -4.75 -4.27 -9.66 -11.58 -12.44 -9.89
Chile -4.82 -4.03 -10.66 -11.12 -4.99 -
Czech -7.81 -2.73 -10.55 -10.99 -6.98 -8.26
Denmark -5.64 -3.23 -10.14 -12.28 -12.06 -8.56
India -10.48 -3.54 -9.91 -9.91 -11.03 -
Indonesia -14.78 -12.42 -10.20 -14.23 -11.08 -10.17
Korea -8.21 -4.49 -14.19 -13.93 -11.24 -7.13
Malaysia -6.61 -4.41 -12.29 -12.99 -9.49 -6.24
Norway -5.96 -9.56 -13.23 -14.10 -9.81 -13.13
South Africa -8.07 -3.85 -9.82 -14.35 -3.12 -
Sweden -5.61 -3.13 -12.75 -14.59 -10.94 -12.76
Thailand -6.81 -5.32 -12.02 -13.99 -10.09 -8.90
UK -8.15 -4.18 -10.10 -11.36 -10.02 -7.34
US -2.55 -4.56 - - -9.35 -9.41
Eurozone (EZ) -5.74 -4.27 - - -9.67 -5.30
* 10% significance level is 2.57
Table 1.8: Time Lag (p) Selection at the SVAR Analysis: Based on AIC
Model p Model p Model p Model p
US → Australia 4 Australia →US 2 EZ → Australia 3 Australia →EZ 2
US → Canada 2 Canada→US 4 EZ → Canada 1 Canada→EZ 2
US → Chile 2 Chile→US 5 EZ → Chile 3 Chile→EZ 2
US → Czech 2 Czech→US 2 EZ → Czech 1 Czech→EZ 4
US → Denmark 3 Denmark→US 5 EZ → Denmark 3 Denmark→EZ 2
US → India 2 India→US 3 EZ → India 2 India→EZ 2
US → Indonesia 3 Indonesia→US 5 EZ → Indonesia 3 Indonesia→EZ 3
US → Korea 4 Korea→US 4 EZ → Korea 2 Korea→EZ 4
US → Malaysia 2 Malaysia→US 4 EZ → Malaysia 2 Malaysia→EZ 2
US → Norway 2 Norway→US 4 EZ → Norway 2 Norway→EZ 2
US → South Africa 2 South Africa→US 5 EZ → South Africa 2 South Africa→EZ 4
US → Sweden 3 Sweden→US 4 EZ → Sweden 3 Sweden→EZ 3
US → Thailand 2 Thailand→US 3 EZ → Thailand 1 Thailand→EZ 1
US → UK 2 UK→US 5 EZ → UK 1 UK→EZ 2
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1.A.4 Seasonal Adjustment using X-12 ARIMA
In the X-12 ARIMA method, the Regression-ARIMA model takes the form of yt =∑
i
βixi,t+zt. yt is an initially adjusted time series
29 and xi,t is a regressor, such as calendar
effects and additive outliers. βi is the coefficient for xi,t, and zt follows an ARIMA process
as below:
φ(B)Φ(Bs)(1−B)d(1−Bs)Dzt = θ(B)Θ(Bs)at (1.A.34)
where B is a backshift operator (Bzt = zt−1), and s is the seasonal period which is 4
for quarterly data in this study. φ(B) is the nonseasonal autoregressive (AR) operator
(φ(B) = (1−φ1B−· · ·−φpBp)), and Φ(Bs) is the seasonal operator (Φ(Bs) = (1−Φ1Bs−
· · ·−ΦPBsP )). Also, θ(B) (= (1−θ1B−· · ·−θqBq)) and Θ(Bs) (= (1−Θ1B−· · ·−ΘQBsQ))
are nonseasonal and seasonal moving average (MA) operators, respectively. d and D
represent the nonseasonal and the seasonal differencing orders. at denotes a white noise
term. The optimal (p, d, q)(P,D,Q) for each country’s data is then selected according to
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) statistic (Table 1.9).
X-12 ARIMA then performs seasonal adjustment using the X-11 method which de-
composes the adjusted original data (Yt) into a trend (Tt), a seasonal component (St), and
an irregular component (It). Since the original data are in a percentage deviation form,
additive decompositions are used in this study30, which implies Yt = Tt + St + It. The
initial estimate of the trend (T
(1)
t ) can be estimated by a moving average (MA) method,
and the detrended time series (SI
(1)
t ) can be obtained by SI
(1)
t = Yt − T (1)t . The initial
seasonal MA series of the detrended data can be then obtained, which is denoted by Sˆ
(1)
t
31.
Defining the initial seasonal component S
(1)
t = Sˆt−(MA of Sˆt), the preliminary seasonally
adjusted series (A
(1)
t ) can be obtained from A
(1)
t = Yt−S(1)t . After this initial estimation,
29yt = ln(Yt/Dt) where Yt is the original data and Dt is an optional adjustment term for known
external effects.
30For series of positive values such as sales and exports, a multiplicative decomposition is used,
where the form is Yt = TtStIt.
31Following Findley, et. al. (1998), for the quarterly data of this study the seasonal (centered)
MA of SI
(1)
t can be obtained by
Sˆ
(1)
t =
1
9SI
(1)
t−8 +
2
9SI
(1)
t−4 +
3
9SI
(1)
t +
2
9SI
(1)
t+4 +
1
9SI
(1)
t+8.
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Table 1.9: Identification of ARIMA Model Orders
(PPI)
Country (p,d,q)(P ,D,Q) Country (p,d,q)(P ,D,Q)
Canada (0 1 1)(0 1 1) Norway (2 1 2)(0 1 1)
Czech (2 1 0)(0 1 1) South Korea (2 1 0)(0 1 1)
Denmark (2 1 0)(0 1 1) Sweden (0 1 1)(0 1 1)
Indonesia (0 1 1)(0 1 1) Thailand (2 1 2)(0 1 1)
Malaysia (2 1 0)(0 1 1) UK (2 1 0)(0 1 1)
* Note: CPI data are used for Australia, Chile, India, and South Africa
(IP)
Country (p,d,q)(P ,D,Q) Country (p,d,q)(P ,D,Q)
Chile (2 1 0)(0 1 1) Malaysia (2 1 2)(0 1 1)
* Note: Only two countries data are not seasonally adjusted for industrial production.
the process above is repeated.
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1.A.5 Two-step Procedures of Ordered Probit Analyses
In the equations (1.4.5) and (1.4.6), central banks respond to the expected current period
values of the output gap and domestic inflation. Since the expected values are different
from realized ones, in the probit model analysis, two-stage methods are used: 1) con-
structing the expected values of the output gap and inflation (CPI) under the rational
expectations (RE) hypothesis32, and 2) estimating the probit model. This is similar to
the two-stage estimation in McCallum (1976) and Fair (1993), except that in the second
stage the ordered probit model is estimated. Since the second step is illustrated in Section
1.4.3, in this appendix the RE models estimation and RE test results are presented.
The central bank forms its expectation based on an available information set (Ωt). In
this model, the information set available at time t is assumed to consist of the t − 1 and
t− 2 data of CPI inflation (piCP ), PPI inflation (piPP ), and the output gap, and the t− 1
data of the nominal exchange rate change (∆E). The model for expectations establishment
is given by:
xt = γ0 + γ1pi
CP
t−1 + γ2pi
CP
t−2 + γ3Y˜t−1 + γ4Y˜t−2
+γ5pi
PP
t−1 + γ6pi
PP
t−2 + γ7∆EUSDt−1 + γ8∆EEurot−1 + νt (1.A.35)
where xt is the realized value of either pi
CP
t or Y˜t, and νt is a prediction error. Using only
the variables with significant coefficients, expectations are constructed (xˆt = x
e
t ), where
xet denotes the predicted value of the output gap or inflation. The estimation results are
illustrated by Table 1.10.
Next, RE tests are conducted. Following Lovell (1986), in this appendix, the tests
check whether all the variables in the information set are uncorrelated with the forecast
error. In the test, the forecast errors (xt − xet ) are regressed on the entire information
set. For strong rationality, all the coefficients should not differ significantly from zero, and
Table 1.11 indicates that RE assumptions are satisfied, where H0 : γ0 = 0, · · · , γ8 = 0.
32In this chapter, for rationality, it is required that the prediction error must be uncorrelated
with the entire set of information that is available to the forecaster at the time the prediction is
made (Lovell, 1986, p.113).
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Table 1.10: Rational Expectation Estimation Results: significant coefficients
(Inflation) c piCPt−1 pi
CP
t−2 Y˜t−1 Y˜t−2 pi
PP
t−1 pi
CP
t−2 EUSDt−1 EEurot−1
US 0.135 0.371 -0.243 0.073
EZ 0.102 0.305 0.009
Australia 0.060 0.721 -0.011
Canada 0.164 -0.166 0.138 -0.031
Chile 0.150 0.446 0.017
Czech 0.104 0.175 0.184
Denmark 0.125 0.074 0.066 0.415
India 0.473 0.172
Indonesia 0.457 0.238
S.Korea 0.237 -0.213 0.199
Malaysia 0.128 0.259 0.016 0.082
Norway 0.132 0.350 -0.206
S.Africa 0.254 0.444 0.021 0.010
Sweden 0.080 0.197 0.009 -0.016
Thailand 0.136 0.207 0.062
UK 0.133 0.342
(Output gap) c piCPt−1 pi
CP
t−2 Y˜t−1 Y˜t−2 pi
PP
t−1 pi
CP
t−2 EUSDt−1 EEurot−1
US -0.112 0.505 1.093 -0.154
EZ -0.253 1.613 0.915
Australia -0.070 0.312 1.618 -0.728
Canada 0.903 0.282
Chile 1.585 0.178 0.253 -1.355 -0.158
Czech 0.630 0.235 0.842
Denmark 0.495 0.240
India 0.409 0.311
Indonesia 0.500 -1.403 0.162 0.434
S.Korea -1.231 0.734 1.299 -0.079
Malaysia 0.387 0.195 0.234 0.456
Norway 0.354
S.Africa 0.588 0.224
Sweden -0.492 2.364 2.276 0.250 0.392
Thailand -0.651 2.174 0.682 0.489 -0.343
UK 0.700 0.160 -0.064
Note: Coefficients that are significant at the 10 percent level
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Table 1.11: Rational Expectation Test Results: t-values of coefficients
(Inflation) c piCPt−1 pi
CP
t−2 Y˜t−1 Y˜t−2 pi
PP
t−1 pi
CP
t−2 EUSDt−1 EEurot−1
US 0.641 0.064 -1.289 0.817 -0.519 -0.247 1.428 - -
EZ 0.195 -1.174 0.295 0.669 -1.018 1.538 -0.122 - -
Australia 0.568 1.285 -1.770 -0.197 0.337 - - -0.882 1.140
Canada 0.917 -1.621 -0.198 1.374 -0.969 0.679 -0.302 -0.777 0.708
Chile 0.476 -0.057 -1.106 0.599 0.140 - - 0.329 1.411
Czech 0.836 -1.149 -1.011 0.814 0.483 0.995 0.228 0.009 -0.534
Denmark -0.611 0.426 0.899 1.281 -1.034 -0.309 -0.458 -0.907 0.023
India 1.477 -0.711 -0.117 -1.405 0.858 - - -1.777 1.794
Indonesia 0.260 -0.249 -1.172 -0.245 0.505 0.606 0.886 1.297 -0.803
S.Korea -0.391 0.881 -0.390 -0.140 -0.079 -0.669 0.803 1.215 -0.284
Malaysia 0.433 0.203 -1.572 -0.612 0.510 -0.028 1.282 0.508 0.025
Norway -0.133 -0.888 0.137 0.248 0.815 1.910 0.561 -1.283 0.287
S.Africa -0.580 -0.689 1.437 -0.488 0.406 - - -0.104 0.239
Sweden -0.315 -0.225 0.689 -0.088 -0.112 0.770 -0.369 -0.164 0.282
Thailand -0.216 -0.174 0.797 -0.055 0.616 -0.326 0.096 0.828 1.054
UK -0.406 0.166 0.306 0.187 -0.542 -0.831 1.090 -1.155 -0.389
(Output gap) c piCPt−1 pi
CP
t−2 Y˜t−1 Y˜t−2 pi
PP
t−1 pi
CP
t−2 EUSDt−1 EEurot−1
US 0.327 -1.609 0.672 -0.539 0.520 1.884 -0.086 - -
EZ 0.821 -1.320 -0.883 -0.783 0.471 1.788 1.076 - -
Australia 0.144 0.062 -0.218 -0.121 0.223 - - -1.666 0.868
Canada -0.351 -0.013 -0.872 0.808 -0.832 -0.127 1.378 -1.334 0.565
Chile -1.006 0.114 0.686 -0.213 -0.221 - - 0.264 0.147
Czech -1.310 -0.365 1.139 0.001 -0.218 0.163 0.385 0.260 0.447
Denmark -1.735 1.145 0.886 -0.342 0.133 0.913 0.755 0.553 -0.604
India -0.794 1.188 -0.046 -0.172 0.233 - - -0.888 1.008
Indonesia 0.285 -0.680 0.165 0.578 -0.319 -0.197 0.172 0.027 0.689
S.Korea 0.516 -0.483 -0.164 0.238 -0.481 -0.211 0.730 -0.510 0.849
Malaysia -1.274 0.611 0.934 -0.314 -0.095 0.081 -0.398 0.110 -1.265
Norway 0.189 -1.107 0.345 0.449 -0.528 0.971 -0.188 0.946 -1.556
S.Africa -1.581 1.470 0.329 -0.090 -0.451 - - -0.425 1.462
Sweden 0.031 -0.294 0.080 -0.011 0.061 0.407 -0.131 0.129 -1.154
Thailand -0.226 -0.186 0.429 0.834 -1.250 0.743 -0.499 0.260 -1.228
UK -0.621 0.214 -0.510 -0.398 -0.027 0.836 0.746 0.434 -0.769
Chapter 2
Globalization and the
Leader-Follower Relationship
between Monetary Policies
2.1 Introduction
The monetary policy of the US Federal Reserve (Fed) has widespread international
effects on the monetary policy decisions of other central banks. Since the beginning
of the financial crisis in the late 2000s, many central banks sequentially lowered
interest rates following the policy changes of the US. The initial policy rate cut of
the US was in 2007:Q3. Canada and the UK then followed it in the next quarter.
In 2008:Q3, Australia and New Zealand started to lower their policy rates, and
in 2008:Q4, the Eurozone and many other economies began expansionary policies
which included both advanced and emerging economies, such as Indonesia, South
Korea, Malaysia, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, and others.
Figure 2.1 indicates that this was not the first time that central banks had
followed the policy decisions of the major central banks. In the early 2000s, many
central banks lowered interest rates immediately after the rapid monetary expansion
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Figure 2.1: Policy Rates since 2000: US, Eurozone, and other economies
of the US in response to the IT bubble collapse and the 9/11 incident. In the mid-
2000s, triggered by the policy change of the US again, central banks raised their
policy rates. The recent policy changes of central banks during the financial crisis
were also stimulated by the policy decisions of the Eurozone, which suffered from a
fiscal crisis. Since the co-movements of central banks’ policy rates were mostly led
by the US or the Eurozone policy changes, their relationships have been in the form
of the leader-follower relationship.
This chapter investigates the reason for the asymmetric relationship between pol-
icy rates, with a focus on the effects of economic globalization. A small open economy
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is established. There are two
economies: home and foreign. The home economy is a small open economy, and the
foreign economy represents the rest of the world.
The model analysis indicates that, when the foreign policy rate is lowered, the
home central bank also cuts its policy rate. Provided that there is a large economy
in reality with a fairly low degree of openness as in this small open economy model,
the relationship between policy rates will be asymmetric. The simulation results
also reveal the factors that strengthen the leader-follower policy relationship. Glob-
alization in financial markets, economic integration, and the central bank’s enhanced
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role in inflation targeting make the policy relationship stronger.
When the foreign policy rate is lowered, the home currency appreciates following
the modified uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) in this model. Consequently,
the relative export price rises and the relative import price decreases. These price
changes then reduce the demand for home produced goods, which leads to a fall in
exports and an increase in imports (expenditure switching effect). The decline in
net exports makes home output fall. Moreover, the drop in the import price leads
to an initial decline in the home inflation rate. Following a modified Taylor rule1,
the home central bank lowers the policy rate.
The sensitivity analyses suggest that the positive correlation between the home
and the foreign policy rates is stronger when (i) the international assets holding
cost facing the home economy is lower, (ii) openness of the home country is higher,
(iii) the home central bank is more active in inflation targeting, and (iv) the home
monetary policy responds to the real exchange rate change. The trend towards
globalization in financial markets and economic integration magnifies the fluctua-
tions in home output, inflation, and the home currency value. This leads to a more
aggressive policy reaction of the home central bank.
The banking friction also has a significant role in determining the policy rates
relationship. A novel feature of the model in this chapter is the extension of the
banking friction framework of Gertler and Karadi (GK, 2011) to an open economy
model2. In this respect, the model differs from other studies based on the framework
of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), which focus on the agency problem in
the non-financial sector. In this chapter, the banking friction strengthens the co-
movements of the home and the foreign policy rates. The financial accelerator
1Under the small open economy assumption in this chapter, the home monetary policy responds
to the changes in home output, inflation, and the real exchange rate, as in Adolfson et al. (2007).
2Similarly Dedola, Karadi and Lombardo (2013) extend the banking friction model of GK
(2011) to an open economy framework, focusing on the international spillovers of the real economic
shocks.
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amplifies the increase in investment and the fall in net exports, thus resulting in a
further decrease in the home agents’ foreign assets holding. As the home currency
becomes more appreciated following the modified UIP, home inflation remains lower.
Eventually, the home policy rate becomes closer to the foreign policy rate.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the following section, the related litera-
ture is discussed. In Section 2.3, a small open economy model is illustrated. Section
2.4 presents estimation and calibration results. Impulse responses and variance de-
composition results are analysed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 then concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
There are numerous empirical investigations of the policy relationship between cen-
tral banks. Mac´kowiak (2006) indicates that the US monetary policy affects the
short-term rates of other countries, and Bergin and Jorda` (2004) show the Euro-
pean countries’ significant responses to the US and German monetary policies before
1998. Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1998) also investigate the influence of German pol-
icy on the policies of the UK, France and Italy during the period spanning 1979-1993.
In a recent study, Kucharcˇukova´, Claeys and Vasˇ´ıcˇek (2014) identify the immediate
policy changes of non-EU European countries following the policy of the European
Central Bank (ECB).
Cross-border monetary policy relationships are related to the optimal policy in
open economies. Indeed, there exist influential studies that explore the optimal
monetary policy rules in open economy models. For instance, Ball (1998), Corsetti
and Pesenti (2005) and De Paoli (2009) conclude that the optimal policy needs to
focus on reducing the volatility of the exchange rate as well as domestic variables -
such as output and the inflation rate. On the other hand, Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005)
and Batini, Harrison and Millard (2003) argue that domestic inflation targeting is
optimal even in an open economy.
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There is a substantial body of literature that analyse the issue of global monetary
policy interdependence within a cooperative framework (Benigno and Benigno, 2006;
Pappa, 2004). However, as Dominquez (1996) indicates, policy makers normally
try to maximize domestic welfare at the expense of global welfare and there is
no incentive to boost foreign welfare. Furthermore, for some large economies, the
degrees of openness are too low to achieve gains from the policy cooperation. Coenen
et al. (2010) also indicate that for the US the gains from the monetary policy
coordination are small due to its low degree of openness.
A stream of literature expands the financial accelerator framework of Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (BGG, 1999) to the open economy environment (Davis and
Huang, 2011; Faia, 2007; Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci, 2007; Kolasa and Lom-
bardo, 2014; Unsal, 2013). These studies focus on the agency problem in the non-
financial sector, rather than that in the banking sector. Even though Bruno and
Shin (2013) and Hwang (2012) analyse banking frictions in open economies, the
anlaysis of Bruno and Shin (2013) is not based on a DSGE framework and Hwang
(2012) assumes a lending cost which is not caused by the agency problem. Only a
few studies, such as Dedola, Karadi and Lombardo (2013), incorporate the banking
friction model of Gertler and Karadi (2011) into open economy frameworks.
2.3 A Small Open Economy Model
2.3.1 Model Description
The theoretical framework consists of a general equilibrium small open economy
model. There are two economies: home and foreign. The foreign economy can
be interpreted as the rest of the world. International variables, such as foreign
inflation and the foreign interest rate, are exogenously given. In the home economy,
households can purchase both home and foreign assets by holding deposits. As in
Benigno (2009), home assets cannot be traded in international markets, since the
2.3. A Small Open Economy Model 62
home currency is not a global currency.
There are seven types of agents in the home economy: households, financial
intermediaries, the central bank, the government, capital producers, and final and
intermediate goods producers. Intermediate goods are produced with capital and
labour inputs. Final goods are produced by combining home intermediate goods
and imported foreign intermediate goods. These final goods are purchased for con-
sumption by households, investment by capital producers, and government spending.
Households provide labour to the intermediate goods producers - receiving wages.
They also get the dividends (cash flows) from goods/capital producers and financial
intermediaries. The government imposes income taxes on the households, and the
central bank sets the nominal risk free interest rate.
Home financial intermediaries obtain funds from household deposits. They pur-
chase claims on intermediate goods producers - transferring funds from the house-
holds to the producers. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), the financial intermediaries
face borrowing constraints due to the agency problem. They can divert a fraction
of funds during each period.
2.3.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Each home intermediate good firm i produces a differentiated good Yt(i) with a
Cobb-Douglas technology. Kt(i) and Lt(i) denote the amounts of capital stock and
labour that are used for production. The variable At is the level of productivity
which is common to all firms. The production function is as below:
Yt(i) = AtKt(i)
ψLt(i)
1−ψ. (2.3.1)
Intermediate goods firms borrow funds from home financial intermediaries by
issuing claims (St) to them. They purchase capital stock (Kt+1) from the capital
producer for production next period. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), the number
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Figure 2.2: Flow of Funds after Production; Intermediate Good Producer (i)
of the claims issued by the firm i is equivalent to the amount of capital stock it
purchases (St(i) = Kt+1(i)) and the price of one unit of the claim equals the capital
price. Thus, given a relative price of capital Qt in units of final goods, the following
equation holds:
QtSt(i) = QtKt+1(i). (2.3.2)
After production in period t, the intermediate good firm i pays back rS,tQt−1St−1(i)
to the financial intermediaries, where rS,t denotes the gross real return of each claim.
In order to repay rS,tQt−1St−1(i), the firm i resells the used and depreciated capital,
(1 − δ)Kt, to the capital producer with the price of Qt. The parameter δ denotes
the depreciation ratio. Since St−1(i) = Kt(i), the real cost of using Kt(i) in produc-
tion is illustrated by [rS,tQt−1 − (1− δ)Qt]Kt(i). Define the user cost of one unit
of capital as rK,t = rS,tQt−1 − (1− δ)Qt. Given the real wage (Wt), then the total
real cost of production becomes rK,tKt(i) +WtLt(i). Figure 2.2 illustrates the flows
of funds regarding debt repayment and the capital purchase.
Since all firms face same input prices with an identical technology, the real
marginal cost (MCt) is the same across firms. Given the constant-returns-to-scale
technology, the optimality condition implies:
Lt(i)
Kt(i)
=
1− ψ
ψ
rK,t
Wt
(2.3.3)
MCt =
1
Atψψ(1− ψ)1−ψ r
ψ
K,tW
1−ψ
t . (2.3.4)
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The intermediate good of the firm i is either purchased in the home economy
or exported abroad: Yt(i) = YH,t(i) + Y
∗
H,t(i). YH,t(i) denotes the amount sold in
the home market and Y ∗H,t(i) is the amount purchased in the foreign market (home
exports)3. The demand function for an individual intermediate good is determined
by cost minimization of the final goods producers in the home and the foreign
economies. Define PH,t(i) and P
∗
H,t(i) as the prices of home produced goods in the
home and the foreign economies, respectively. The demand function for the good i
in each economy is then illustrated as:
YH,t(i) =
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−ε
YH,t Y
∗
H,t(i) =
(
P ∗H,t(i)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
Y ∗H,t (2.3.5)
where ε denotes the elasticity of substitution among individual intermediate goods
in both home and foreign markets. YH,t and Y
∗
H,t are the aggregate demands for
home goods in those two economies. PH,t and P
∗
H,t denote the aggregate prices.
The aggregate demands and prices follow the aggregator form of Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977):
YH,t =
[∫ 1
0
YH,t(i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
Y ∗H,t =
[∫ 1
0
Y ∗H,t(i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
PH,t =
[∫ 1
0
PH,t(i)
1−εdi
] 1
1−ε
P ∗H,t =
[∫ 1
0
P ∗H,t(i)
1−εdi
] 1
1−ε
Symmetrically, the demand functions for the foreign intermediate good j in the
home and the foreign economies are
YF,t(j) =
(
PF,t(j)
PF,t
)−ε
YF,t Y
∗
F,t(j) =
(
P ∗F,t(j)
P ∗F,t
)−ε
Y ∗F,t (2.3.6)
3For quantity variables (inputs and outputs), the subscript H or F denotes the country of
production. An asterisk indicates foreign consumption/use, while the lack of an asterisk indicates
home consumption/use. Prices denominated in foreign currency are indicated with an asterisk.
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where PF,t(j) and P
∗
F,t(j) denote the prices of the foreign intermediate good j in
the home and the foreign economies, respectively. P ∗F,t(j) is denominated in foreign
currency. The aggregators are as follow:
YF,t =
[∫ 1
0
YF,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
] ε
1−ε
Y ∗F,t =
[∫ 1
0
Y ∗F,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
] ε
1−ε
PF,t =
[∫ 1
0
PF,t(j)
1−εdj
] 1
1−ε
P ∗F,t =
[∫ 1
0
P ∗F,t(j)
1−εdj
] 1
1−ε
.
Following a classical view of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature
(i.e. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995b), home firms set export prices in home currency,
which means producer currency pricing (PCP). Firms choose identical prices for both
domestically purchased goods and exported goods. Also, as in Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995b), there are no trade costs or trade barriers. Assuming demand elasticities are
constant and identical across borders, the law of one price (LOOP) holds (Corsetti,
Dedola and Leduc, 2010). This implies PH,t(i) = EtP ∗H,t(i), where Et denotes the
nominal exchange rate in units of home currency per unit of foreign currency. With
the LOOP, the aggregate price indices for domestically purchased goods (PH,t) and
exported goods (P ∗H,t) have a relationship as below:
PH,t = EtP ∗H,t. (2.3.7)
Assuming symmetric price aggregation in the foreign economy, PF,t(j) = EtP ∗F,t(j)
for the foreign intermediate good j and
PF,t = EtP ∗F,t. (2.3.8)
Since the home intermediate good firm i sells its products in both home and
foreign markets, its revenue in period t is the sum of the revenue from each market.
The real cash flow at t is
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PH,t(i)
Pt
YH,t(i) +
EtP ∗H,t(i)
Pt
Y ∗H,t(i)− rK,tKt(i)−WtLt(i). (2.3.9)
Defining Φ
(
YH,t(i) + Y
∗
H,t(i)
)
as the nominal cost of producing YH,t(i) + Y
∗
H,t(i), the
nominal cash flow at time t can be expressed as
PH,t(i)YH,t(i) + EtP ∗H,t(i)Y ∗H,t(i)− Φ(YH,t(i) + Y ∗H,t(i)). (2.3.10)
Following Calvo (1983), in the home market an individual intermediate good
producer can adjust its price with a probability 1−ξ each period. As in Yun (1996),
when it cannot optimally change the price, its home price rises at the steady state
home inflation rate (Π¯). The steady state inflation of the home and the foreign
economies are assumed to be the same (Π¯ = Π¯∗). Define P˜H,t and P˜ ∗H,t as the
optimized home and foreign prices of home produced goods at time t. Also, define
PH,t+τ pt and P
∗
H,t+τ pt as the prices τ periods later, if no further optimization has
taken place. Since the LOOP holds, the price of home produced goods in the
foreign economy is indexed to not only the steady state inflation rate (Π¯∗), but also
the inverse of the nominal exchange rate change4. Then
PH,t+τ pt = Π¯
τ P˜H,t and P
∗
H,t+τ pt =
( Et
Et+τ
)
Π¯∗τ P˜ ∗H,t. (2.3.11)
The price stickiness parameter (ξ) and the elasticity of substitution among inter-
mediate goods (ε) are identical in both economies. For the firm whose last price reset
was at time t, the income from the exports at time t+τ would be Et+τP ∗H,t+τ ptY ∗H,t+τ pt
in home currency, which is equivalent to Π¯∗τEtP˜ ∗H,tY ∗H,t+τ pt following the equation
(2.3.11). The home producer who has a chance to optimize its price then maximizes
4Assuming the LOOP and Π¯ = Π¯∗, PH,t+τ pt = Π¯τ P˜H,t = Π¯∗τEtP˜ ∗H,t. From PH,t+τ pt =
Et+τP ∗H,t+τ pt, Π¯∗τ (Et/Et+τ )P˜ ∗H,t = P ∗H,t+τ pt.
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∞∑
τ=0
βτξτEt
{
Dt,t+τ
[
Π¯τ P˜H,t
(
PH,t+τ pt
PH,t+τ
)−ε
YH,t+τ + Π¯
∗τEtP˜ ∗H,t
(
P ∗H,t+τ pt
P ∗H,t+τ
)−ε
Y ∗H,t+τ − Φ(Yt+τ pt)
]}
(2.3.12)
where βτDt,t+τ (= β
τΛt,t+τ
Pt
Pt+τ
) is the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs.
The real discount factor Λt,t+τ will be defined later. Yt+τ pt denotes output at t + τ
for a firm whose last price reset was at time t, which is the sum of the domestically
sold goods (YH,t+τ pt) and the exported home goods (Y
∗
H,t+τ pt).
Given the LOOP, PH,t+τ pt/PH,t+τ = P
∗
H,t+τ pt/P
∗
H,t+τ and P˜H,t = EtP˜ ∗H,t. Since
Π¯ = Π¯∗, the optimization problem can be rewritten by:
max
P˜H,t
∞∑
τ=0
βτξτEt
{
Dt,t+τ
[
Π¯τ P˜H,t
(
PH,t+τ pt
PH,t+τ
)−ε (
YH,t+τ + Y
∗
H,t+τ
)− Φ(Yt+τ pt)]}
(2.3.13)
which yields the following optimal price equation5:
P˜H,t
Pt
=
ε
ε−1
∞∑
τ=0
β˜τEt
(
Dt,t+τ Π¯
−ετΠεH,t,t+τΠt,t+τYt+τVt+τMCt+τ
)
∞∑
τ=0
β˜τEt
(
Dt,t+τ Π¯(1−ε)τΠεH,t,t+τYt+τVt+τ
) (2.3.14)
whereMCt+τ is the real marginal cost at t+τ . β˜ = βξ and Vt+τ =
[∫ 1
0
(
PH,t+τ (i)
PH,t+τ
)−ε
di
]−1
.
Πt,t+τ (= Pt+τ/Pt) is cumulative inflation in the home country and ΠH,t,t+τ (=
PH,t+τ/PH,t) is cumulative inflation of home produced goods.
As in Yun (1996), the aggregate price index PH,t evolves over time according to
the recursive form below:
PH,t =
[
ξ
(
PH,t−1Π¯
)1−ε
+ (1− ξ)P˜ 1−εH,t
] 1
1−ε
(2.3.15)
5The appendix 2.A.3 provides the details of the derivation of the equation (2.3.14).
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which can be rewritten by
PH,t
Pt
=
ξ( Π¯
Πt
)1−ε(
PH,t−1
Pt−1
)1−ε
+ (1− ξ)
(
P˜H,t
Pt
)1−ε 11−ε . (2.3.16)
2.3.3 Final Goods Producers
Final goods producing firms in the home and the foreign markets produce final
goods Zt and Z
∗
t by combining home and foreign intermediate goods. The final
goods production functions are given by:
Zt =
[
α
1
θY
θ−1
θ
H,t + (1− α)
1
θY
θ−1
θ
F,t
] θ
θ−1
(2.3.17)
Z∗t =
[
α∗
1
θY
∗ θ−1
θ
F,t + (1− α∗)
1
θY
∗ θ−1
θ
H,t
] θ
θ−1
, (2.3.18)
where the parameter θ denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign intermediate goods, which is identical in the home and the foreign
economies. α ∈ (0, 1) and α∗ ∈ (0, 1) represent the long-run weights of domestic
goods in the home and the foreign economies, respectively. The amount of foreign
final goods production (Z∗t ) is exogenously given.
For the home and the foreign (imported) intermediate goods in the home econ-
omy, cost minimization by the home final goods producers yields the following de-
mand equations:
YH,t = α
(
PH,t
Pt
)−θ
Zt (2.3.19)
YF,t = (1− α)
(
PF,t
Pt
)−θ
Zt, (2.3.20)
with a price index
2.3. A Small Open Economy Model 69
Pt =
[
αP 1−θH,t + (1− α)P 1−θF,t
] 1
1−θ . (2.3.21)
Dividing both sides of the equation (2.3.21) by Pt−1 yields
Πt =
[
α
(
ΠH,t
PH,t−1
Pt−1
)1−θ
+ (1− α)
(
ΠF,t
PF,t−1
Pt−1
)1−θ] 11−θ
(2.3.22)
where ΠH,t = PH,t/PH,t−1 and ΠF,t = PF,t/PF,t−1. Also, by the definition
ΠH,t =
PH,t/Pt
PH,t−1/Pt−1
Πt and ΠF,t =
PF,t/Pt
PF,t−1/Pt−1
Πt. (2.3.23)
Similarly in the foreign economy (with superscript *),
Y ∗F,t = α
∗
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−θ
Z∗t (2.3.24)
Y ∗H,t = (1− α∗)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−θ
Z∗t (2.3.25)
with a price index
P ∗t =
[
α∗P ∗1−θF,t + (1− α∗)P ∗1−θH,t
] 1
1−θ . (2.3.26)
Dividing both sides of the equation (2.3.26) by P ∗t−1 leads to
Π∗t =
[
α∗
(
Π∗F,t
P ∗F,t−1
P ∗t−1
)1−θ
+ (1− α∗)
(
Π∗F,t
P ∗F,t−1
P ∗t−1
)1−θ] 11−θ
(2.3.27)
where Π∗t = P
∗
t /P
∗
t−1, Π
∗
F,t = P
∗
F,t/P
∗
F,t−1 and Π
∗
H,t = P
∗
H,t/P
∗
H,t−1. Also,
Π∗F,t =
P ∗F,t/P
∗
t
P ∗F,t−1/P
∗
t−1
Π∗t and Π
∗
H,t =
P ∗H,t/P
∗
t
P ∗H,t−1/P
∗
t−1
Π∗t . (2.3.28)
The foreign inflation rate is assumed to be at its long-run level (Π∗t = Π¯
∗).
Given the LOOP (EtP ∗H,t = PH,t and EtP ∗F,t = PF,t) and the definition of the real
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exchange rate (ER,t = EtP ∗t /Pt), the intermediate goods’ relative prices in the home
and the foreign economies have the relationships as follow:
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
=
PH,t
Pt
E−1R,t (2.3.29)
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
=
PF,t
Pt
E−1R,t. (2.3.30)
Combining the equations (2.3.25) and (2.3.29), the aggregate demand for imported
goods in the foreign economy (Y ∗H,t, home exports) can be rewritten as
Y ∗H,t = (1− α∗)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−θ
EθR,tZ∗t . (2.3.31)
Since the weights of home and foreign intermediate goods in final goods produc-
tion are different across economies, the real exchange rate is not necessarily unity
in the short-run (Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc, 2010). Defining ∆Et = Et/Et−1, ER,t
evolves following the process as below:
ER,t = Π¯∗∆EtΠ−1t ER,t−1. (2.3.32)
2.3.4 Households
There is a continuum of identical households in the home economy, indicated by
h ∈ (0, 1). As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), there are two types of members in each
household: workers and bankers. At any moment a fraction (1− f) of the members
are workers, and the fraction f are bankers who are running financial intermediaries.
Workers can consume and deposit money at the home and the foreign financial
intermediaries. Households (Workers) supply labour to the intermediate goods firms
and receive wages. Also, they purchase home and foreign assets (deposits). The
household h has a preference over consumption and labour supply as follows:
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Eτ
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τ
[
Ct(h)
1−σ
1− σ −
Lst(h)
1+χ
1 + χ
]
(2.3.33)
where Ct(h) and L
s
t(h) denote individual levels of consumption and labour supply at
time t, respectively. σ represents the coefficient of relative risk aversion of households
or the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitutions, and χ is the inverse
of the elasticity of labour supply.
The household h faces a nominal flow budget constraint as below:
PtCt(h) +R
−1
t B
d
H,t(h) + Γ(b
d
F,t)R
∗−1
t EtBdF,t(h) =
Pt(1−m)WtLst(h) +Dt(h) +BdH,t−1(h) + EtBdF,t−1(h) + PtΩt(h)
where Pt is the overall price level. Rt and R
∗
t are home and foreign nominal risk-free
interest rates determined by central banks. R−1t B
d
H,t(h) and R
∗−1
t EtBdF,t(h) denote
the nominal amounts of deposits in the home and the foreign financial intermediaries,
respectively. BdF,t(h) is denominated in foreign currency, and all deposits are for one
period. m ∈ (0, 1) is an income tax ratio, and Dt(h) is the sum of the dividends
from intermediate goods and capital producing firms - owned by households. Ωt(h)
is the real net transfer from the financial intermediary sector, which will be explained
later. In real terms, the budget constraint can be illustrated as follows:
Ct(h) +
(
Rt
Πt+1
)−1
bdH,t(h) + Γ(b
d
F,t)
(
R∗t
Πt+1
)−1 Et
Et+1 b
d
F,t(h) =
(1−m)WtLst(h) +Dt(h) + bdH,t−1(h) + bdF,t−1(h) + Ωt(h)
where bdH,t(h) and b
d
F,t(h) denote the real amounts of home and foreign deposits,
respectively. Thus, bdH,t(h) = B
d
H,t(h)/Pt+1 and b
d
F,t(h) = Et+1BdF,t(h)/Pt+1. Defining
rs = Rs/Πs+1 and r
∗
s = R
∗
s/Πs+1, lim
t→∞
t∏
s=1
r−1s b
d
H,t(h) = 0 and lim
t→∞
t∏
s=1
r∗−1s b
d
F,t(h) = 0
(no-Ponzi scheme).
As in Benigno (2001), and Basu and Thoenissen (2011), each household bears a
foreign assets (deposits) holding cost, which is reflected in the function Γ(·). This
function is multiplied to the original price of foreign deposits. This cost helps to
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determine a well-defined steady state assets portfolio. The foreign assets holding
cost increases as the home economy’s total amount of foreign deposits holding (bdF,t)
rises; Γ(bdF,t) is increasing in b
d
F,t. Thus, each household regards this cost as given
when choosing an optimal consumption and the foreign assets holding combination.
The foreign assets holding cost function (Γ(bdF,t)) is illustrated as
Γ(bdF,t) =
[
1− µT
(
bdF,t
b¯dF
− 1
)]−1
. (2.3.34)
Defining λM,t as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the flow budget con-
straint, the first-order conditions facing the household h are:
λM,t = Ct(h)
−σ (2.3.35)
λM,t(1−m)Wt = Lst(h)χ (2.3.36)
βRtEt
[(
Ct+1(h)
Ct(h)
)−σ
1
Πt+1
]
= 1 (2.3.37)
βR∗tΓ(b
d
F,t)
−1Et
[(
Ct+1(h)
Ct(h)
)−σ
1
Πt+1
Et+1
Et
]
= 1. (2.3.38)
Combining the equations (2.3.37) and (2.3.38) yields the following modified uncov-
ered interest rate parity (UIP) condition:
Rt = R
∗
t
[
1− µT
(
bdF,t
b¯dF
− 1
)]
Et
(Et+1
Et
)
. (2.3.39)
In the producer’s optimization problem (2.3.12), Λt,t+τ is determined by the house-
hold’s perceived intertemporal rate of substitution in consumption as follows:
Λt,t+τ =
(
Ct+τ (h)
Ct(h)
)−σ
. (2.3.40)
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2.3.5 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries are modelled as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). There is
a continuum of financial intermediaries indexed by j ∈ (0, 1) in the home lending
market. Each intermediary obtains funds from household deposits. Using the funds
and its own net worth, it holds claims on intermediate goods producers. The nominal
balance sheet of an individual financial intermediary j can be written as:
PtQtSt(j) = PtNt(j) +R
−1
t BH,t(j) (2.3.41)
where Nt(j) is the amount of the intermediary j’s net worth in real terms. Qt
is the relative price of each claim which is identical across the financial intermedi-
aries. R−1t BH,t(j) denotes the amount of funds borrowed from households (deposits).
Defining bH,t(j) = BH,t(j)/Pt+1, in real terms
QtSt(j) = Nt(j) + r
−1
t bH,t(j) (2.3.42)
where
rt =
Rt
Πt+1
. (2.3.43)
Given the real gross return from the intermediate goods firms for each claim
(rS,t), the real profit at each period is accumulated as net worth:
Nt(j) = rS,tQt−1St−1(j)− bH,t−1(j). (2.3.44)
Combining (2.3.42) and (2.3.44) yields the following law of motion of net worth:
Nt(j) = (rS,t − rt−1)Qt−1St−1(j) + rt−1Nt−1(j) (2.3.45)
where rS,t − rt−1 represents the excess return on the claims.
The probability that a banker continues its business next period is ζ. The number
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of bankers exiting from the financial intermediary sector is assumed to be the same
as the number of new bankers each period. The exiting bankers bring final net worth
back to the households; the financial intermediary j then maximizes the expected
final net worth (V Et (j)) which can be expressed by
V Et (j) = Et
∞∑
τ=t
(1− ζ)ζτ−tβτ+1−tΛt,τ+1Nτ+1(j) (2.3.46)
where Nτ+1(j) = (rS,τ+1 − rτ )QτSτ (j) + rτNτ (j). When Et(rS,τ+1− rτ ) is positive6
and there is no other constraint, the financial intermediary would increase its assets
indefinitely. However, a moral hazard problem sets a limit on borrowing; at each
period, the banker j can divert a fraction (λ) of its available funds. The banker
j then exits from the banking sector with λQtSt(j). However, in this case the
banker sacrifices the expected value of the business (V Et (j)). Therefore, an incentive
constraint must be satisfied in order for the depositors to be willing to supply funds
to the banking sector as below:
V Et (j) ≥ λQtSt(j). (2.3.47)
The expected value of the banking business (V Et (j)) can be expressed by a re-
cursive form as follows:
V Et (j) = υtQtSt(j) + ηtNt(j) (2.3.48)
where
υt = Et [(1− ζ) βΛt,t+1(rS,t+1 − rt) + βΛt,t+1ζxt+1υt+1] (2.3.49)
ηt = Et [(1− ζ) + βΛt,t+1ζht+1ηt+1] . (2.3.50)
6With imperfect capital markets, the excess return can be positive due to the limits to arbitrage
imposed by banking frictions (Gertler and Karadi, 2011).
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υt is the expected discounted marginal gain of expanding assets QtSt(j) by one
unit, holding Nt(j) constant; ηt indicates the expected discounted value of having
one additional unit of Nt(j) while holding St(j) constant. xt is the gross growth
rate of assets, and ht denotes the gross growth rate of net worth at time t.
xt = QtSt(j)/Qt−1St−1(j) ht = Nt(j)/Nt−1(j). (2.3.51)
From the equation (2.3.48), the incentive constraint (2.3.47) can be rewritten by:
υtQtSt(j) + ηtNt(j) ≥ λQtSt(j).
If λ ≤ υt, the incentive constraint is not binding since the value of the banking
business is always larger than the gain from diverting funds. As in Gertler and
Karadi (2011), with reasonable parameters that lead to 0 < υt < λ, the constraint
is assumed to bind in the equilibrium of this model. In consequence, the amount of
the financial intermediary j’s available funds depends positively on its net worth:
QtSt(j) = φtNt(j) where φt =
ηt
λ− υt . (2.3.52)
The variable φt implies the leverage ratio of the intermediary j, which is determined
such that the benefit of diverting funds is balanced by the opportunity cost.
Using the leverage ratio, the evolution of net worth of the intermediary j in
(2.3.45) can be rewritten by:
Nt(j) = [(rS,t − rt−1)φt−1 + rt−1]Nt−1(j). (2.3.53)
From the equations (2.3.51), (2.3.52) and (2.3.53), then
ht = (rS,t − rt−1)φt−1 + rt−1 (2.3.54)
xt =
φt
φt−1
(
Nt(j)
Nt−1(j)
)
=
φt
φt−1
ht. (2.3.55)
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Since the leverage ratio (φt) does not depend on individual factors, from the
equation (2.3.52), the aggregate demand for claims is determined by:
QtSt = φtNt (2.3.56)
where Nt denotes aggregate net worth after new bankers enter into the banking
sector. Therefore, Nt can be illustrated as the sum of existing net worth (Ne,t) and
net worth of the new bankers (Nn,t) as below:
Nt = Ne,t +Nn,t (2.3.57)
Given the survival ratio ζ, from the equation (2.3.44) existing net worth can be
illustrated by:
Ne,t = ζ (rS,tQt−1St−1 − bH,t−1) (2.3.58)
where St−1 =
∫ 1
0
St−1(j)dj and bH,t−1 =
∫ 1
0
bH,t−1(j)dj. The amount of exiting
bankers’ net worth is then
Nx,t = (1− ζ) (rS,tQt−1St−1 − bH,t−1) . (2.3.59)
When the exiting bankers transfer terminal net worth (Nx,t) to the households,
each household needs to pay income tax to the government. In order to avoid double
taxation, no tax is levied on financial intermediaries when they receive the return
from the claims. Given the income tax ratio m, then the actual amount of net worth
transferred to the households is (1−m)Nx,t.
The amount of new bankers’ net worth (Nn,t) is assumed to be a fraction
ω
1−ζ of
the total amount of the exiting bankers’ assets, (1− ζ)QtSt−1. From this, net worth
of the new bankers transferred from the households can be expressed as
Nn,t = ωQtSt−1. (2.3.60)
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Aggregating individual balance sheets of (2.3.42) across all intermediaries yields
QtSt = Nt + r
−1
t bH,t. From the equations (2.3.57) and (2.3.58), then the following
equation holds:
QtSt − r−1t bH,t = ζ (rS,tQt−1St−1 − bH,t−1) + ωQtSt−1. (2.3.61)
From the equation (2.3.53), the equation (2.3.57) can be also rewritten by:
Nt = ζ [(rS,t − rt−1)φt−1 + rt−1]Nt−1 + ωQtSt−1. (2.3.62)
2.3.6 Capital Producing Firm
After intermediate goods production at time t, a representative home capital pro-
ducing firm purchases (1 − δ)Kt units of used capital from the home intermediate
goods firms given the relative capital price Qt. It produces new capital stock (Kt+1)
via investment (It). The process of capital accumulation is then given by:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It. (2.3.63)
After investment, the capital producing firm sells new capital stock (Kt+1) to the
intermediate goods producers with the price Qt. Therefore, from this capital trade
the capital producing firm can get the real cash flow QtIt.
For one unit of investment, the capital producer purchases [1 + g(AI,tIt/It−1)] of
final goods. The function g(·) represents an investment adjustment cost and AI,t is
an investment adjustment cost shock with an expected value of unity. The capital
producing firm then solves
max
It
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τEτ
{
Λτ,t
[
QtIt − It − g
(
AI,tIt
It−1
)
It
]}
.
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The first-order condition is illustrated by
Qt = 1+g
(
AI,tIt
It−1
)
+
AI,tIt
It−1
g′
(
AI,tIt
It−1
)
−βEt
{
AI,t+1Λt,t+1
(
It+1
It
)2
g′
(
AI,t+1It+1
It
)}
(2.3.64)
where the investment adjustment cost is given as
g
(
It
It−1
)
=
µI
2
(
AI,tIt
It−1
− 1
)2
. (2.3.65)
2.3.7 Government
The home government purchases Gt of final goods, and the government spending
is financed by taxing labour and exiting net worth from the banking sector (Nx,t).
With the income tax ratio m, the government budget constraint is
m(WtLt +Nx,t) = Gt. (2.3.66)
Plugging the equation (2.3.59) into (2.3.66) then yields
m [WtLt + (1− ζ)(rS,tQt−1St−1 − bH,t−1)] = Gt. (2.3.67)
2.3.8 Central Bank
The home central bank adjusts the gross nominal risk-free rate (Rt, policy rate).
Under the small open economy assumption, the home central bank considers not
only domestic output and inflation, but also international variables7. Following
Adolfson et al. (2007), then the home central bank in this model responds to the
real exchange rate changes. Indeed, Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012) find that the
policy rates in many countries have been below the levels suggested by the standard
7A similar model with an inward-looking Taylor rule is analysed in Basu, Lee and Reinhorn
(2015), which also reveals the asymmetric relationship between policy rates.
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Taylor rule for more than a decade. According to He and McCauley (2013), and
Taylor (2013), the deviation from the traditional rule was caused by the central
banks’ concerns about international variables.
The desired level of the policy rate is determined by a modified Taylor rule, and
the central bank takes gradual steps toward the desired policy rate - policy rate
smoothing. With a monetary policy smoothing parameter ρR ∈ (0, 1), the home
policy rate rule is determined as follows:
Rt = κR
ρR
t−1
(
ΠγPt Y
γY
t EγER,t
)1−ρR µt (2.3.68)
where Yt denotes aggregate home output (
∫ 1
0
Yt(i)di), and κ is a scale parameter.
The parameters γP , γY , and γE represent the policy weights on the inflation rate,
output, and the real exchange rate, respectively. µt denotes a policy shock with an
expected value of one. On the other hand, the foreign policy rate (R∗t ) is exogenously
given, following the small open economy assumption.
2.3.9 Market Clearing
The international asset market clearing condition is given by:
[1− Γ(bF,t)]−1R∗−1t EtBF,t − EtBF,t−1 = PtNXt (2.3.69)
whereNXt denotes net exports in real terms, and by definition PtNXt = EtP ∗H,tY ∗H,t−
PF,tYF,t. Given the LOOP (EtP ∗H,t = PH,t), the equation (2.3.69) can be rewritten as
[1− Γ(bF,t)]−1R∗−1t ∆E−1t+1Πt+1bF,t − bF,t−1 =
PH,t
Pt
Y ∗H,t −
PF,t
Pt
YF,t (2.3.70)
where bF,t−1 = EtBF,t−1/Pt and ∆Et+1 = Et+1/Et.
The amount of the total intermediate goods produced in the home economy is
equal to the sum of domestically purchased intermediate goods (YH,t) and exported
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intermediate goods (Y ∗H,t). From the equation (2.3.5), then
Yt = YH,t
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−ε
di+ Y ∗H,t
∫ 1
0
(
P ∗H,t(i)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
di (2.3.71)
where
Yt =
∫ 1
0
Yt(i)di and Yt(i) = YH,t(i) + Y
∗
H,t(i).
Since
PH,t(i)
PH,t
=
P ∗H,t(i)
P ∗H,t
given the LOOP, the equation (2.3.71) can be rewritten by:
Yt =
(
YH,t + Y
∗
H,t
)
V −1t where Vt =
[∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−ε
di
]−1
. (2.3.72)
The amount of home final goods production (Zt) is equivalent to the sum of
households’ consumption, government spending, investment, and the investment
adjustment cost, which is represented by:
Ct + It +Gt + g
(
It
It−1
)
It = Zt. (2.3.73)
The capital and the labour markets clear. The intermediate goods producers’
entire demand for capital stock is equal to the sum of the equity claims purchased
by the financial intermediaries. Also, the sum of the producers’ labour demands is
equivalent to the total labour supply of the households. These are illustrated by:
Kt =
∫ 1
0
Kt(i)di =
∫ 1
0
St−1(j)di (2.3.74)
Lt =
∫ 1
0
Lt(i)di =
∫ 1
0
Lst(h)dh (2.3.75)
where Kt and Lt denote aggregate capital stock and labour, respectively.
The sum of the individual deposit holding of each household h is same to the
sum of the individual debt of each financial intermediary j. Therefore, the home
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lending market clears as follows:
BH,t =
∫ 1
0
BdH,t(h)dh =
∫ 1
0
BH,t(j)dj, (2.3.76)
and this can be rewritten by bH,t =
∫ 1
0
bdH,t(h)dh =
∫ 1
0
bH,t(j)dj.
2.3.10 Exogenous Variables
Home technology (At), the investment adjustment cost (AI,t), the home policy rate
shock (µt), the foreign policy rate (R
∗
t ) and foreign final goods production (Z
∗
t )
follow
At = A¯
1−ρAAρAt−1εA,t (2.3.77)
AI,t = A¯
1−ρAI
I A
ρAI
t−1εAI,t (2.3.78)
µt = µ¯
1−ρmµρmt−1εm,t (2.3.79)
R∗t = R¯
∗1−ρmfR∗ρmft−1 ε
∗
m,t (2.3.80)
Z∗t = Z¯
∗1−ρZZ∗ρZt−1 ε
∗
Z,t (2.3.81)
where variables with bars represent the steady state values. The expected values of
εA,t, εAI,t, εm,t, ε
∗
m,t and ε
∗
Z,t are all unity, and for the coefficients, ρA, ρAI , ρm, ρmf , ρZ ∈
(0, 1).
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2.3.11 National Income Identity
From the aggregate households’ budget constraint and the asset market clearing
condition (2.3.69),
Ct +
(
r−1t bH,t − bH,t−1
)
+NXt = (1−m)WtLt +Dt + Ωt (2.3.82)
where Dt is the sum of the aggregate dividends from intermediate goods producers
(DG,t) and the capital producer (DC,t). DG,t and DC,t can be illustrated as follow:
DG,t =
(
PH,t
Pt
)
YH,t +
(EtP ∗H,t
Pt
)
Y ∗H,t − [rS,tQt−1 − (1− δ)Qt]Kt −WtLt
=
(
PH,t
Pt
)(
YH,t + Y
∗
H,t
)− rS,tQt−1St−1 +QtKt+1 −QtIt −WtLt (2.3.83)
DC,t = QtKt+1 − (1− δ)QtKt −
(
1 + g
(
It
It−1
))
It
= QtIt −
(
1 + g
(
It
It−1
))
It (2.3.84)
Also, given Ωt
8, combining the equations (2.3.57), (2.3.58), (2.3.59) and (2.3.62)
yields
rS,tQt−1St−1 −QtSt =
(
bH,t−1 − r−1t bH,t
)
+ Ωt +mNx,t. (2.3.85)
From the equation (2.3.85) and Kt+1 = St, the real dividends from intermediate
goods producers can be rewritten as follows:
DG,t =
(
PH,t
Pt
)(
YH,t + Y
∗
H,t
)
+
(
r−1t bH,t − bH,t−1
)− (Ωt +mNx,t)−QtIt −WtLt.
(2.3.86)
Plugging the equations (2.3.84) and (2.3.86) into the households’ aggregate bud-
get constraint (2.3.82) and using government budget constraint, the national income
8Ωt is the net transfer from banking sector to the households, which is
Ωt = (1−m)Nx,t − ωQtSt−1 = (1− ζ) (rS,tQt−1St−1 − bH,t−1)− ωQtSt−1 −mNx,t.
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identity is derived as follows:
Ct + It +Gt +NXt + g (It/It−1) It =
(
PH,t
Pt
)(
YH,t + Y
∗
H,t
)
(2.3.87)
where YH,t + Y
∗
H,t = YtVt.
2.3.12 Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of 42 equations and 42 variables. Home intermediate
goods producers’ optimization is illustrated by the equations (2.3.1), (2.3.3), (2.3.4),
(2.3.14) and (2.3.16). Final goods demands and equilibrium conditions are indicated
by (2.3.19), (2.3.20), (2.3.22), (2.3.23) and (2.3.27)-(2.3.32). Home households’ util-
ity maximization is represented by the equations (2.3.36), (2.3.37), (2.3.39) and
(2.3.40). In the financial intermediary sector, the equilibrium consists of the equa-
tions (2.3.43), (2.3.49), (2.3.50), (2.3.52), (2.3.54)-(2.3.56), (2.3.61), and (2.3.62).
Capital producers’ optimization and the capital stock evolution are represented by
the equations (2.3.63) and (2.3.64). Government balanced budget and the monetary
policy are given by (2.3.67) and (2.3.68). Market clearing conditions are illustrated
by (2.3.70), (2.3.71) and (2.3.73). There are five exogenous shocks, represented by
(2.3.77)-(2.3.81)9.
Given St = Kt+1, and assuming bH,t = b
d
H,t and Lt = L
d
t , corresponding variables
are as follow: C, I, Q, G, Z, Y , K, L, MC, W , R, R∗, r, rS, Λ, bH , bF , YH , YF , Y ∗H ,
PH
P
, PF
P
, P˜H
P
,
P ∗H
P ∗ ,
P ∗F
P ∗ , Π, ΠH , ΠF , Π
∗
H , Π
∗
F , x, h, φ, ν, N , ER, ∆E , AI , A, η, µ, Z∗.
2.3.13 Solution Method
The solution method of the model starts with computing the well-defined steady
state. The steady state values of variables are found analytically and illustrated
9Appendix 2.A.1 and 2.A.2 outline the model’s steady state and the log-linearized equation
system.
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in the appendix 2.A.1. Having computed the steady state, equations are approx-
imated around the steady state, using log-linearization. The linearized equations
are reported in the appendix 2.A.2. These equations are also represented by the
following state space form:
AE(xt+1) = Bxt + Czt
where x is the vector of endogenous variables and z denotes the vector of exogenous
variables. Following the method of Klein (2000), firstly a generalized Shur decom-
position to matrices A and B is conducted. This yields QAZ = S and QBZ = T ,
where S and T are upper triangular matrices. Using block matrices of Q, Z, S and
T , eventually reduced form solutions are derived. Given a shock on the vector z,
then the impulse response simulation results are computed.
In the Baeyesian estimation, a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation
is used, with the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm. It is a process of finding
the desired posterior distributions of parameters using a large number of iterations.
In the MH algorithm, given a current state variable, a new draw is accepted only
when it increases the posterior density (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, 2010). The detailed
method is illustrated in the appendix 2.A.5.
2.4 Parameters Calibration and Estimation
2.4.1 Data
In this section, both calibration and a Bayesian estimation are used to set up the
parameters and the steady state values. For model validation, South Korea is used
as the test bed for the following reasons. First, openness of the economy (0.515) is
close to the world average (0.463). Also, the size of GDP is proper for a small open
economy model (around 1.7% of the global GDP), and the central bank implements
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an independent inflation targeting monetary policy. Finally, the relevant real and
financial data are available.
Given that there are five shocks, five series of quarterly data are used in the
Bayesian estimation: (i) consumption, (ii) employment (labour), (iii) the policy
rate10, (iv) investment, and (v) the real exchange rate. The sample period ranges
from 1982:Q1 to 2014:Q4. Since the model analysis is based on log-linearized equa-
tions, all the variables are transformed into the percentage deviations from the
long-run levels.
Calibrating the other parameters and steady state values, mostly the quarterly
data during 1999:Q1-2014:Q4 are used. For long-run inflation, quarterly changes of
CPI are used and the steady state excess return is derived from the lending-deposit
rate spreads. Deriving the steady state level of openness of the home economy,
‘imports/GDP’ and ‘exports/GDP’ data are used. For the financial intermediary
sector, the aggregate balance sheet of domestic banks during 2008-2013 are used.
Data sources are reported in the appendix 2.A.4.
2.4.2 Calibration
In extant studies such as Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), and Christoffel, Coenen and
Warne (2008), openness (1−α) is calculated by the ‘import/GDP’ ratios. However,
in this model the degree of openness is defined as the steady state level of ‘im-
port/final goods production’ (YF/Z), which can be derived from the ‘import/GDP’
and the ‘export/GDP’ ratio11. From the data, openness of South Korea is 0.515 in
201312 which was below 0.3 in 1990s. Also, given that ‘export/GDP’ of South Korea
10Since the policy rate does not have usual statistical property, short-term (3 month) interest
rate data are used.
11National income identity implies 1 = (C + I +G)/Y + (Y ∗H −YF )/Y at the steady state. The
value of YF /Z can be derived from 1 = Z/Y + Y
∗
H/Y − YF /Y .
12Using this way, various levels of openness by country (2013) can be observed such as the US
0.160, Netherlands 0.810, Malaysia 0.798, and Czech Republic 0.758.
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is 0.54 and its output is 1.7% of global output in 2013, openness of the rest of the
world (1− α∗) is calibrated as 0.01.
In the financial intermediary sector, the quarterly excess return from funding
and lending is derived as 41 basis point (bp) based on the long-run lending-deposit
spread, which is higher than 25bp in Gertler and Karadi (2011). Also, the long-run
leverage is calculated from the ratio of ‘loans to business/net equity’ in the aggregate
balance sheet of South Korean banks, which yields φ¯ = 4.51. The calibrated leverage
is higher than that (4.00) in Gertler and Karadi (2011). The fraction of the possible
funds diversion (λ) is related to the deposit holder’s expected loss when a financial
intermediary is at a state of bankruptcy. From the ratio of recovery during the
financial crisis bailout since 1998, calibration suggests λ = 0.27013, which is lower
than 0.381 of Gertler and Karadi (2013). The corresponding survival ratio of an
individual banker (ζ) is 0.899. This means that bankers return final net worth
(Nx,t) from the financial intermediary sector to the households every 9.9 quarters
(equal to 1/(1-0.899)) on average.
Using the CPI, the long-run quarterly inflation rate (Π¯) is calibrated as 1.0067
which means the annual inflation rate is 2.70% at the steady state. Using the
data of the deposit rate, the long-run nominal interest rate (R¯) is determined at
1.0107, which yields the corresponding discount rate (β = 0.996) and the real interest
rate (r¯ = 1.004). In the monetary policy rule, parameters are calibrated such
that the estimated path of the policy rate fits the actual data14; ρR = 0.9, γP =
1.1 and γY = 0.3. The annual depreciation ratio of capital is 10% (δ = 0.025)
and the price stickiness parameter (ξ) is 0.75. The tax rate (m) is 0.20 such that
‘government spending/GDP ratio’ in the model fits the average ratio of it during
13Among the total amount of South Korean banks bailout regarding the financial crisis in 1997-
1998, 44.6% has not been recovered during 1998-2014. Given that 60.6% of total loans are not
insured by Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) (2014), the expected loss when an asset
(deposit) is default can be calibrated as 27.0%.
14Comparison between the estimated path and the actual data of the policy rate is illustrated
in the appendix 2.A.7.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated Values of Parameters
parameter value parameter value parameter value
α 0.485 ζ 0.899 m 0.20
α∗ 0.990 ω 0.018 ρA 0.85
δ 0.025 λ 0.270 ρAI 0.85
β 0.996 γP 1.100 ρm 0.85
β˜ 0.824 γY 0.300 ρmf 0.85
φ 4.510 ρR 0.900 ρzf 0.85
the sample period (14.7%). Using the long-run levels of net worth of the financial
intermediary sector, the leverage, and net foreign assets (NFA), the steady state ratio
of bH/bF is determined at 1.98. For exogenous variables, the coefficient parameters,
ρA, ρAI , ρm, ρmf and ρZ , are 0.85 following Kolasa and Lombardo (2014). Table 2.1
summarizes the calibrated values of the baseline parameters.
2.4.3 Bayesian Estimation
A Bayesian estimation is performed for the second moments of the five exogenous
shocks and for eight parameters which are not calibrated15. These parameters are:
(i) the share of the capital income in production (ψ), (ii) consumer’s preference
parameters (σ and χ), (iii) elasticities of substitution between intermediate goods
(ε), and between home and foreign intermediate goods (θ), (iv) the investment
adjustment cost (µI), (v) the international assets holding cost (µT ), and (vi) the
coefficient of the real exchange rate in the monetary policy rule (γE).
For the Bayesian approach, the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (MH) is used with
50,000 draws. The first three columns of Table 2.2 provide the assumptions regarding
the prior distributions of the parameters and the exogenous shocks. The share of
the capital income (ψ) is assumed to have a beta distribution with a mean 0.33.
Following Christoffel, Coenen and Warne (2008), the prior mean of the elasticity of
15The Bayesian estimation method is summarized in the appendix 2.A.5.
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Table 2.2: Parameter Estimates using Bayesian Approaches
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Type Mean St.error Mode Median Mean 5% 95%
ψ beta 0.33 0.02 0.369 0.362 0.361 0.334 0.390
σ normal 1.50 0.30 3.034 2.865 2.864 2.501 3.226
χ normal 1.00 0.20 1.304 1.484 1.486 1.224 1.760
ε gamma 6.00 1.00 5.986 5.446 5.498 3.944 7.152
θ gamma 1.50 0.30 2.179 2.378 2.389 1.995 2.760
µI gamma 4.00 0.50 3.856 3.526 3.550 2.926 4.237
µT gamma 0.20 0.03 0.257 0.242 0.244 0.192 0.296
γE gamma 0.05 0.02 0.035 0.044 0.046 0.018 0.073
εA inv.gamma 0.10 - 0.124 0.125 0.126 0.106 0.147
εAI inv.gamma 0.10 - 0.233 0.246 0.248 0.206 0.292
εm inv.gamma 0.10 - 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.014
εmf inv.gamma 0.10 - 0.064 0.059 0.060 0.048 0.071
εmf inv.gamma 0.10 - 0.196 0.204 0.206 0.169 0.244
substitution between home and foreign goods (θ) is 1.5 and that of the investment
adjustment cost (µI) is 4 with gamma distributions. As in Kollmann (2002), the
prior mean of ε is 6 with a gamma distribution. Household preference parameters
σ and χ have means 1.5 and 1.0 with normal distributions. The prior mean of the
international assets holding cost (µT ) is 0.2. The policy rule coefficient of the real
exchange rate (γE) has a prior mean 0.05. All the standard errors of the shocks are
assumed to have inverse gamma distributions.
The result of the parameters estimation reveals that all the estimated values of
the parameters are significantly different from zero. The posterior mean of ψ is
0.36 during the sample period which means that capital has a share more than the
conventional level, 0.33. The elasticity of substitution between home intermediate
goods is lower (ε = 5.50) than the prior mean, and the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods (θ) is 2.39. The posterior mean of the investment
adjustment cost parameter (µI) is 3.55, and for the international holding cost pa-
rameter (µT ), it is 0.24. The posterior mean of the real exchange rate coefficient
(γE) is 0.05. Regarding consumer’s preference, both σ and χ have means higher
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than unity, 2.86 and 1.49, respectively16.
2.5 Impulse Responses: Foreign Policy Rate Shock
2.5.1 Bayesian Impulse Response Analysis
In this section, the impulse responses of home economic variables to the foreign
policy rate shock are presented. Figure 2.3 reports the Bayesian impulse responses
with respect to a negative foreign policy rate shock. The figure illustrates the mean
responses (solid line) with the 5 and 95 per cent confidence bands (dotted line).
The lower foreign rate induces home households to decrease their foreign as-
sets holdings. Moreover, the nominal exchange rate initially declines following the
modified UIP condition17; thus, the real exchange rate also falls (home currency ap-
preciation). Consequently, the relative price of home produced goods rises, and this
lowers exports, while boosting imports (expenditure switching effect). The fall in
net exports then reduces home output. On the other hand, home inflation declines,
as the drop in import price inflation (ΠF ) drags it down. The decline in the import
price is caused by the home currency appreciation. Following the policy rule which
responds to home output, inflation and the real exchange rate, the home central
bank lowers its policy rate. This reveals the leader-follower relationship between
the home and the foreign policy rates when there is a policy rate cut in the foreign
economy.
As the amount of imports increases, final goods production (Z) rises, thus boost-
ing investment. The unanticipated increase in investment raises the capital price
(Q), and as a result the balance sheet of the entrepreneur sector expands; the amount
of net worth increases and the excess return on claims (E(rS)− r) falls. This raises
16The appendix 2.A.6 illustrates the prior and the posterior distributions.
17In the modified UIP condition (2.3.39), a negative shock on R∗t puts downward pressure on
bdF,t and Et.
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Figure 2.3: Responses to Foreign Policy Shock: Baseline Model
investment and the capital price further (financial accelerator). The higher level of
Q lowers the intermediate goods producers’ capital hiring costs18.
2.5.2 Comparative Statics of Impulse Responses
In this section, the effects of a parameter value change or model modification on the
monetary policy relationship are investigated. All other parameters are fixed at the
calibrated or estimated levels. There is a negative 1%p foreign policy rate shock.
18The producer’s capital hiring cost is rK,t = rS,tQt−1 − (1− δ)Qt.
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Figure 2.4: Responses to Foreign Policy Shock: Different Foreign Assets Holding Costs
Effect of a Change in the International Assets Holding Cost
The level of the international assets holding cost is represented by the parameter µT
in the equation (2.3.34). The effect of a change in this cost on the impulse responses
to a foreign rate shock is illustrated by Figure 2.4. The result indicates that the
lower international assets holding cost (µT = 0.1) makes the home policy rate follow
the foreign rate more aggressively than the higher cost case (µT = 0.8).
When the international assets holding cost is lower, the home agents’ foreign
assets holding decreases more in response to a negative foreign interest rate shock.
Moreover, the nominal and the real exchange rates decline more significantly; the
relative import and export prices also change more. This leads to a stronger expen-
diture switching effect - a greater decrease in net exports. Import price inflation
also falls rapidly following the nominal exchange rate change. As a result, home
output and inflation decline more sharply. Following the monetary policy rule, the
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home central bank responds by cutting the policy rate more. This implies that the
co-movements of policy rates become more significant as the financial markets are
more globalized and international investment becomes easier.
Effect of a Change in Openness
The impulse responses in two different openness environments are compared in Fig-
ure 2.5. When the degree of home openness is higher (α = 0.2), a fall in net exports
yields a sharp decline in home output - inducing a stronger expenditure switching
effect. Even though the exports and imports changes are smaller in terms of the de-
viation from the steady state, the larger portion of trade in the home economy leads
to a greater decline in output than the other case with lower openness (α = 0.8).
When the amount of of imports is larger, downward pressure of the fall in the
import price on the home inflation rate becomes stronger. Therefore, home inflation
declines more with higher openness. Combined with the fall in output, this leads to
a more aggressive home policy rate cut. Higher openness strengthens the correlation
between the home and the foreign policy rates when there is a foreign policy shock.
With higher openness, the rise in imports yields a further increase in final goods
production; this raises investment, and the capital price rises more. Thus, net worth
rises and the excess return drops more significantly. As trade volume is larger, home
agents’ foreign assets holding decreases more in response to the fall in net exports.
This dampens the decline in the nominal and the real exchange rates19.
Inflation Targeting and Policy Response to Real Exchange Rate
Since inflation targeting was initially adopted by New Zealand in 1989, many central
banks have established the inflation-targeting frameworks20. Given that still many
19In the modified UIP (2.3.39), a further decrease in bdF,t puts upward pressure on Et.
20In the first half of 1990s, Canada, Israel, UK, Australia and Sweden joined the inflation-
targeting regime. During 1997-2002, 15 more countries adopted inflation-targeting: Czech, Poland,
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Figure 2.5: Responses to Foreign Policy Shock: Different Openness
central banks are in the process of adopting inflation-targeting regimes, it is mean-
ingful to investigate the effect of such a policy framework on the policy relationship.
The sensitivity analysis is performed with different degrees of inflation targeting,
as illustrated by Figure 2.6 (a). The aggressiveness of targeting is measured by the
parameter γP in the policy rate rule equation with two different values: (i) strong
targeting with γP = 2.5 and (ii) weak targeting with γP = 1.2. In response to a
negative foreign rate shock, the home central bank with strong inflation targeting
cuts its policy rate more aggressively than the case of weaker inflation targeting.
As the financial markets become more globalized and individual economies are
integrated with each other, central banks have more serious concerns about the
fluctuations in international variables. The parameter estimation (γE > 0) suggests
South Korea, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, South Africa, Thailand, Hungary, Iceland, Mexico, Norway,
Ghana, Peru and Philippine (Hammond, 2012)
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Figure 2.6: Effect of Aggressive Inflation Targeting and Modified Taylor Rule
that the home central bank lowers the policy rate when its currency appreciates.
Figure 2.6 (b) describes the role of the policy response to the real exchange rate
in the policy relationship. Compared to the case with the standard Taylor rule
(γE = 0), the home central bank cuts its policy rate more when it responds to the
real exchange rate as well (γE = 0.5). This result implies that the concern about the
currency appreciation can lead to a deviation of the policy rate from the standard
Taylor rule, as indicated by Taylor (2013), and He and McCauley (2013).
Effect of the Financial Friction
The financial friction strengthens the co-movements of the home and the foreign
policy rates. This is related to the financial accelerator, which amplifies the move-
ments of investment and the asset price through the changes in entrepreneurs’ net
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Figure 2.7: Responses to Foreign Policy Shock: Effects of Financial Friction
worth and the excess return on the claims (Et (rS,t+1)−rt). Two cases are compared
in Figure 2.7: with and without the financial friction.
Without the friction, financial intermediaries simply intermediate funds with-
out the agency problem21, and the excess return remains zero (Et (rS,t+1) = rt).
With the friction, the foreign policy rate cut lowers the home excess return, as the
unanticipated increase in investment and the following rise in the asset price boost
entrepreneurs’ balance sheets; the expansion of net worth forces down the excess
return. The fall in the excess return then lowers the cost of capital and raises capi-
tal demand more. This leads to further increases in investment and the asset price
(financial accelerator).
The additional increase in investment requires more final goods (Z) in the home
21Without the financial friction, the financial intermediaries are assumed to have no net worth,
which means QtSt = r
−1
t bH,t.
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economy, which yields a further decline in exports and a rise in imports - a larger
drop in net exports. The international asset market clearing condition leads to a
more significant fall in the foreign assets holding (bdF ). The modified UIP suggests
that, given the decline in R∗, the greater fall in bdF puts downward pressure on the
exchange rate changes (∆E)22, and as a result the nominal and the real exchange
rates remain lower with the financial friction. As the higher home currency value
lowers the relative import price, home inflation remains below the level without the
financial friction; the home central bank keeps its policy rate lower. This makes the
home policy rate closer to the foreign policy rate.
2.5.3 Variance Decomposition
Table 2.3 presents the variance decomposition of the home interest rate with respect
to all five exogenous shocks: home technology (εA), the investment adjustment
cost (εAI), the home policy rate (εm), the foreign policy rate (ε
∗
m) and the foreign
aggregate demand (ε∗Z). In the estimated baseline model with the financial friction,
the home monetary policy shock accounts for the largest fraction of the fluctuations
in the home policy rate (58.5%). The productivity shock (30.9%) is next to it.
The foreign monetary policy shock (ε∗m) explains 2.4% of the home policy rate
fluctuations in the estimated baseline model with the friction. In the case of the
lower international assets holding cost, it increases to 6.7%. With greater openness,
the contribution (2.4%) is larger than the case of lower openness. More aggressive
inflation targeting (6.9%) raise the contribution of the foreign monetary policy shock.
When the home monetary policy responds to the real exchange rate, the foreign
rate’s contribution also rises to 2.8%. However, the foreign policy effect in the no
friction case (5.5%) is larger, since the effect of the productivity shock is greater
22The modified UIP condition is given by Rt = R
∗
t
[
1− µT
(
bdF,t/b¯
d
F − 1
)]
Et (Et+1/Et) (2.3.39).
As bdF,t becomes lower, the nominal exchange rate increase (∆E) is smaller. The nominal exchange
rate in the figure 2.7 is derived from Eˆt =
∑t
τ=1 ∆̂Eτ since Et is not stationary.
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Table 2.3: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (%) of Home Policy Rate (R)
Case Parameter εA εAI εm ε
∗
m ε
∗
Z
International High µT = 0.8 30.8 6.8 60.5 0.4 1.5
Transaction Cost Low µT = 0.1 30.1 6.4 55.2 6.7 1.6
Openness Low 1− α = 0.2 36.7 7.8 53.6 1.7 0.2
High 1− α = 0.8 25.0 5.0 63.0 2.4 4.6
Inflation Targeting Weak γP = 1.2 29.3 5.0 62.0 2.4 1.3
Strong γP = 2.5 23.6 1.0 68.0 6.9 0.5
Taylor Rule Standard γE = 0.0 30.1 6.3 59.6 2.4 1.7
Modified γE = 0.5 38.2 8.7 48.8 2.8 1.5
Financial Friction None 27.1 8.3 58.0 5.5 1.0
Baseline 30.9 6.5 58.5 2.4 1.6
with the financial friction.
2.6 Conclusion
During recent decades, the monetary policies of central banks in many countries
have shown significant co-movements. Indeed, those co-movements were mostly led
by the policy changes of major central banks, such as the US Fed and the ECB. As
a result, the leader-follower relationships between central bank policies have been
observed in many cases.
In the model analysis of this chapter, the leader-follower relationship between
the home and the foreign policy rates is caused by the changes in the home and
foreign goods’ relative prices. When the foreign policy rate is lowered, the fall in
home output and the drop in inflation make the home central bank cut its policy
rate. The real currency appreciation also contributes to the home central bank’s
following behaviour. If one country is a large economy in reality with a very low
degree of openness as in this small open economy model, there will be an asymmetric
relationship between policy rates.
The model simulations suggest that the leader-follower policy relationship be-
comes stronger when (i) the home agents’ international assets holding cost is lower,
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(ii) openness of the home economy is higher, (iii) the home central bank adopts
more aggressive inflation targeting, and (iv) the home monetary policy responds to
the real exchange rate change. The first two results and the last one suggest that
financial market globalization and economic integration lead to a stronger policy
rates relationship. Also, as more central banks adopt inflation targeting, the pol-
icy rates co-movements would be more significant in the global economy. Finally,
the banking friction strengthens the policy rates relationship through the financial
accelerator, which raises investment further and lowers home inflation.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Steady State
Π¯ = 1.0067(= Π¯∗)
Λ¯ = Q¯ = 1
A¯ = A¯I = 1(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)
=
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)
= 1
∆¯E = 1
r¯S = r¯ + r¯P
MC =
ε− 1
ε
L¯
K¯
=
1− ψ
ψ
r¯KW¯
−1
Y¯ =
(
L¯
K¯
)1−ψ
K¯
I¯ = δK¯
F¯ =
1
1− βξ
Y¯ = Y¯H + Y¯
∗
H
b¯H = (φ− 1)N¯ r¯
b¯H/b¯F = 1.98
G¯ = m[W¯ L¯+ (1− ζ)(r¯SK¯ − b¯H)]
x¯ = h¯
υ¯ =
(1− ζ)βr¯P
1− βζx¯
r¯ = β−1
R¯ = Π¯β−1 = R¯∗
E¯R = µ¯ = 1(
PH,t
Pt
)
=
(
PF,t
Pt
)
=
(
P˜H,t
Pt
)
= 1
r¯P = 0.0041
r¯K = r¯S − (1− δ)
W¯ =
[
1
ψψ(1− ψ)1−ψ r¯
ψ
KMC
−1
] 1
ψ−1
φ¯ = 4.51
K¯ = φ¯N¯
L¯ =
L¯
K¯
K¯
C¯ =
(
L¯−ϕW¯
) 1
σ
Z¯ = C¯ + I¯ + G¯
Y¯H = αZ¯
Y¯F = (1− α)Z¯
b¯F =
(
R¯∗−1Π¯− 1)−1 (Y¯ ∗H − Y¯F )
h¯ = φ¯r¯P + r¯
η¯ =
1− ζ
1− βζh¯
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2.A.2 Log-linearized Equations
Yˆt = Aˆt + ψKˆt + (1− ψ)Lˆt (2.A.1)
M̂Ct = −Aˆt + ψ
(
1
r¯s − (1− δ)
)[
r¯s
(
rˆs,t + Qˆt−1
)
− (1− δ)Qˆt
]
+ (1− ψ)Wˆt(2.A.2)
Lˆt − Kˆt =
(
1
r¯s − (1− δ)
)[
r¯s
(
rˆs,t + Qˆt−1
)
− (1− δ)Qˆt
]
− Wˆt (2.A.3) ̂˜PH,t
Pt
 = F¯−1M̂Ct + (1− F¯−1)Et
 ̂˜PH,t+1
Pt+1
+ Πˆt+1
 (2.A.4)
(
P̂H,t
Pt
)
= ξ
[(
P̂H,t−1
Pt−1
)
− Πˆt
]
+ (1− ξ)
 ̂˜PH,t
Pt
 (2.A.5)
YˆH,t = −θ
(
P̂H,t
Pt
)
+ Zˆt (2.A.6)
YˆF,t = −θ
(
P̂F,t
Pt
)
+ Zˆt (2.A.7)
Πˆt = α
[(
P̂H,t−1
Pt−1
)
+ ΠˆH,t
]
+ (1− α)
[(
P̂F,t−1
Pt−1
)
+ ΠˆF,t
]
(2.A.8)
0 = α∗
[(
P̂ ∗F,t−1
P ∗t−1
)
+ Πˆ∗F,t
]
+ (1− α∗)
[(
P̂ ∗H,t−1
P ∗t−1
)
+ Πˆ∗H,t
]
(2.A.9)(
P̂F,t
Pt
)
=
(
P̂ ∗F,t
P ∗t
)
+ EˆR,t (2.A.10)(
P̂ ∗H,t
P ∗t
)
=
(
P̂H,t
Pt
)
− EˆR,t (2.A.11)
ΠˆH,t =
(
P̂H,t
Pt
)
−
(
P̂H,t−1
Pt−1
)
+ Πˆt (2.A.12)
ΠˆF,t =
(
P̂F,t
Pt
)
−
(
P̂F,t−1
Pt−1
)
+ Πˆt (2.A.13)
Πˆ∗F,t =
(
P̂ ∗F,t
P ∗t
)
−
(
P̂ ∗F,t−1
P ∗t−1
)
(2.A.14)
Πˆ∗H,t =
(
P̂ ∗H,t
P ∗t
)
−
(
P̂ ∗H,t−1
P ∗t−1
)
(2.A.15)
Yˆ ∗H,t = −θ
(
P̂H,t
Pt
)
+ θEˆR,t + Zˆ∗t (2.A.16)
EˆR,t = ∆̂Et − Πˆt + EˆR,t−1 (2.A.17)
Wˆt = σCˆt + χLˆt (2.A.18)
2.A. Appendix 101
Cˆt = Et
(
Cˆt+1
)
+ σ−1
[
Et
(
Πˆt+1
)
− Rˆt
]
(2.A.19)
Rˆt = Rˆ
∗
t + Et
(
∆̂Et+1
)
− µT bˆF,t (2.A.20)
Λˆt,t+1 = σ(Cˆt − Cˆt+1) (2.A.21)
rˆt = Rˆt − Πˆt+1 (2.A.22)
υ¯υˆt = (1− ζ)β
(
r¯P Λˆt,t+1 + r¯S rˆS,t+1 − r¯rˆt
)
+ βζx¯υ¯
(
Λˆt,t+1 + xˆt+1 + υˆt+1
)
(2.A.23)
xˆt = hˆt + φˆt − φˆt−1 (2.A.24)
h¯hˆt = φ¯
[
(r¯S rˆS,t − r¯rˆt−1) + (r¯S − r¯) φˆt−1
]
+ r¯rˆt−1 (2.A.25)
ηˆt = βζh¯
(
Λˆt,t+1 + hˆt+1 + ηˆt+1
)
(2.A.26)
Qˆt + Kˆt+1 = φˆt + Nˆt (2.A.27)
φˆt =
1
λ− υ¯
(
η¯
φ¯
ηˆt + υ¯υˆt
)
(2.A.28)
Nˆt =
ωK¯
N¯
(
Qˆt + Kˆt
)
+ ζh¯
(
hˆt + Nˆt−1
)
(2.A.29)
Kˆt+1 = (1− δ) Kˆt + I¯
K¯
Iˆt (2.A.30)
Qˆt = µI
(
Iˆt − Iˆt−1 + AˆI,t
)
− βµI
(
Iˆt+1 − Iˆt + AˆI,t+1
)
(2.A.31)
Rˆt = ρRRˆt−1 + (1− ρR)
(
γP Πˆt + γY Yˆt
)
+ µˆt (2.A.32)
Yˆt =
Y¯H
Y¯
YˆH,t +
Y¯ ∗M
Y¯
Yˆ ∗H,t (2.A.33)
Zˆt =
C¯
Z¯
Cˆt +
I¯
Z¯
Iˆt +
G¯
Z¯
Gˆt (2.A.34)
Aˆt = ρAAˆt−1 + εˆA,t (2.A.35)
AˆI,t = ρAIAˆI,t−1 + εˆAI,t (2.A.36)
µˆt = ρM µˆt−1 + εˆM,t (2.A.37)
Rˆ∗t = ρMF Rˆ
∗
t−1 + εˆ
∗
M,t (2.A.38)
Zˆ∗t = ρZZˆ
∗
t−1 + εˆ
∗
Z,t (2.A.39)
(1− ω) Qˆt + Kˆt+1 = ζr¯S
(
rˆS,t + Qˆt−1 + Kˆt
)
− b¯H
K¯
(
ζbˆH,t−1 − bˆH,t − rˆt
r¯
)
+ ωKˆt (2.A.40)
G¯Gˆt = m (1− ζ)
[
r¯SK¯
(
rˆS,t + Qˆt−1 + Kˆt
)
− b¯H bˆH,t−1
]
+mW¯L¯
(
Wˆt + Lˆt
)
(2.A.41)
Y¯ ∗H
[(
P̂H,t
Pt
)
+ Yˆ ∗H,t
]
−Y¯F
[(
P̂F,t
Pt
)
+ YˆF,t
]
=
(
Y¯ ∗H − Y¯F + b¯F
) [
(1 + µT ) bˆF,t − Rˆ∗t − ∆̂Et+1 + Πˆt+1
]
−b¯F bˆF,t−1
(2.A.42)
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2.A.3 Derivation of the Sticky Price Dynamics
Optimal Relative Price
Combining the equations (2.3.13) and (2.3.72), the optimization problem of the home
intermediate good producer is given by:
max
P˜H,t
∞∑
τ=0
βτξτEt
{
Dt,t+τ
[
Π¯τ P˜H,t
(
PH,t+τ pt
PH,t+τ
)−ε
Yt+τVt+τ − Φ(YH,t+τ pt + Y ∗H,t+τ pt)
]}
. (2.A.43)
From the demand functions of home purchased goods and exported goods, the equation
(2.3.5), and the law of one price (Et+τP ∗H,t+τ = PH,t+τ ),
∂YH,t+τ pt
∂P˜H,t
= −ε
(
Π¯τ
ΠH,t,t+τ
)−ε(
P˜H,t
PH,t
)−ε
YH,t+τ
P˜H,t
(2.A.44)
∂Y ∗H,t+τ pt
∂P˜H,t
= −ε
(
Π¯τ
ΠH,t,t+τ
)−ε(
P˜H,t
PH,t
)−ε
Y ∗H,t+τ
P˜H,t
(2.A.45)
where ΠH,t,t+τ = PH,t+τ/PH,t. Also, PH,t+τ pt = Π¯
τ P˜H,t and PH,t+τ = ΠH,t,t+τPH,t. Using
the equations (2.A.44) and (2.A.45), the first-order condition is rewritten by:
∞∑
τ=0
βτξτEt
{
Dt,t+τ
(
Π¯τ
ΠH,t,t+τ
)−ε [
(1− ε)Π¯τYt+τVt+τ + εPt+τMCt+τ
(
YH,t+τ
P˜H,t
+
Y ∗H,t+τ
P˜H,t
)]}
= 0.
(2.A.46)
Given that Yt+τVt+τ = YH,t+τ + Y
∗
H,t+τ , the equation (2.3.14) is then derived from
∞∑
τ=0
βτξτEt
{
Dt,t+τYt+τVt+τ
(
Π¯τ
ΠH,t,t+τ
)−ε [
Π¯τ
(
P˜H,t
Pt
)
− ε
ε− 1Πt,t+τMCt+τ
]}
= 0. (2.A.47)
Dynamics of Optimal Relative Price
The optimality condition (2.3.14) can be rewritten by:
P˜H,t
Pt
∞∑
τ=0
β˜τEt
(
Dt,t+τ Π¯
(1−ε)τΠεH,t,t+τYt+τVt+τ
)
=
ε
ε− 1
∞∑
τ=0
β˜τEt
(
Dt,t+τ Π¯
−τΠεH,t,t+τΠt,t+τYt+τVt+τMCt+τ
)
.
(2.A.48)
Without the expectation term, at t+ 1 the optimal price would satisfy
P˜H,t+1
Pt+1
∞∑
τ=0
β˜τ
(
Dt+1,t+1+τ Π¯
(1−ε)τΠεH,t+1,t+1+τYt+1+τVt+1+τ
)
=
ε
ε− 1
∞∑
τ=0
β˜τ
(
Dt+1,t+1+τ Π¯
−τΠεH,t+1,t+1+τΠt+1,t+1+τYt+1+τVt+1+τMCt+1+τ
)
.(2.A.49)
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By the definition, Dt,t+1Dt+1,t+τ = Dt,t+τ . Multiplying β˜Dt,t+1Π¯
1−εΠεH,t,t+1 to the left
hand side of the equation (2.A.49) yields
P˜H,t+1
Pt+1
(
β˜Dt,t+1Π¯
1−εΠεH,t,t+1Yt+1Vt+1 + β˜
2Dt,t,t+2Π¯
2(1−ε)Πεt,t+2Yt+2Vt+2 + · · ·
)
, (2.A.50)
which can be rewritten by:
P˜H,t+1
Pt+1
∞∑
τ=0
(
β˜τDt,t+τ Π¯
(1−ε)τΠεH,t,t+τYt+τVt+τ
)
− P˜H,t+1
Pt+1
YtVt. (2.A.51)
In a similar way, multiplying β˜Dt,t+1Π¯
1−εΠεH,t,t+1 to the right hand side of the equation
(2.A.49) yields
ε
ε− 1
Π¯
Πt,t+1
[ ∞∑
τ=0
β˜τ
(
Dt,t+τ Π¯
−τΠεH,t,t+τΠt,t+τYt+τVt+τMCt+τ
)−MCtYtVt] . (2.A.52)
From the equality of (2.A.51) and (2.A.52), the following equation holds:
P˜H,t+1
Pt+1
∞∑
τ=0
(
β˜τDt,t+τ Π¯
(1−ε)τΠεH,t,t+τYt+τVt+τ
)
− P˜H,t+1Pt+1 YtVt
=
ε
ε− 1
(
Π¯
Πt,t+1
) ∞∑
τ=0
β˜τ
(
Dt,t+τ Π¯
−τΠεH,t,t+τΠt,t+τYt+τVt+τMCt+τ
)− ε
ε− 1
(
Π¯
Πt,t+1
)
MCtYtVt.
(2.A.53)
From the equation (2.A.48), multiplying
[ ∞∑
τ=0
(
β˜τDt,t+τ Π¯
(1−ε)τΠεH,t,t+τYt+τVt+τ
)]−1
to
both sides of (2.A.53) yields
P˜H,t+1
Pt+1
{
1− YtVt
[ ∞∑
τ=0
(
β˜τDt,t+τ Π¯
(1−ε)τΠεH,t,t+τYt+τVt+τ
)]−1}
=
(
Π¯
Πt,t+1
)
P˜H,t
Pt
− ε
ε− 1
(
Π¯
Πt,t+1
)
MCtYtVt
[ ∞∑
τ=0
β˜τ
(
Dt,t+τ Π¯
(1−ε)τΠεH,t,t+τYt+τVt+τ
)]−1
.
(2.A.54)
Defining Ft = Y
−1
t V
−1
t
∞∑
τ=0
β˜τ
(
Dt,t+τ Π¯
(1−ε)τΠεH,t,t+τYt+τVt+τ
)
, the equation (2.A.54) can
be rewritten as follows:
P˜H,t
Pt
= F−1t
ε
ε− 1MCt +
(
1− F−1t
)(Πt,t+1
Π¯
)(
P˜H,t+1
Pt+1
)
. (2.A.55)
This recursive form can be represented by a log-linearized equation as below:
̂˜PH,t
Pt
 = F¯−1M̂Ct + (1− F¯−1)
 ̂˜PH,t+1
Pt+1
+ Πˆt,t+1
 . (2.A.56)
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From the definition of the variable Ft,
Ft+1 = Y
−1
t+1V
−1
t+1
∞∑
τ=0
β˜τ
(
Dt+1,t+1+τ Π¯
(1−ε)τΠεH,t+1,t+1+τYt+1+τVt+1+τ
)
(2.A.57)
and multiplying β˜Y −1t V
−1
t Yt+1Vt+1Dt,t+1Π¯
1−εΠεH,t,t+1 to both sides of (2.A.57) yields(
β˜Y −1t V
−1
t Yt+1Π¯
1−εΠεH,t,t+1Dt,t+1
)
Ft+1 = Y
−1
t V
−1
t
∞∑
τ=1
β˜τ
(
Dt,t+τ Π¯
(1−ε)τΠεH,t,t+τYt+τVt+τ
)
.
(2.A.58)
Subtracting (2.A.58) from Ft yields
Y −1t V
−1
t
[ ∞∑
τ=0
β˜τ
(
Dt,t+τ Π¯
(1−ε)τΠεH,t,t+τYt+τVt+τ
)
−
∞∑
τ=1
β˜τ
(
Dt,t+τ Π¯
(1−ε)τΠεH,t,t+τYt+τVt+τ
)]
= 1
Ft − β˜Y −1t V −1t Π¯1−εEt
(
Dt,t+1Π
ε
H,t,t+1Yt+1Vt+1Ft+1
)
= 1
which means the steady state value of Ft (= F¯ ) can be derived as
F¯ =
1
1− β˜ =
1
1− βξ . (2.A.59)
2.A.4 Data Source
Table 2.4: List of Data Sources
Data Source (code)
Output (GDP) Datastream: KOGDP...D
Inflation (CPI) Bank of Korea
Real Exchange Rate Datastream: KOQCC011H
Investment Bank of Korea
Government Spending Datastream: KOCNGOV.D
Consumption Datastream: KOCNPER.D
Import/Output The World Bank Data
Export/Output The World Bank Data
World GDP The World Bank Data
Net Foreign Assets The World Bank Data
Certificate Deposit rate Datastream: KODPNNCD
Loan-Deposit Spread The World Bank Data
Bank Balance Sheet Financial Supervisory Service (FSS Korea)
Bailout and Recovery Financial Services Commission (FSC Korea)
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2.A.5 Bayesian Estimation Method
The Bayesian approach in this section aims to produce the posterior densities of parameters
using prior information, data and simulations. Define y as the value of data and θ as the
parameter estimated. Following the Bayes’ theorem23, the posterior distribution pi(θ | y)
can be illustrated by
pi(θ | y) = f(y | θ)pi(θ)
f(y)
(2.A.60)
where pi(θ) denotes the prior distribution of the parameter. f(y) is the probability density
function of y, and f(y | θ) denotes the likelihood function. Since f(y) is independent of θ,
it is convenient to express the posterior distribution as follows:
pi(θ | y) ∝ f(y | θ)pi(θ). (2.A.61)
The Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation in the Bayesian estimation is
based on the Markov process where the transition probabilities between different values
in the state space depend only on the current state of the random variable24. Consider
a stochastic process Xt in a continuous state space and a transition kernel p(θ0, θ1) =
P (Xt+1 = θ1 | Xt = θ0). An invariant density pi∗(·) for the kernel p(θ0, θ1) is a density
that satisfies
pi∗(θ1) =
∫
R
pi∗(θ0)p(θ0, θ1)dθ0. (2.A.62)
Within this stationary distribution pi∗(·), the probability values are independent of the
actual starting value.
The invariant density equals to the desired posterior distribution with some required
conditions of the Markov chain. The chain needs to be (i) irreducible, (ii) aperiodic, and
(iii) positive recurrent25. These properties make it possible to find the transition kernel
23P (A | B) = P (B | A)P (A)/P (B) where P (A) denotes the probability of an event A, and
P (A | B) is the probability of A given that B is true.
24In the MCMC algorithm, each draw slightly depends on the previous one.
25A Markov chain is aperiodic if for all states the period of returning to the state is one, and
it is irreducible if the process can reach any other states with positive probabilities starting from
a state. Also, the chain is positive recurrent if the expected return time to a state is finite. The
chain is then ergodic.
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using an MCMC algorithm with a large number of iterations: the Metropolis-Hastings
(MH) algorithm (Greenberg, 2008). The MH algorithm is useful, since it does not require
the full set of conditional distributions, contrary to the Gibbs algorithm26.
In order to find a kernel p(θ0, θ1) that has pi
∗(·) as its invariant distribution, firstly
define a reversible kernel, q(·, ·), which satisfies
pio(θ0)q(θ0, θ1) = pi
o(θ1)q(θ1, θ0). (2.A.63)
From the definition of q(·, ·) then,
∫
A
∫
R
pio(θ0)q (θ0, θ1) dθ0dθ1 =
∫
A
∫
R
pio(θ1)q (θ1, θ0) dθ0dθ1 =
∫
A
pio(θ1)dθ1 (2.A.64)
which suggests that pio(·) is an invariant distribution for the kernel q(·, ·). When pi(θ0)q(θ0, θ1) >
pi(θ1)q(θ1, θ0), it is suggested that the probability of θ0 → θ1 is too high. In this case the
transition density can be reduced by introducing a probability α(θ0, θ1) < 1 (Chib and
Greenberg, 1995). The probability then satisfies
pi(θ0)q(θ0, θ1)α(θ0, θ1) = pi(θ1)q(θ1, θ0). (2.A.65)
From the equation (3.4.6), in practice α(θ0, θ1) can be derived by
α(θ0, θ1) =

min
{
pi(θ1)q(θ1,θ0)
pi(θ0)q(θ0,θ1)
, 1
}
, if pi(θ0)q(θ0, θ1) 6= 0
0, otherwise.
(2.A.66)
In the MH algorithm, given a current state variable a new draw is accepted only when
it increases the posterior density (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, 2010). Otherwise it is accepted
only proportionally. The steps of the MH algorithm are then illustrated as below:
1. Given θ0 generate θ
∗
1 from q(θ1, θ0), and yield u from U(0, 1). Solve the model with
26The invariant distribution for the Gibbs kernel p(x, y) is derived from
∫
p(x, y)pi(x)dx =∫
pi(y1 | x1)pi(y2 | y1)pi(x1, x2)dx1dx2 = pi(y2 | y1)
∫
pi(y1 | x2)pi(x2)dx2 = pi(y2 | y1)pi(y1) = pi(y).
pi(· | ·) is a conditional distribution and pi(·, ·) is a joint distribution.
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θ∗1. Evaluate p(y | θ∗1) and pi(θ∗1) then with likelihood functions.
2. If pi(θ0 | y)q(θ0, θ∗1) < pi(θ∗1 | y)q(θ∗1, θ0), accept the new draw, since θ∗1 increases the
posterior density assuming the symmetric transition kernel which implies q(θ0, θ
∗
1) =
q(θ∗1, θ0). If pi(θ0 | y)q(θ0, θ∗1) > pi(θ∗1 | y)q(θ∗1, θ0), accept it with the probability
α(θ0, θ
∗
1) < 1. This implies, accept if
u ≤ α(θ0, θ∗1) = min
{
pi(θ∗1 | y)q(θ∗1, θ0)
pi(θ0 | y)q(θ0, θ∗1)
, 1
}
= min
{
p(y | θ∗1)pi(θ∗1)q(θ∗1, θ0)
p(y | θ0)pi(θ0)q(θ0, θ∗1)
, 1
}
(2.A.67)
where α(θ0, θ
∗
1) represents the acceptance ratio.
3. If accepted, θ1 = θ
∗
1, and otherwise θ1 = θ0. Eventually, the invariant density
pi(θ | y) is constructed.
Choosing the proposal density q(·, ·), two kernels are frequently used: the random-walk
kernel and the independence kernel27 (Greenberg, 2008).
27The random-walk kernel uses a process θ1 = θ0+ω where ω is a random variable. Since the ker-
nel is symmetric which means q(θ0, θ1) = q(θ1, θ0), the acceptance ratio satisfies α = pi(θ1)/pi(θ0).
The independence kernel assumes q(θ0, θ1) = q(θ1) which means the density is independent of the
current state.
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2.A.6 Bayesian Estimation Results
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2.A.7 Comparison between Implied Interest Rate and Data
Chapter 3
Cross-border Capital Flows and
International Effects of
Quantitative Easing
3.1 Introduction
Since the economic crisis in the late 2000s, the unconventional monetary policy
conducted by major central banks, namely quantitative easing (QE)1, has been one
of the most significant factors influencing international capital flows. Most empirical
studies find that QE of those advanced economies stimulated the capital flows into
other economies, lowering interest rates and raising asset prices in those economies
- accompanied by currency appreciations (IMF, 2013a; Chen et al., 2012). Moore
et al. (2013) indicate that the capital flows were driven by the higher risk-adjusted
returns in other economies, because QE lowered domestic interest rates. According
to the portfolio balance channel, the decline in the domestic interest rate caused by
1The Bank of Japan and the US Federal Reserve expanded balance sheets from 2001 and
2008, respectively. The Bank of England and the European Central Bank began QE in 2009. In
Switzerland and Sweden, the balance sheet policies were adopted in 2013 and 2015, respectively.
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Figure 3.1: QE of Major Central Banks and Capital Flows into EMEs
QE boosts demands for other economies’ assets. This also lowers interest rates and
raises asset prices in those economies (Lavigne, Sarker and Vasishtha, 2014)2.
Many empirical studies focus on the capital flows into emerging market economies
(EMEs) (Cho and Rhee, 2013; IMF, 2013a). The capital flows into EMEs around
the QE periods are illustrated by Figure 3.1. Emerging economies are heavily reliant
on external debts (Table 3.1), and the financial crises in those economies have been
closely related to capital flows (Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012). In this respect,
investigating the cross-border effects of QE is meaningful, since the spillovers affect
international capital flows and financial stability in the global economy.
This chapter models the international spill-over effects of QE, filling in the gap
between empirical findings and theoretical approaches. The analysis focuses on
cross-border capital flows - international lending and borrowing. The model simula-
tions suggest that foreign QE enlarges the home economy’s foreign borrowing, invest-
ment, capital stock, and the asset price - lowering interest rates in both economies;
this raises home loans as well, and the home currency appreciates. These results
2Lavigne, Sarker and Vasishtha (2014) explain three more channels of QE spillovers. First, the
home currency appreciation caused by foreign QE negatively affects home exports (exchange rate
channel). However, the increase in the foreign aggregate demand boosts home exports (trade flow
channel). The foreign QE commitment also stimulates the capital flows (signalling channel).
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Table 3.1: Portfolio and Other Investment Position/GDP Ratio (%, 2014)
Country Ratio Country Ratio Country Ratio Country Ratio
Argentina -20.7 Czech -10.1 Israel -2.4 Poland -46.0
Brazile -27.4 India -27.6 Mexico 1.4 South Africa -23.6
Chile 15.1 Indonesia -34.0 New Zealand -38.7 Thailand -29.2
China -5.6 Korea -25.3 Philipines -35.0 Turkey -53.9
Note: Net assets (Assets-Liabilities). Central banks’ external assets positions are not included.
Data: IMF - International Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Economic Outlook (WEO)
are in good agreement with the findings of empirical studies, such as Fratzscher, Lo
Duca and Straub (2013), and He and McCauley (2013).
A two-country open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model is established, with the home and the foreign economies. The home econ-
omy represents an emerging market economy, and the foreign economy indicates an
advanced economy where the central bank conducts QE. The foreign central bank
purchases foreign bank securities implementing QE. In the lending market, each
home borrower (entrepreneur) can use either home or foreign loans - purchasing
home capital stock. This helps to verify the link between the home and the foreign
interest rates. Following the financial friction framework of Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (BGG, 1999), agency problems exist not only between home agents, but
also between home borrowers and foreign lenders.
The impulse response analysis suggests that foreign QE firstly expands foreign
banks’ liabilities, thus boosting assets (loans). As a consequence, the amount of
foreign banks’ overseas loans - home agents’ foreign borrowing - increases; funds
flow into the home economy. This raises home capital stock, investment, and the
asset price. In the foreign economy, as foreign agents’ borrowing rises, capital stock
increases; the foreign borrowers’ capital return declines, and this lowers the foreign
banks’ return on loans. Under the banks’ no arbitrage condition, then the foreign
banks’ funding rate declines. As the foreign nominal interest rate falls sharply, the
home currency appreciates following a modified uncovered interest rate parity.
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Foreign QE lowers the home interest rate through the change in the home capital
return. The drop in the foreign banks’ funding rate leads to a fall in the required
return on foreign banks’ cross-border lending. Since the amount of home borrow-
ers’ debt repayment depends on the capital return, the home gross capital return
declines. On the other hand, the fall in the home capital return lowers the home
banks’ income from domestic loans. Under the banks’ no arbitrage condition, then
the home banks’ funding rate also declines.
In summary, when the foreign central bank conducts QE, the increase in the
assets demand and the fall in the interest rate in the foreign economy cause funds to
flow into the home economy, lowering the home interest rate. Therefore, the effects
of foreign QE through capital flows in this model represent the portfolio balance
channel. On the other hand, foreign QE also affects the home economy through the
trade flow channel. Since the increase in foreign capital stock boosts the foreign
economy, the foreign aggregate demand rises. This raises home exports, output and
employment. As the wage and the marginal cost increase, home inflation rises.
The financial friction magnifies the spill-over effects of foreign QE through the
financial accelerator. The unanticipated rise in the home asset price enlarges home
borrowers’ net worth - lowering the external finance premium as in BGG (1999).
As a result, investment rises more, and this leads to more significant increases in
capital stock, loans and output in the home economy.
The comparative analysis provides further implications. At first, a higher assets
adjustment cost in the foreign economy increases the strength of the international
effects of QE. As the foreign deposit rate declines due to QE, foreign households
reduce their deposits. However, facing a higher assets adjustment cost, the decline
in deposits becomes more sluggish. Combined with the liquidity injection of QE,
this leads to a greater rise in foreign banks’ funding; foreign banks’ loans to home
borrowers thus increase more. This implies that, as the foreign financial market
suffers from low liquidity, the cross-border effects of foreign QE become more sig-
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nificant. The analysis also suggests that a lower home investment adjustment cost
yields stronger effects of foreign QE, since the propagation is through the investment
and capital stock changes. Finally, a higher degree of home financial openness leads
to stronger international effects of foreign QE, as home investment and capital stock
are more substantially affected by the cross-border flows of funds.
The chapter continues as follows. Section 3.2 presents the relative literature. The
model is illustrated in Section 3.3, and Section 3.4 describes the results of calibration
and the estimation. The estimation procedure uses Bayesian approaches based on
the data of South Korea and the US. In Section 3.5, impulse response analyses are
presented. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
There are recent empirical studies that verify the international effects of QE (Cho
and Rhee, 2013; Fratzscher, Lo Duca and Straub, 2013; He and McCauley, 2013;
Lavigne, Sarker and Vasishtha, 2014; IMF, 2013a; Chen et al., 2012; Lim, Mohapatra
and Stocker, 2014; Park, Ramayandi and Shin, 2014). These papers find that the
quantitative policies of advanced economies stimulated the capital flows into other
economies, raising asset prices and inducing currency appreciations. Chen et al.
(2012) indicate that the spillover effects of QE were stronger in emerging economies
than in advanced economies. However, Ahmed and Zlate (2013) find no significant
effect of QE on the capital flows into emerging market economies. IMF (2013b)
argues that the cross-border effect of QE is remarkable when it restores domestic
market stability.
Some studies focus on the effects of QE lowering interest rates and market risks
in other economies. Neely (2012), Bauer and Neely (2013), and Bayoumi and Bui
(2011) argue that QE of the large economies lowered interest rates in other countries.
Moore et al. (2013) also find the falls in the emerging economies’ bond yields.
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Moreover, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and Chen et al. (2012)
highlight the cross-border effects on the credit risk.
Despite the profusion of empirical research on QE, there has been little attempt
to investigate the international effects of QE theoretically. Most QE papers are based
on closed economy frameworks (Cu´rdia and Woodford, 2010; Gertler and Karadi,
2011; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011). Only a few studies analyse the cross-border
effects of QE. For instance, Dedola, Karadi and Lombardo (2013) investigate the role
of an endogenous QE policy rule in the propagation of other shocks. Gieck (2014)
focuses on the effect of QE on the exchange rate and analyses different scenarios,
such as coordinated and non-coordinated QE policies between countries.
This chapter is different from other open economy financial friction papers, since
the model assumes both domestic and cross-border borrowing. Indeed, many open
economy papers using the financial friction framework of Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999) consider only domestic funding (Davis and Huang, 2011; Dedola
and Lombardo, 2012; Hirakata and Kurozumi, 2013; Faia, 2007; Gertler, Gilchrist
and Natalucci, 2007; Kolasa and Lombardo, 2014). Some other studies assume that
home agents’ borrowing is only from the foreign economy (Akinci, 2014; Cu´rdia,
2009; Elekdag, Justiniano and Tchakarov, 2005). Only a few literature such as
Unsal (2013) considers both domestic and cross-border borrowing, where a fraction
of home agents borrow funds from the foreign economy.
Many studies indicate the enhanced role of international capital flows in the busi-
ness cycle. Goldfajn and Valde´s (1997) and Goldberg (2009) argue that the capital
flows between countries magnify the fluctuations of economic variables. Bruno and
Shin (2013) also indicate that the cross-border effect of the foreign monetary policy
shock is amplified by the changes in foreign borrowing. According to Zhou (2008),
a decrease in foreign loans reduces home employment and production.
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3.3 The Model
3.3.1 Model Description
The baseline framework of the model is a two-country open economy version of
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (BGG, 1999). The model also adopts a New Keyne-
sian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework with price stickiness
and monopolistic competition. There are two economies: home and foreign. Figure
3.2 illustrates the flows of goods and funds in the home and the foreign economies.
In the home economy, there are eight types of economic agents: households,
entrepreneurs, banks, final and intermediate goods producers, a capital producer,
the central bank and the government. Households consume, supply funds to home
banks, and hold home government bonds. Yet they cannot purchase foreign assets
nor borrow from the foreign economy due to lack of expertise as in Aoki, Benigno
and Kiyotaki (2016). The foreign exchange market is only accessed by goods pro-
ducers, entrepreneurs and the government3, because only licensed institutions can
trade foreign currencies. Intermediate goods firms use households’ labour and cap-
ital inputs. Final goods producers combine home and foreign intermediate goods.
Entrepreneurs borrow funds from home and foreign banks to purchase home capital
stock and lend it to home intermediate goods producers - receiving rental incomes.
A fraction of home entrepreneurs seek funding from foreign banks due to a low
level of home financial development; at the steady state, home banks’ domestic
funding is far less than the total loan demands from home entrepreneurs4. Foreign
loans are denominated in foreign currency5. As in Unsal (2013), there are two
3This assumption is similar to Cu´rdia (2009) and Montoro and Ortiz (2012) where households
do not participate in the foreign exchange market. Carlson, Dahl and Osler (2008) also indicate
that currencies are traded in wholesale markets where most of participants are large institutions.
4In many emerging market economies, the amount of debts to foreign economies is larger than
that of external assets (Table 3.1).
5As indicated by Elekdag, Justiniano and Tchakarov (2005), and Gourinchas and Obstfeld
(2012), in emerging market economies foreign credit is typically denominated in foreign currency.
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Figure 3.2: Home and Foreign Economies: Goods and Funds Flows
groups of entrepreneurs: group I and group J . The entrepreneurs in the group I
borrow funds from home banks, and group J entrepreneurs use foreign loans. As in
BGG (1999), each entrepreneur is exposed to an idiosyncratic risk that affects the
realized capital return. Since the disturbance is not observed by home and foreign
banks, there are agency problems between borrowers and lenders. In case of an
entrepreneur’s default, the lender needs to pay an auditing cost in order to verify
the entrepreneur’s realized income.
The basic framework of the foreign economy is similar to that of the home econ-
omy - with eight types of economic agents. For simplicity, there is no agency problem
between foreign banks and entrepreneurs. Also, competitiveness is assumed among
foreign banks and capital producers, and intermediate goods producers set prices in
a flexible way. Implementing QE, the foreign central bank injects liquidity into the
banking sector by purchasing the securities issued by foreign banks.
3.3.2 Households
In the home economy, there is a continuum of identical households indicated by h ∈
(0, 1). Also, there is a continuum of households indicated by f ∈ (0, τ) in the foreign
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economy, where τ denotes the mass of the foreign households. Households consume
and provide the production sector with labour. The home household h and the
foreign household f maximize the following lifetime utility functions, respectively:
Eτ
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τ
[
Ct(h)
1−σ
1− σ −
N st (h)
1+χ
1 + χ
]
Eτ
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τ
[
C∗t (f)
1−σ
1− σ −
N s∗t (f)
1+χ
1 + χ
]
(3.3.1)
where Ct(h) (C
∗
t (f)) and N
s
t (h) (N
s∗
t (f)) denote consumption and labour supply
of the home (foreign) household h (f) at time t in real terms, respectively. The
parameter σ represents the coefficient of relative risk aversion of households or the
reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. χ denotes the inverse of
the elasticity of the labour supply.
Households receive wages and earn incomes from ownership of goods and capital
producers. During each period, the home and the foreign households consume,
deposit, and purchase government bonds. They do not hold international assets.
The home household h faces a real budget constraint as below:
Ct(h) + R
−1
t Bt(h) +R
−1
D,tDt(h) + Ψ (Dt(h))
= WtN
s
t (h) +Dt−1(h) +Bt−1(h) + Ωt(h) + Ω
E
t + κ
A
t (3.3.2)
and the real budget constraint of the foreign household f is given by:
C∗t (f) + R
∗−1
t B
∗
t (f) +R
∗−1
D,t D
∗
t (f) + Ψ
∗ (D∗t (f)) + T
∗ + ΩCB∗t
= W ∗t N
s∗
t (f) +D
∗
t−1(f) +B
∗
t−1(f) + Ω
∗
t (f) + κ
A∗
t , (3.3.3)
where Bt(h) (B
∗
t (f)) and Dt(h) (D
∗
t (f)) denote the government bonds holding and
deposits of the home (foreign) household h (f), respectively. Rt (R
∗
t ) and RD,t (R
∗
D,t)
denote the real gross interest rate on home (foreign) government bonds and the home
(foreign) banks’ funding rate (deposit rate), respectively. Wt and W
∗
t denote real
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wages, and Ωt(h) (Ω
∗
t (f)) indicates the profits from home (foreign) intermediate
goods and capital producers in real terms. ΩEt is net transfer from the home en-
trepreneur sector6. ΩCB∗t denotes the net transfer to the foreign central bank, which
supports the unconventional policy. When ΩCB∗t > 0, the foreign households finance
the central bank’s assets increase. T ∗ denotes the tax in the foreign economy, which
is fixed every period and supports foreign government spending. For simplicity, there
is no government spending in the home economy. Also, no-Ponzi scheme is assumed,
which means lim
τ→∞
τ∏
t=1
R−1t Bτ (h), lim
τ→∞
τ∏
t=1
R−1D,tDτ (h) = 0, limτ→∞
τ∏
t=1
R∗−1t B
∗
τ (f) = 0 and
lim
τ→∞
τ∏
t=1
R∗−1D,t D
∗
τ (f) = 0.
As in Ghironi, Lee and Rebucci (2007), the home and the foreign households
h and f pay assets transaction costs Ψ (·) and Ψ∗ (·) when their deposit holdings
deviate from the steady states, D¯ and D¯∗, respectively. These costs help determining
the home and the foreign households’ well-defined steady state assets portfolios
without taking second-order approximations. The cost functions are given by:
Ψ (Dt(h)) =
µA
2
(
Dt(h)− D¯
)2
(3.3.4)
Ψ∗ (D∗t (f)) =
µ∗A
2
(
D∗t (f)− D¯∗
)2
. (3.3.5)
The parameters µA and µ
∗
A represent the levels of the home and the foreign assets
transaction costs. King (2016) indicates that portfolio investors can sell their assets
with a very small reduction in the price when the financial market is liquid. Without
enough market liquidity, the reduction would be larger - represented by higher µA
or µ∗A; each agent needs to pay a greater cost of finding the counterparts of the
trade. As the international assets transaction cost in Christoffel, Coenen and Warne
(2008), the average assets transaction costs are rebated in a lump-sum manner, being
indicated by κAt and κ
A∗
t .
6There is no net worth in the foreign entrepreneur sector, which is to be explained later.
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The first-order conditions facing the home household h are:
N st (h)
χ
Ct(h)−σ
= Wt (3.3.6)
βRtEt
(
Ct+1(h)
Ct(h)
)−σ
= 1 (3.3.7)
β
[
R−1D,t + µA
(
Dt(h)− D¯
)]−1
Et
(
Ct+1(h)
Ct(h)
)−σ
= 1, (3.3.8)
and the optimization of the foreign household f implies:
N s∗t (f)
χ
C∗t (f)−σ
= W ∗t (3.3.9)
βR∗tEt
(
C∗t+1(f)
C∗t (f)
)−σ
= 1 (3.3.10)
β
[
R∗−1D,t + µ
∗
A
(
D∗t (f)− D¯∗
)]−1
Et
(
C∗t+1(f)
C∗t (f)
)−σ
= 1. (3.3.11)
3.3.3 Home Entrepreneurs
Home entrepreneurs borrow funds from home and foreign banks. Using the funds,
they purchase capital stock from the home capital producer. The entrepreneurs then
lend capital stock to intermediate goods producers and receive rental incomes. The
baseline framework follows Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
Home and Foreign Loans, and Idiosyncratic Risk
Due to a low level of financial development, the amount of home banks’ total funding
is far less than the entire home entrepreneurs’ loan demands at the steady state.
Therefore, some of the home entrepreneurs use foreign loans. Following Unsal (2013),
there are two groups of entrepreneurs: group I and group J . The entrepreneurs in
the group I borrow funds from home banks, and the others in the group J are
funded by foreign banks. Foreign loans are denominated in foreign currency, and
thus the group J entrepreneurs are licensed by the home government to participate
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in the foreign exchange market.
The total mass of the home entrepreneur sector is unity. The share of the group
J entrepreneurs borrowing funds from foreign banks at time t is γt+1 ∈ (0, 1). Unsal
(2013) assumes identical sizes of those two types of entrepreneurs. In this model,
the steady state value of γt+1 (= γ¯) is fixed - reflecting the long-run level of demand
and supply of loans in the home economy. In the short-run, γt+1 can deviate from
the steady state, as the government can adjust the mass of group J entrepreneurs7.
In order to finance capital stock (Kt+1(i)) at time t, the entrepreneur i ∈ (0, 1−
γt+1) in the group I uses home bank loans in addition to its own net worth (NWt(i)).
Likewise the entrepreneur j ∈ (1 − γt+1, 1) in the group J borrows funds from
foreign banks. The price of one unit of capital is Qt in terms of home final goods.
Defining Lt(i) and L
F
t (j) as the real amounts of home and foreign (cross-border)
loans, respectively,
Lt(i) +NWt(i) = QtKt+1(i) (3.3.12)
SR,tL
F
t (j) +NWt(j) = QtKt+1(j) (3.3.13)
where LFt (j) is denominated in units of foreign final goods
8. SR,t denotes the real
exchange rate which is defined as SR,t = StP
∗
t /Pt. St is the nominal exchange rate
- the value of the foreign currency denominated in home currency. P ∗t and Pt are
foreign and home final goods aggregate prices. The average capital stock purchased
in each group can be illustrated as:
KIt+1 =
1
1− γt+1
∫ 1−γt+1
0
Kt+1(i)di K
J
t+1 =
1
γt+1
∫ 1
1−γt+1
Kt+1(j)dj,
(3.3.14)
7This assumption is not fundamentally different from that of fixed γ; even when the ratio γ
is fixed, in the short-run the ratio of ‘foreign loans/home loans’ deviates from the steady state in
response to shocks.
8In home currency, the nominal amount of foreign loans can be expressed by StP
∗
t L
F
t (j) =
Pt (QtKt+1(j)−NWt(j)).
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Figure 3.3: Entrepreneur i’s Business at time t: Flows of Funds and Capital
and the average home and foreign loans are
Lt =
1
1− γt+1
∫ 1−γt+1
0
Lt(i)di L
F
t =
1
γt+1
∫ 1
1−γt+1
LFt (j)dj. (3.3.15)
The aggregate capital stock (Kt+1) can be illustrated as follows:
Kt+1 = (1− γt+1)KIt+1 + γt+1KJt+1. (3.3.16)
From capital lent last period (Kt(i) and Kt(j)), entrepreneurs i and j receive
rental incomes from intermediate goods producers. The flows of funds and capital
for the entrepreneur i are illustrated by Figure 3.39. The rental rate of one unit
of capital (rK,t) is common to all entrepreneurs. During production, capital stock
depreciates by the rate of δ. After production, entrepreneurs resell depreciated
capital stock to the capital producer with the price Qt. Eventually the gross return
on one unit of capital (RKt ) is then illustrated as follows:
RKt =
rK,t + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
. (3.3.17)
9The entrepreneur j borrows funds from foreign banks. All other funds and capital flows are
the same.
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When the gross capital return (RKt ) is realized, each entrepreneur experiences
an idiosyncratic shock. For the entrepreneurs i and j, these are represented by id-
iosyncratic disturbances ωt(i) and ωt(j) - random variables, and i.i.d across time
and across entrepreneurs. Those variables have continuous log-normal density func-
tions, f(ωt(i)) and f(ωt(j)). The expected values are all unity, E{ωt(i)} = 1 and
E{ωt(j)} = 1. For the entrepreneurs i and j, then the realized gross capital incomes
at time t become
ωt(i)R
K
t Qt−1Kt(i) and ωt(j)R
K
t Qt−1Kt(j). (3.3.18)
Agency Problem and Loan Contracts
As in BGG (1999), given the expected gross capital return, the entrepreneur i in the
group I chooses Kt+1(i) at time t prior to the realization of the idiosyncratic shock
(t+1). The optimal contract is then characterized by a cut-off value ωIt+1(i) ∈ (0, 1)
and a non-default real gross interest rates RL,t+1(i). When the realized shock ωt+1(i)
is below the threshold value ωIt+1(i), the entrepreneur i becomes bankrupt. Before
the realization of ωt+1(i), the gross capital income is R
K
t+1QtKt+1(i) at time t + 1,
and the amount of debt repayment is RL,t+1(i)Lt(i). Therefore, when ωt+1(i) <
ωIt+1(i), RL,t+1(i)Lt(i) is not payable: ωt+1(i)R
K
t+1QtKt+1(i) < RL,t+1(i)Lt(i). When
ωt+1(i) ≥ ωIt+1(i), it pays RL,t+1(i). The gross capital income is equivalent to debt
repayment when ωt+1(i) = ω
I
t+1(i), which is illustrated as below:
ωIt+1(i)R
K
t+1QtKt+1(i) = RL,t+1(i)Lt(i). (3.3.19)
For the entrepreneur j in the group J , similarly, in terms of home final goods
ωJt+1(j)R
K
t+1QtKt+1(j) = R
F
L,t+1(j)L
F
t (j)SR,t+1. (3.3.20)
In case of default, home (foreign) banks can take all the remaining income of the
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entrepreneur, ωt+1(i)R
K
t+1QtKt+1(i) (ωt+1(j)R
K
t+1QtKt+1(j)). However, the realized
idiosyncratic disturbances are not observed by home and foreign banks, and there
are auditing (monitoring) costs for the verification, µI and µJ for one unit of the
income (costly state verification). The levels of these costs are identical in this
model (µI = µJ = µ). Home and foreign banks purchase home final goods in order
to conduct the audits.
For the entrepreneur i, the amount of expected debt repayment to home banks
at t + 1 is determined by two cases: (i) default (0 ≤ ωt+1(i) < ωIt+1(i)) and (ii)
non-default (ωIt+1(i) ≤ ωt+1(i)). Defining Ξ
(
ωIt+1(i)
)
as the amount of expected
repayment of the entrepreneur i,
Ξ
(
ωIt+1(i)
)
= RKt+1QtKt+1(i)
∫ ωIt+1(i)
0
ωf(ω)dω +RL,t+1Lt(i)
∫ ∞
ωIt+1(i)
f(ω)dω.
(3.3.21)
Likewise the entrepreneur j’s expected debt repayment to foreign banks is
Ξ
(
ωJt+1(j)
)
= RKt+1QtKt+1(j)
∫ ωJt+1(j)
0
ωf(ω)dω +RFL,t+1L
F
t (j)SR,t+1
∫ ∞
ωJt+1(j)
f(ω)dω
(3.3.22)
in terms of home final goods. Define Γ(ωIt+1(i)) and Γ(ω
J
t+1(j)) as
Γ
(
ωIt+1(i)
)
=
∫ ωIt+1(i)
0
ωf(ω)dω + ωIt+1(i)
∫ ∞
ωIt+1(i)
f(ω)dω (3.3.23)
Γ
(
ωJt+1(j)
)
=
∫ ωJt+1(j)
0
ωf(ω)dω + ωJt+1(j)
∫ ∞
ωJt+1(j)
f(ω)dω. (3.3.24)
From the equations (3.3.19) and (3.3.20), then the amounts of expected debt repay-
ment of the entrepreneurs i and j can be rewritten by
Ξ
(
ωIt+1(i)
)
= RKt+1QtKt+1(i)Γ
(
ωIt+1(i)
)
Ξ
(
ωJt+1(j)
)
= RKt+1QtKt+1(j)Γ
(
ωJt+1(j)
)
(3.3.25)
where Γ
(
ωIt+1(i)
)
and Γ
(
ωJt+1(j)
)
represent home and foreign banks’ income shares
3.3. The Model 126
in one unit of the capital income with respect to the loans to i and j, respectively.
In case of default, the expected remaining capital incomes of the entrepreneurs
i and j would be
RKt+1QtKt+1(i)
∫ ωIt+1(i)
0
ωf(ω)dω and RKt+1QtKt+1(j)
∫ ωJt+1(j)
0
ωf(ω)dω
(3.3.26)
in terms of home final goods, respectively. Define then
M
(
ωIt+1(i)
)
=
∫ ωIt+1(i)
0
ωf(ω)dω and M
(
ωJt+1(j)
)
=
∫ ωJt+1(j)
0
ωf(ω)dω.
(3.3.27)
In order to verify the remaining incomes, home and foreign banks pay
µIRKt+1QtKt+1(i)M
(
ωIt+1(i)
)
and µJRKt+1QtKt+1(j)M
(
ωJt+1(j)
)
(3.3.28)
as the monitoring costs, respectively.
The home and the cross-border lending markets are competitive, and thus the
expected profits are zero across lenders. Given the home (RD) and the foreign banks’
funding rates (R∗D), from (3.3.25) and (3.3.28), following equations hold:
Et
(
RKt+1
)
QtKt+1(i)
[
Γ
(
ωIt+1(i)
)− µIM (ωIt+1(i))] = RD,tLt(i) (3.3.29)
Et
(
RKt+1
)
QtKt+1(j)
[
Γ
(
ωJt+1(j)
)− µJM (ωJt+1(j))] = R∗D,tEt (SR,t+1)LFt (j).
(3.3.30)
Due to competitiveness of the home and the cross-border lending markets, loan
contracts are made such that entrepreneurs’ profits are maximized. Given the home
and the foreign banks’ incomes illustrated by (3.3.25), the income shares of the
entrepreneurs i and j in one unit of the capital return are 1 − Γ (ωIt+1(i)) and 1 −
Γ
(
ωJt+1(j)
)
, respectively. Given the banks’ expected zero profit conditions (3.3.29)
and (3.3.30), the loan contracts specify
{
ωIt+1(i), Kt+1(i)
}
and
{
ωJt+1(j), Kt+1(j)
}
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that solve the following optimization problems:
max
{Kt+1(i),ωIt+1(i)}
[
1− Γ (ωIt+1(i))]Et (RKt+1)QtKt+1(i) (3.3.31)
max
{Kt+1(j),ωJt+1(j)}
[
1− Γ (ωJt+1(j))]Et (RKt+1)QtKt+1(j). (3.3.32)
Assume solutions are interior10, and ωIf(ωI)/
(
1− F (ωI)) and ωJf(ωJ)/ (1− F (ωJ))
are both increasing in ωI and ωJ , respectively (regularity condition). First-order
conditions then imply11
Et
(
RKt+1
)
RD,t
=
{[
1− Γ (ωIt+1(i))] [Γ′ (ωIt+1(i))− µIM ′ (ωIt+1(i))]
Γ′
(
ωIt+1(i)
) + [Γ (ωIt+1(i))− µIM (ωIt+1(i))]
}−1
(3.3.33)
Et
(
RKt+1
)
R∗D,t
=
Et (SR,t+1)
SR,t
{[
1− Γ (ωJt+1(j))] [Γ′ (ωJt+1(j))− µJM ′ (ωJt+1(j))]
Γ′
(
ωJt+1(j)
) + [Γ (ωJt+1(j))− µJM (ωJt+1(j))]
}−1
(3.3.34)
which determine the optimal threshold values of ωIt+1(i) and ω
J
t+1(j) given Et
(
RKt+1
)
/RD,t
and Et
(
RKt+1
)
/R∗D,t. As can be seen from the first-order conditions, Et
(
RKt+1
)
=
RD,t and Et
(
RKt+1
)
= R∗D,t
Et(SR,t+1)
SR,t
when the monitoring costs are zero (µI = µJ =
0). Since RK , RD, R
∗
D and SR are common across entrepreneurs, the first-order con-
ditions suggest that ωIt+1(i) and ω
J
t+1(j) are identical within each group (I and J).
Defining ωIt+1 and ω
J
t+1 as the common cut-off values in each group, the equations
(3.3.33) and (3.3.34) are then rewritten as
Et
(
RKt+1
)
RD,t
= ρI(ω
I
t+1)
Et
(
RKt+1
)
R∗D,t
=
Et (SR,t+1)
SR,t
ρJ(ω
J
t+1), (3.3.35)
where ρ′I(ω
I
t+1) > 0 and ρ
′
J(ω
J
t+1) > 0 following the regularity condition
12.
10As in BGG (1999), Et
(
RKt+1
)
/RD,t < 1/
(
Γ(ωIG,t+1)− µM(ωIG,t+1)
)
and Et
(
RKt+1
)
/R∗D,t <
1/
(
Γ(ωJG,t+1)− µM(ωJG,t+1)
)
are assumed. ωIG,t+1 and ω
I
G,t+1 are lenders’ global optimal values
such that Γ′
(
ωIG,t+1
)− µIM ′ (ωIG,t+1) = 0 and Γ′ (ωJG,t+1)− µJM ′ (ωJG,t+1) = 0
11The derivations of the first-order conditions are illustrated in the appendix 3.A.3.
12Proofs are illustrated in BGG (1999). Also, any monotonically increasing transformation
of the normal distribution satisfies this condition (BGG, 1999). In this chapter, ωI and ωJ are
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The first-order conditions also imply that RD and R
∗
D are linked by a modified
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) through the common home capital return (RK).
Combining the two equations in (3.3.35) and using SR,t = StP
∗
t /Pt,
RD,t = R
∗
D,tEt
(
Π∗t+1
Πt+1
St+1
St
)
ρJ(ω
J
t+1)
ρI(ωIt+1)
(3.3.36)
where
Et
(
Π∗t+1
Πt+1
St+1
St
)
=
Et (SR,t+1)
SR,t
. (3.3.37)
Defining then RND and R
∗
ND as the home and the foreign nominal deposit rates,
RND,t = RD,tEt (Πt+1) R
∗
ND,t = R
∗
D,tEt
(
Π∗t+1
)
. (3.3.38)
From the equations (3.3.12) and (3.3.13), the equations (3.3.29) and (3.3.30) are
then transformed into13
QtKt+1(i) = φ
I
tNWt(i) QtKt+1(j) = φ
J
t NWt(j) (3.3.39)
where
φIt =
{
1− ρI(ωIt+1)
[
Γ
(
ωIt+1
)− µIM (ωIt+1)]}−1
φJt =
{
1− ρI(ωJt+1)
[
Γ
(
ωJt+1
)− µJM (ωJt+1)]}−1 . (3.3.40)
The variables φIt and φ
J
t denote the leverage ratios of group I and J , respectively.
Since Γ′
(
ωIt+1
)−µIM ′ (ωIt+1) > 0 and Γ′ (ωJt+1)−µJM ′ (ωJt+1) > 0 with the interior
solutions assumption, the leverages are increasing in ωIt+1 and ω
J
t+1. Therefore, φ
I
t
and φJt are increasing in Et
(
RKt+1
)
/RD,t and Et
(
RKt+1
)
/R∗D,t, respectively
14.
assumed to have log-normal distributions.
13The derivation of the equation (3.3.39) is illustrated in the appendix 3.A.3.
14ωIt+1 and ω
J
t+1 are increasing in Et
(
RKt+1
)
/RD,t and Et
(
RKt+1
)
/R∗D,t in (3.3.35), respectively.
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When the expected income of foreign borrowing increases (decreases) due to an
external shock, more (less) home entrepreneurs would like to borrow funds from the
foreign economy. This happens when the foreign interest rate drops and thus home
agents’ foreign debts repayment is reduced. Without any constraint, however, the
number of the group J entrepreneurs (γt+1) would be indeterminate in response to
the shock. Solving this problem, it is assumed that the number of foreign loans users
is controlled by the home government in the short-run. Since home agents would get
foreign funds only if they can participate in the FX market, the government control
is through FX trade authorization15. The home government maximizes the sum of
the total entrepreneurs’ expected income at t+ 1 by choosing γt+1 at time t, facing
an additional social cost. When γt+1 deviates from the steady state (γ¯), there is a
cost of setting up temporary funding channels, such as local branches. This cost is
paid by home households, reducing the amount of net transfer to them at time t+1.
The optimization problem of the government is then illustrated by:
max
{γt+1}
{
(1− γt+1)
[
1− Γ (ωIt+1)]KIt+1 + γt+1 [1− Γ (ωJt+1)]KJt+1}Et (RKt+1)Qt−µγ2 (γt+1 − γ¯)2
where µγ denotes the entrepreneurs reallocation cost parameter. The first-order
condition implies:
µγ (γt+1 − γ¯) =
{[
1− Γ (ωJt+1)]KJt+1 − [1− Γ (ωIt+1)]KIt+1}Et (RKt+1)Qt.
(3.3.41)
The equation (3.3.41) implies that the number of the group J entrepreneurs (γt+1)
declines when each foreign bank’s share of income (Γ
(
ωJt+1 )) increases. The fluctu-
ation in capital flows from the foreign economy is affected by not only the average
foreign borrowing (LF ) variations but also the size of γt+1 changes.
15For instance, FX traders are authorized by the FCA (Financial Conduct Authority) in the
UK. In South Korea, the Ministry of Finance imposes the requirements for participating in the FX
markets. In Thailand, only the agents authorized by the central bank can trade foreign currencies.
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Net Worth and External Finance Premium
After paying debts, home entrepreneurs accumulate their profits as net worth. An
individual entrepreneur then continues its business with a probability ζ and exits
from the entrepreneur sector with a probability 1− ζ. Exiting entrepreneurs (1− ζ)
return their net worth (NWX) to households. Simultaneously, the same number
of new entrepreneurs begin their business with new net worth (NWN), which is
financially invested by the households. Continuing and new entrepreneurs are then
able to borrow funds from banks to purchase new capital stock.
After debt repayment at time t, the group I and the group J entrepreneurs’ av-
erage profits are RKt Qt−1K
I
t
[
1− Γ (ωIt )] and RKt Qt−1KJt [1− Γ (ωJt )], respectively.
Given the survival ratio (ζ) and the mass of the group J entrepreneurs at t− 1 (γt),
at the moment of borrowing, the amount of aggregate net worth (NWt) is the sum
of continuing entrepreneurs’ net worth and new net worth as follows16:
NWt = ζR
K
t Qt−1
{
(1− γt)
[
1− Γ (ωIt )]KIt + γt [1− Γ (ωJt )]KJt }+NWN .
(3.3.42)
For simplicity, after the exits and the new entrepreneurs’ entrances, the total
net worth (NWt) is identically distributed to the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs
still have incentives to maximize profits, since they return net worth to households
with a probability 1 − ζ in the next period. Given the unitary mass of the home
entrepreneurs,
NWt(i) = NWt(j) = NWt. (3.3.43)
Since the capital return and the capital price are common, the entrepreneurs are
identical within groups while making loan contracts - before the realization of indi-
16Exiting net worth is given by
NWX,t = (1− ζ)RKt Qt−1
{
(1− γt)
[
1− Γ (ωIt )]KIt + γt [1− Γ (ωJt )]KJt } .
3.3. The Model 131
vidual shocks. The identical contracts within each group lead to Kt+1(i) = K
I
t+1,
Kt+1(j) = K
J
t+1, Lt(i) = Lt and L
F
t (j) = L
F
t . Defining RL,t+1 and R
F
L,t+1 as the
common non-default loan rates in group I and J , respectively, RL,t+1(i) = RL,t+1
and RFL,t+1(j) = R
F
L,t+1. From the equations (3.3.16) and (3.3.39), then the following
equation holds:
QtKt+1 = φtNWt (3.3.44)
where φ is the aggregate leverage ratio, which satisfies φt = (1− γt+1)φIt + γt+1φJt .
The entrepreneurs reallocation cost is paid when exiting net worth is returned
to households, purchasing home final goods. Therefore, net transfer to households
(ΩEt ) in the equation (3.3.2) is illustrated as:
ΩEt = NWX,t −NWN −
µγ
2
(γt+1 − γ¯)2 . (3.3.45)
The home banks’ funding rate (RD, deposit rate) also represents the opportunity
cost of entrepreneurs’ funds, since entrepreneurs can alternatively put their funds
in home banks. As illustrated in BGG (1999), the expected gross return of capi-
tal (Et
(
RKt+1
)
) is equated to the marginal cost of external finance in equilibrium.
Defining REP as the external finance premium which is represented by the ratio of
‘external finance cost/opportunity cost’,
REPt =
Et
(
RKt+1
)
RD,t
. (3.3.46)
Since φI is increasing in Et
(
RKt+1
)
/RD,t, the equation (3.3.39) suggests that the
external finance premium (REPt ) is inversely related to entrepreneurs’ net worth.
3.3.4 Capital Producing Firms
During intermediate goods production in both economies, capital stock depreciates
by δ per one unit. In the home economy, the capital producing firm purchases used
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capital stock (1− δ)Kt from the entrepreneurs given the relative price Qt. Through
investment (It), the capital producer makes new capital stock (Kt+1) and sell it to
the entrepreneurs. The capital accumulation is then illustrated by:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It. (3.3.47)
Producing one unit of It, the capital producer purchases [1 + g(It/It−1)] of final
goods, where g(·) represents the investment adjustment cost. The investment ad-
justment cost function is given by:
g
(
It
It−1
)
=
µiv
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
(3.3.48)
where µiv denotes the investment adjustment parameter. Eventually, the capital
producing firm solves
max
It
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τEτ
{
Λτ,t
[
QtIt − It − g
(
It
It−1
)
It
]}
,
which yields the first-order condition as follows:
Qt = 1 + g
(
It
It−1
)
+
It
It−1
g′
(
It
It−1
)
− βEt
{
Λt,t+1
(
It+1
It
)2
g′
(
It+1
It
)}
. (3.3.49)
For simplicity, the foreign capital producing market is assumed to be competitive
and there is no investment adjustment cost; the relative capital price (Q∗) is fixed at
unity17, and the profit of the foreign capital producing sector is zero. In the foreign
economy capital stock accumulates as follows:
K∗t+1 = (1− δ)K∗t + I∗t . (3.3.50)
17In nominal terms, same to the price of final goods
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3.3.5 Foreign QE and Lending Market
Foreign Central Bank QE
Quantitative easing (QE) is defined as an expansion of the central bank assets, which
is aimed at injecting liquidity into the financial market. In this model, the foreign
central bank gets funds from foreign households and purchases assets from foreign
banks. One period later, debts are repaid with the interest rate and the funds are
transferred to foreign households. The amount of net transfer from households to
the central bank is represented by ΩCB∗t in the equation (3.3.3), and it is determined
by the foreign central bank’s QE decision. Thus, ΩCB∗t plays a similar role of banks’
interest-bearing reserves in the central bank18. When the foreign central bank pur-
chases the assets from foreign banks, a fraction of financial intermediation is funded
by QE. Figure 3.4 illustrates the flows of funds with respect to QE implementation.
The liquidity change caused by the quantitative policy at time t is determined as
a fraction (ψ∗t − 1) of the amount of foreign banks’ total funding (liabilities), which
is represented by:
τ (ψ∗t − 1)R∗−1D,t D∗B,t (3.3.51)
where τ is the mass of foreign banks, and R∗−1D,t D
∗
B,t denotes the average amount of an
individual foreign bank’s total liabilities at time t. ψ∗t is an exogenous variable with
a unitary steady state value (ψ¯∗ = 1); at the steady state, there is no quantitative
policy. QE is represented by a positive shock on the variable ψ∗t .
Foreign Banks and Entrepreneurs
The mass of foreign banks and that of foreign entrepreneurs are both τ - equivalent
to the mass of foreign households. Foreign banks identically make loans to foreign
and home entrepreneurs, using the funds provided by the foreign households and
18Bank of England (2015) explains that ‘the quantity of reserves is determined by accounting
identities on the central bank’s balance sheet’ (p.10).
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Figure 3.4: Foreign Central Bank QE and Flows of Funds
the foreign central bank (QE). Defining L∗ as an individual foreign bank’s average
amount of total loans, the average balance sheet of an individual foreign bank can
be expressed as follows:
R∗−1D,t D
∗
B,t = L
∗
t . (3.3.52)
The foreign banking sector is competitive, and thus the profit is zero. In the
short-run, a fraction (γF ) of foreign banks’ total loans are made to home entrepreneurs
- overseas loans. Another fraction (1−γF ) of loans are made to foreign entrepreneurs
who purchase foreign capital stock. There is no agency problem between lenders
and borrowers in the foreign economy; foreign entrepreneurs do not accumulate
net worth. Defining K∗t+1 as the average amount of capital stock purchased by an
individual foreign entrepreneur at time t, with the unitary foreign capital price
(1− γF )L∗t = K∗t+1. (3.3.53)
Since there is no auditing cost in the foreign loan market, contrary to the home
economy’s lending market,
Et
(
RK∗t+1
)
= R∗D,t (3.3.54)
where RK∗ denotes the foreign gross real capital return, which is illustrated as
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follows:
RK∗t = r
∗
K,t + 1− δ. (3.3.55)
r∗K,t is the foreign capital rental rate in the intermediate goods production sector.
Consequently, the profit of the foreign entrepreneur sector is also zero.
3.3.6 Intermediate Goods Producers
There is a continuum of identical intermediate goods producers indicated by h ∈
(0, 1) in the home economy. Each home intermediate good firm h produces a differ-
entiated intermediate good Yt(h) with a Cobb-Douglas technology as below:
Yt(h) = AtK
d
t (h)
νNt(h)
1−ν (3.3.56)
where Kdt (h) and Nt(h) are the amounts of capital and labour inputs that are used
for production. The variable At denotes the level of productivity which is common
to all firms. The parameter ν ∈ (0, 1) denotes the share of the capital income, which
is common across countries. Similarly in the foreign economy the intermediate goods
producers are indexed by f ∈ (0, τ), and the production function is given by
Y ∗t (f) = A
∗
tK
d∗
t (f)
νN∗t (f)
1−ν . (3.3.57)
The producers h and f borrow capital stock (Kdt (h) and K
∗
t
d(f)) from the home
and the foreign entrepreneur sectors, respectively. They return capital stock af-
ter production, paying real rental rates (rK,t and r
∗
K,t). The real marginal costs
(MCt and MC
∗
t ) are identical across firms within each country. Given the constant-
returns-to-scale technologies, optimality conditions imply
Nt(h)
Kdt (h)
=
1− ν
ν
rK,t
Wt
MCt =
1
Atνν(1− ν)1−ν r
ν
K,tW
1−ν
t (3.3.58)
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N∗t (f)
Kd∗t (f)
=
1− ν
ν
r∗K,t
W ∗t
MC∗t =
1
A∗tνν(1− ν)1−ν
r∗νK,tW
∗1−ν
t . (3.3.59)
The intermediate good of the home producer h is either purchased in the home
economy or exported abroad: Yt(h) = YH,t(h)+Y
∗
H,t(h), where YH,t(h) is the amount
of home good h sold in the home market and Y ∗H,t(h) denotes the amount purchased
in the foreign market (home exports)19. Similarly, for the foreign producer Y ∗t (f) =
Y ∗F,t(f) + YF,t(f), where Y
∗
F,t(f) is purchased in the foreign market and YF,t(f) is
exported to the home economy.
The demand function for an individual intermediate good is determined by cost
minimization of the final good producer in each economy. Define PH,t(h) and P
∗
H,t(h)
as the nominal prices of home produced goods purchased in the home and the foreign
economies, respectively. P ∗H,t(h) is denominated in foreign currency. The demand
function for the home intermediate good h in each economy is given by
YH,t(h) =
(
PH,t(h)
PH,t
)−ε
YH,t Y
∗
H,t(h) =
(
P ∗H,t(h)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
Y ∗H,t (3.3.60)
where ε is the elasticity of substitution among individual intermediate goods in the
home and the foreign economies. YH,t and Y
∗
H,t denote the aggregate demands for
home intermediate goods in both economies. PH,t and P
∗
H,t are the aggregate prices.
The aggregate demands and prices follow the aggregator form of Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) as below:
YH,t =
[∫ 1
0
YH,t(h)
ε−1
ε dh
] ε
ε−1
PH,t =
[∫ 1
0
PH,t(h)
1−εdh
] 1
1−ε
Y ∗H,t =
[∫ 1
0
Y ∗H,t(h)
ε−1
ε dh
] ε
ε−1
P ∗H,t =
[∫ 1
0
P ∗H,t(h)
1−εdh
] 1
1−ε
In a symmetric way, the demand functions for the foreign intermediate good (f) in
19The subscript H or F implies the place of production and the superscript (* or nothing)
denotes where it is purchased.
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the home and the foreign economies are represented by
Y ∗F,t(f) =
(
P ∗F,t(f)
P ∗F,t
)−ε
Y ∗F,t YF,t(f) =
(
PF,t(f)
PF,t
)−ε
YF,t (3.3.61)
with aggregators:
Y ∗F,t =
[(
1
τ
) 1
ε
∫ τ
0
Y ∗F,t(f)
ε−1
ε df
] ε
ε−1
P ∗F,t =
[
1
τ
∫ τ
0
P ∗F,t(f)
1−εdf
] 1
1−ε
YF,t =
[(
1
τ
) 1
ε
∫ τ
0
YF,t(f)
ε−1
ε df
] ε
ε−1
PF,t =
[
1
τ
∫ τ
0
PF,t(f)
1−εdf
] 1
1−ε
.
Y ∗F,t and YF,t are per capita terms, and τ is the mass of the foreign households.
Home and foreign intermediate goods producers set export prices in domestic
currency - producer currency pricing (PCP); firms choose identical prices across
borders maximizing the total revenue. Assuming that there are no trade costs or
trade barriers, the law of one price (LOOP) holds; this means PH,t(h) = StP
∗
H,t(h)
and PF,t(f) = StP
∗
F,t(f). Given the identical elasticity of substitution between in-
termediate goods in both economies (ε), the following equations hold:
PH,t = StP
∗
H,t PF,t = StP
∗
F,t. (3.3.62)
Given the definition of the real exchange rate (SR,t = StP
∗
t /Pt), the equation (3.3.62)
can be rewritten by
PH,t
Pt
= SR,t
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
PF,t
Pt
= SR,t
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
. (3.3.63)
The revenue of the home intermediate goods producer h is the sum of the cash
flows in the home and the foreign markets. At time t the real profit of the firm h is
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as follows:
PH,t(h)
Pt
YH,t(h) +
StP
∗
H,t(h)
Pt
Y ∗H,t(h)−
(
rK,tK
d
t (h) +WtLt(h)
)
. (3.3.64)
Defining Θ
(
YH,t(h) + Y
∗
H,t(h)
)
as the nominal cost of producing YH,t(h) + Y
∗
H,t(h),
the nominal cash flow at time t can be expressed as
PH,t(h)YH,t(h) + StP
∗
H,t(h)Y
∗
H,t(h)−Θ
(
YH,t(h) + Y
∗
H,t(h)
)
. (3.3.65)
Following Calvo (1983), an individual home intermediate good producer can
adjust its price with a probability 1 − ξ at each period. As Yun (1996), when it
cannot optimally change the price, its home price is increasing at the steady state
home inflation rate (Π¯). The steady state inflation rates of the home and the foreign
economies are assumed to be same to each other (Π¯ = Π¯∗). P˜H,t is defined as the
home price of home produced goods optimized at time t, and the foreign price P˜ ∗H,t
is determined by the LOOP (P˜H,t = StP˜
∗
H,t). Also, PH,t+τ pt and P
∗
H,t+τ pt denote the
home and the foreign prices of those goods at time t + τ , respectively. When the
home producer cannot change its price, the price in the foreign economy is indexed
by not only Π¯∗ but also the inverse of the nominal exchange rate change such that
the LOOP holds every period20. Therefore, for the home intermediate goods, the
following equations hold:
PH,t+τ pt = Π¯
τ P˜H,t P
∗
H,t+τ pt =
(
St
St+τ
)
Π¯∗τ P˜ ∗H,t. (3.3.66)
Given the LOOP, the equation (3.3.66) implies St+τP
∗
H,t+τ pt = Π¯
∗τStP˜ ∗H,t, which
is the foreign market price at time t+ τ in home currency. The home producer who
has a chance to optimize its price then maximizes
20Assuming the LOOP and Π¯ = Π¯∗, PH,t+τ pt = Π¯τ P˜H,t = Π¯∗τStP˜ ∗H,t. From PH,t+τ pt =
St+τP
∗
H,t+τ pt, Π¯
∗τ (St/St+τ )P˜ ∗H,t = P
∗
H,t+τ pt.
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∞∑
τ=0
βτξτEt
{
Λt,t+τ
Pt
Pt+τ
[
Π¯τ P˜H,t
(
PH,t+τpt
PH,t+τ
)−ε
YH,t+τ + Π¯
∗τStP˜ ∗H,t
(
P∗H,t+τpt
P∗H,t+τ
)−ε
Y ∗H,t+τ −Θ(Yt+τ pt)
]}
where Λt,t+τ = (Ct+1/Ct)
−σ and βτΛt,t+τ is the stochastic discount factor for real
payoffs. Yt+τ pt denotes output at t+ τ of a firm whose last price reset was at time t.
It is the sum of the domestically sold goods (YH,t+τ pt) and the exported home goods
(Y ∗H,t+τ pt). Given the LOOP and Π¯ = Π¯
∗, the optimization problem becomes
max
P˜H,t
∞∑
τ=0
βτξτEt
{
Λt,t+τ
Pt
Pt+τ
[
Π¯τ P˜H,t
(
PH,t+τ pt
PH,t+τ
)−ε (
YH,t+τ + Y
∗
H,t+τ
)−Θ(Yt+τ pt)]}
(3.3.67)
Profit maximization of the home producer yields the optimal relative price of the
home goods in the home economy (P˜H,t/Pt) as follows:
P˜H,t
Pt
=
ε
ε−1
∞∑
τ=0
β˜τ Π¯−ετEt
(
Λt,t+τΠ
ε
H,t,t+τYt+τVt+τMCt+τ
)
∞∑
τ=0
β˜τ Π¯(1−ε)τEt
(
Λt,t+τΠ
−1
t,t+τΠ
ε
H,t,t+τYt+τVt+τ
) (3.3.68)
whereMCt+τ is the real marginal cost at t+τ . β˜ = βξ and Vt+τ =
[∫ 1
0
(
PH,t+τ (i)
PH,t+τ
)−ε
di
]−1
.
Πt,t+τ denotes the cumulative gross inflation rate of home final goods from t to t+τ ,
and ΠH,t,t+τ is the cumulative inflation of home produced goods. The aggregate
home goods price PH,t evolves over time as below:
PH,t =
[
ξ
(
PH,t−1Π¯
)1−ε
+ (1− ξ)P˜ 1−εH,t
] 1
1−ε
. (3.3.69)
The equation (3.3.69) can be rewritten as follows:
PH,t
Pt
=
ξ( Π¯
Πt−1,t
)1−ε(
PH,t−1
Pt−1
)1−ε
+ (1− ξ)
(
P˜H,t
Pt
)1−ε 11−ε . (3.3.70)
For simplicity, foreign intermediate goods producers adjust foreign goods prices in
3.3. The Model 140
a flexible manner, which implies
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
=
ε
ε− 1MC
∗
t (3.3.71)
where ε/(ε− 1) represents the markup.
3.3.7 Final Goods Producers
Final goods producing firms in the home and the foreign economies produce final
goods Zt and Z
∗
t by combining home and foreign intermediate goods. Zt and Z
∗
t are
per capita terms. Define Y˜F,t as the per capita foreign goods consumption in the
home economy (home imports) and Y˜ ∗H,t as the per capita home goods consumption
in the foreign economy (foreign imports)21. The representative final good producer
in each economy then faces a CES technology as below:
Zt =
[
(1− α) 1θY
θ−1
θ
H,t + α
1
θ Y˜
θ−1
θ
F,t
] θ
θ−1
(3.3.72)
Z∗t =
[
(1− α∗) 1θY ∗
θ−1
θ
F,t + α
∗ 1
θ Y˜
∗ θ−1
θ
H,t
] θ
θ−1
, (3.3.73)
where the parameter θ denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign intermediate goods, which is identical in the home and the foreign
economies. α ∈ (0, 1) and α∗ ∈ (0, 1) represent the degrees of openness in the home
and the foreign economies, respectively.
Cost minimization by the home final good producer yields the following demand
21Since YF,t is per capital value in the foreign economy and the size of the home economy is
unity, Y˜F,t = τYF,t. In a similar way, Y˜
∗
H,t =
1
τ Y
∗
H,t where Y
∗
H,t is per capita exports of the home
economy.
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equations for the home and the foreign intermediate goods:
YH,t = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−θ
Zt (3.3.74)
Y˜F,t = α
(
PF,t
Pt
)−θ
Zt, (3.3.75)
with a price index
Pt =
[
(1− α)P 1−θH,t + αP 1−θF,t
] 1
1−θ (3.3.76)
which implies
1 = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)1−θ
+ α
(
PF,t
Pt
)1−θ
. (3.3.77)
The demand functions for the foreign and the home intermediate goods in the
foreign country can be written as:
Y ∗F,t = (1− α∗)
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−θ
Z∗t (3.3.78)
Y˜ ∗H,t = α
∗
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−θ
Z∗t (3.3.79)
with a price index
P ∗t =
[
(1− α∗)P ∗1−θF,t + α∗P ∗1−θH,t
] 1
1−θ (3.3.80)
which also means
1 = (1− α∗)
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)1−θ
+ α∗
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)1−θ
. (3.3.81)
3.3.8 Central Bank Policy Rate
The nominal gross policy rates in the home and the foreign economies (RN and R
∗
N)
are determined based on Taylor-type rules (Taylor, 1993). With a monetary policy
smoothing parameter ρR ∈ (0, 1), the nominal policy rates are chosen by the rules
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as below:
RN,t = κR
ρR
N,t−1 (Π
γP
t Y
γY
t )
1−ρR ηm,t (3.3.82)
R∗N,t = κ
∗R∗ρRN,t−1 (Π
∗γP
t Y
∗γY
t )
1−ρR η∗m,t (3.3.83)
where Yt and Y
∗
t denote the amounts of home and foreign aggregate output per
capita; this means Yt =
∫ 1
0
Yt(h)dh and Y
∗
t =
1
τ
∫ τ
0
Y ∗t (f)df . κ and κ
∗ are scale
parameters, and γP and γY represent the policy weights on inflation and output,
respectively. ηm,t and η
∗
m,t indicate policy shocks with unitary expected values. The
nominal interest rates have the following relationships with the real interest rates:
Rt =
RN,t
Et(Πt+1)
R∗t =
R∗N,t
Et(Π∗t+1)
. (3.3.84)
3.3.9 Government
The home government (i) intervenes in the home foreign exchange (FX) market, (ii)
holds foreign government bonds (foreign reserves), and (iii) issues government bonds
in the home market. Introducing foreign reserves accumulation (public capital flows)
enables the sum of the change in foreign loans (private capital flows) and net exports
to be non-zero22. Thus, net exports and foreign loans are not bound to each other in
equilibrium. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2011) argue that considering
public (government) capital flows helps to understand upstream capital flows23 and
global imbalances, although the government’s behaviour is still puzzling. In this
chapter, the government’s behaviour is explained by FX intervention and resulting
foreign reserves accumulation. Figure 3.5 illustrates the flows of funds around the
22In the equilibrium, Net Exports = ∆Private Net Foreign Assets + ∆Public Net Foreign Assets.
23Contrary to the prediction of the neoclassical model, international capital flows from emerging
economies to developed economies - the Lucas paradox (Lucas, 1990). Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and
Volosovych (2011) find that the private capital flows do not contradict the prediction, while the
public flows do.
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Figure 3.5: Sterilized Government FX Intervention and Foreign Reserves
home government.
The home government purchases or sells the foreign currency based on an FX
intervention rule. Following the intervention rules in Montoro and Ortiz (2012)
and Chutasripanich and Yetman (2015)24, the government’s demand for the foreign
currency (ΥGt ) depends on the currency value changes (∆St = St/St−1) as below:
ΥGt = Υ¯
G
t + B¯
F ln
(
∆S
1
ρFX
t
)
(3.3.85)
where B¯F denotes the steady state amount of the foreign government bonds held by
the home government. Υ¯Gt is the steady state value of Υ
G
t , and Υ
G
t is in real terms
- in units of foreign final goods.
Purchasing (selling) the foreign currency in the FX market, the home govern-
ment increases (reduces) its foreign reserves25. Therefore, the amount of the home
government’s foreign currency purchase (ΥGt ) is equivalent to the net funds outflow
through the changes in the foreign government bond holding (BF ):
ΥGt = R
∗−1
t B
F
t −BFt−1, (3.3.86)
24In Montoro and Ortiz (2012), the pre-announced FX intervention rule is given by ωt = φ∆St+
εt where ωt denotes the government’s foreign currency demand and εt is an unanticipated shock.
The intervention rule in Chutasripanich and Yetman (2015) is illustrated as ∆FRt = φ(St−1−St)
where FRt denotes foreign reserves and φ > 0.
25The relationship between government intervention and foreign reserves accumulation is well
supported by many studies, such as Aizenman and Lee (2006) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2008).
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where R∗t denotes the gross return of the foreign government bonds.
In order to offset the monetary effects of FX intervention on the home economy,
the home government issues bonds (B). The nominal cash flow in home currency
obtained from bonds issuance, Pt(R
−1
t Bt −Bt−1), is equivalent to the government’s
home currency supply in the FX market, which is StP
∗
t Υ
G
t - in return for the foreign
currency (P ∗t Υ
G
t ). Thus, in real terms, the following equation holds:
SR,tΥ
G
t = R
−1
t Bt −Bt−1. (3.3.87)
Foreign government spending is funded by bonds issuance and the tax (T ∗). The
foreign government bonds are purchased by foreign households (B∗) and the home
government (BF ). Define G∗ as per capita foreign government spending. Given the
mass of foreign households (τ), then the following equation holds:
τ
(
R∗−1t B
∗
t −B∗t−1
)
+R∗−1t B
F
t −BFt−1 + τT ∗ = τG∗t . (3.3.88)
3.3.10 Market Clearing
In the home FX market, the private net supply of the foreign currency26 is balanced
by the government’s foreign currency demand. From the equation (3.3.86), the FX
market clearing condition is given by:
P ∗t
(
R∗−1t B
F
t −BFt−1
)
= P ∗t
(
γt+1L
F
t − γtR∗D,t−1LFt−1
)
+ P ∗H,tY
∗
H,t − PF,tS−1t YF,t
(3.3.89)
and the real net exports in units of home final goods (NXt) is
NXt = SR,t
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
Y ∗H,t −
PF,t
Pt
YF,t. (3.3.90)
26This consists of (i) net exports and (ii) the change in foreign loans.
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Defining NX∗t as the foreign economy’s net exports (per capita) in units of the
foreign final goods, NX∗t = − 1τ NXtSR,t .
In each country, the amount of aggregate intermediate goods production is equal
to the sum of domestically purchased goods and exported goods. From the equations
(3.3.60) and (3.3.61), this can be illustrated by:
Yt = YH,t
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(h)
PH,t
)−ε
dh+ Y ∗H,t
∫ 1
0
(
P ∗H,t(h)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
dh (3.3.91)
Y ∗t =
1
τ
Y ∗F,t
∫ τ
0
(
P ∗F,t(f)
P ∗F,t
)−ε
df +
1
τ
YF,t
∫ τ
0
(
PF,t(f)
PF,t
)−ε
df (3.3.92)
where Yt and Y
∗
t denote the amounts of aggregate intermediate goods production
per capita in the home and the foreign economies, which implies:
Yt =
∫ 1
0
Yt(h)dh and Y
∗
t =
1
τ
∫ τ
0
Y ∗t (f)df .
In the home economy, the amount of final goods production (Z) is equal to the
sum of households’ consumption, investment, home and foreign banks’ monitoring
costs (m), the investment adjustment cost, and the entrepreneurs reallocation cost.
This is illustrated by:
Ct + It +mt + g
(
It
It−1
)
It +
µγ
2
(γt+1 − γ¯)2 = Zt (3.3.93)
where
mt = R
K
t Qt−1
[
(1− γt)µItM
(
ωIt
)
KIt + γtµ
J
tM
(
ωJt
)
KJt
]
. (3.3.94)
Also, the amount of foreign final goods is equivalent to the sum of consumption,
investment, the investment adjustment cost, and government spending as below:
C∗t + I
∗
t + g
(
I∗t
I∗t−1
)
I∗t +G
∗
t = Z
∗
t . (3.3.95)
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Since the mass of home entrepreneurs and that of home intermediate goods
producers are both unity, Kt+1 in the equation (3.3.16) is equivalent to K
d
t+1 in the
production function. Equivalently, in the foreign economy K∗t+1 = K
d∗
t+1. In the
production sector, the sum of the individual producer’s labour demand is same to
the sum of the individual labour supply of each household as follow:
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(h)dh =
∫ 1
0
N st (h)dh (3.3.96)
N∗t =
1
τ
∫ τ
0
N∗t (f)df =
1
τ
∫ τ
0
N s∗t (f)df (3.3.97)
where Nt and N
∗
t denote per capita employment in each country.
In the home banking sector, the total amount of home loans is equivalent to the
amount of funding (household deposits) as follows:
(1− γt+1)Lt = R−1D,tDt. (3.3.98)
Also, the home group J entrepreneurs’ total loan demands are matched by the
foreign banks’ overseas loans supply, which is illustrated by:
γt+1L
F
t = τγFL
∗
t (3.3.99)
where τ and γt+1 denote the mass of foreign banks and that of the group J en-
trepreneurs, respectively. γF denotes the share of the foreign banks’ overseas loans.
DefiningD∗t =
1
τ
∫ τ
0
D∗t (f)df as the average foreign household deposit, from (3.3.51)
27
(2− ψ∗t )D∗B,t = D∗t . (3.3.100)
27The amount of an individual foreign bank’s funding is the sum of the household deposit and
the central bank’s liquidity injection. From the equation (3.3.51) then, D∗B,t = D
∗
t +(ψ
∗
t − 1)D∗B,t.
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3.3.11 Exogenous Variables
Home and foreign technologies (At and A
∗
t ), the home and the foreign policy rate
shocks (ηm,t and η
∗
m,t), and the foreign QE shock (ψ
∗
t ) follow
At = A¯
1−ρAAρAt−1εA,t (3.3.101)
A∗t = A¯
∗1−ρAA∗ρAt−1ε
∗
A,t (3.3.102)
ηm,t = η¯
1−ρm
m η
ρm
t−1εm,t (3.3.103)
η∗m,t = η¯
∗1−ρm
m η
∗ρm
t−1 ε
∗
m,t (3.3.104)
ψ∗t = ψ¯
∗1−ρqeψ∗ρqet−1 ε
∗
qe,t. (3.3.105)
where the variables with bars represent the steady state values. The expected values
of the variables εA,t, ε
∗
A,t, εm,t, ε
∗
m,t, and ε
∗
qe,t are all unity, and the coefficients
ρA, ρm, ρqe ∈ (0, 1).
3.3.12 National Income Identity
Home Economy
Aggregating home households’ budget constraints (3.3.2) and subtracting the port-
folio adjustment cost (κAt ) from both sides yields
Ct +R
−1
t Bt +R
−1
D,tDt = WtNt + Ωt +Dt−1 +Bt−1 + Ω
E
t . (3.3.106)
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From the equations (3.3.86), (3.3.87), (3.3.89) and (3.3.90), (3.3.106) is rewritten as
Ct + SR,t
(
γt+1L
F
t − γtR∗D,t−1LFt−1
)
+R−1D,tDt +NXt = WtNt + Ωt +Dt−1 + Ω
E
t .
(3.3.107)
From the equations (3.3.29) and (3.3.98)
Dt−1 = (1− γt)RKt Qt−1KIt
[
Γ
(
ωIt
)− µIM (ωIt )] , (3.3.108)
and using the equation (3.3.94),
Ct + γt+1SR,tL
F
t − γtRKt Qt−1KJt Γ
(
ωJt
)
+mt + (1− γt+1)Lt +NXt
= WtNt + Ωt + (1− γt)RKt Qt−1KIt Γ
(
ωIt
)
+ ΩEt (3.3.109)
Aggregating the entrepreneurs’ balance sheets (3.3.12) and (3.3.13), and using the
equation (3.3.16),
Ct+QtKt+1−NWt−γtRKt Qt−1KJt Γ
(
ωJt
)
+mt+NXt = WtNt+Ωt+(1−γt)RKt Qt−1KIt Γ
(
ωIt
)
+ΩEt .
(3.3.110)
From the equations (3.3.42), (3.3.43), and (3.3.45),
ΩEt = R
K
t Qt−1
{
(1− γt)
[
1− Γ (ωIt )]KIt + γt [1− Γ (ωIt )]KJt }−NWt−µγ2 (γt+1 − γ¯)2 ,
(3.3.111)
and plugging the equation (3.3.111) into (3.3.110) and using the equation (3.3.17),
Ct +QtKt+1 −RKt Qt−1Kt +mt +NXt = WtNt + Ωt −
µγ
2
(γt+1 − γ¯)2 . (3.3.112)
The cash flows from the producers (Ωt) is the sum of the dividends from inter-
mediate goods producers (ΩIG,t) and the capital producer (ΩK,t), where
ΩIG,t =
PH,t
Pt
(
YH,t + Y
∗
H,t
)−rKt Kt−WtNt ΩK,t = QtIt−It−g(·)It. (3.3.113)
3.3. The Model 149
Combining the equations (3.3.112) and (3.3.113) yields
Ct +QtKt+1 − RKt Qt−1Kt +mt +
µγ
2
(γt+1 − γ¯)2 +NXt
=
PH,t
Pt
(
YH,t + Y
∗
H,t
)− rKt Kt +QtIt − It − g(·)It. (3.3.114)
Also, from the definition of the home gross return of capital (3.3.17), the equation
(3.3.114) is rewritten by
Ct+QtKt+1−(1−δ)QtKt+mt+µγ
2
(γt+1 − γ¯)2+NXt = PH,t
Pt
(
YH,t + Y
∗
H,t
)
+QtIt−It−g(·)It,
(3.3.115)
and from QtKt+1 = QtIt+Qt(1−δ)Kt, the home economy’s national income identity
is derived as follows:
Ct + It +mt + g
(
It
It−1
)
It +
µγ
2
(γt+1 − γ¯)2 +NXt = PH,t
Pt
(
YH,t + Y
∗
H,t
)
. (3.3.116)
Foreign Economy
Aggregating and normalizing foreign households’ budget constraints (3.3.3), the fol-
lowing equation holds:
C∗t +R
∗−1
t B
∗
t +R
∗−1
D,t D
∗
t + T
∗ + ΩCB∗t = W
∗
t N
s∗
t + Ω
∗
t +D
∗
t−1 +B
∗
t−1. (3.3.117)
From the equation (3.3.88), the equation (3.3.117) can be rewritten by
C∗t +R
∗−1
D,t D
∗
t +G
∗
t −
1
τ
(
R∗−1t B
F
t −BFt−1
)
+ ΩCB∗t = W
∗
t N
s∗
t + Ω
∗
t +D
∗
t−1. (3.3.118)
DefineM∗qe,t as the amount of QE at time t, which impliesM
∗
qe,t = τ (ψ
∗
t − 1)R∗−1D,t D∗B,t.
3.3. The Model 150
Using the equations (3.3.52), (3.3.53) and (3.3.99),
C∗t +
(
1
τ
γt+1L
F
t +K
∗
t+1 −
1
τ
M∗qe,t
)
+G∗t −
1
τ
(
R∗−1t B
F
t −BFt−1
)
+ ΩCB∗t
= W ∗t N
s∗
t + Ω
∗
t +R
∗
D,t−1
(
1
τ
γtL
F
t−1 +K
∗
t −
1
τ
M∗qe,t−1
)
(3.3.119)
From the FX market clearing condition (3.3.89) and the definition of NX∗t , the
equation (3.3.119) can be simplified as:
C∗t +NX
∗
t +K
∗
t+1+G
∗
t+Ω
CB∗
t = W
∗
t N
s∗
t +Ω
∗
t+R
∗
D,t−1K
∗
t −
1
τ
(
R∗D,t−1M
∗
qe,t−1 −M∗qe,t
)
,
(3.3.120)
where ΩCB∗t =
1
τ
(
M∗qe,t −R∗D,t−1M∗qe,t−1
)
. Using R∗D,t−1 = R
K∗
t = r
∗
K,t + 1 − δ and
K∗t+1 = (1− δ)K∗t + I∗t ,
C∗t + I
∗
t +G
∗
t +NX
∗
t = W
∗
t N
s∗
t + r
∗
K,tK
∗
t + Ω
∗
t . (3.3.121)
Since the profits of foreign banks and entrepreneurs are both zero, Ω∗t represents
only the profit in the production sector, which can be illustrated by
Ω∗t =
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
(
Y ∗F,t + YF,t
)− (W ∗t N s∗t + r∗K,tK∗t ) . (3.3.122)
Finally the national income identity is derived as
C∗t + I
∗
t +G
∗
t +NX
∗
t =
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
(
Y ∗F,t + YF,t
)
. (3.3.123)
3.3.13 Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of 68 equations and 68 variables. Home and foreign house-
holds’ maximization is represented by the equations (3.3.6)-(3.3.11). In the home
entrepreneurs sector, the equilibrium is illustrated by the equations (3.3.12), (3.3.13),
(3.3.16), (3.3.17), (3.3.33), (3.3.34), (3.3.37)-(3.3.42), (3.3.44) and (3.3.46). Capi-
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tal producers’ profit maximization and capital accumulation are represented by the
equations (3.3.47), (3.3.49) and (3.3.50). The foreign lending market equilibrium
consists of the equations (3.3.52)-(3.3.55). Optimization of home and foreign inter-
mediate goods producers is illustrated by the equations (3.3.56)-(3.3.59), (3.3.63),
(3.3.68), (3.3.70) and (3.3.71). In the home and the foreign final goods production
sectors, the equilibrium consists of the equations (3.3.74), (3.3.75), (3.3.77)-(3.3.79),
(3.3.81). The equations (3.3.82)-(3.3.84) denote central bank policy rates and the
nominal rates. The home and the foreign government balance sheets are given by
the equations (3.3.85), (3.3.86) and (3.3.88). The market clearing conditions are
illustrated by the equations (3.3.89), (3.3.91)-(3.3.95), (3.3.98)-(3.3.100). Finally,
the exogenous variables are indicated by the equations (3.3.101)-(3.3.105)28.
Assuming K = Kd, K∗ = Kd∗, N = N s and N∗ = N s∗, corresponding variables
are as follow: C, C∗, N , N∗, Y , Y ∗, I, I∗, K, KI , KJ , K∗, SR, ∆S, B, BF , B∗, D,
D∗, D∗B, L, L
F , L∗, MC, MC∗, YH , YF , Y ∗H , Y
∗
F , G
∗, Z, Z∗, W , W ∗, rK , r∗K , R, R
∗,
RD, R
∗
D, RND R
∗
ND, Π, Π
∗, RN , R∗N , R
EP , γ, NW , ωI , ωJ , m, RK , RK∗, PH
P
, PF
P
,
P ∗H
P ∗ ,
P ∗F
P ∗ ,
P˜H
P
, φ, φI , φJ , Q, A, A∗, ηm, η∗m, ψ.
3.3.14 Solution Method
The solution method of the model starts with computing the well-defined steady
state. The steady state values of variables are found analytically and illustrated
in the appendix 3.A.1. Having computed the steady state, equations are approx-
imated around the steady state, using log-linearization. The linearized equations
are reported in the appendix 3.A.2. These equations are also represented by the
following state space form:
AE(xt+1) = Bxt + Czt
28Appendix 3.A.1 and 3.A.2 illustrate the steady state and the log-linearized equation system.
3.4. Parameters and Steady States 152
where x is the vector of endogenous variables and z denotes the vector of exogenous
variables. Following the method of Klein (2000), firstly a generalized Shur decom-
position to matrices A and B is conducted. This yields QAZ = S and QBZ = T ,
where S and T are upper triangular matrices. Using block matrices of Q, Z, S and
T , eventually reduced form solutions are derived. Given a shock on the vector z,
then the impulse response simulation results are computed.
In the Baeyesian estimation, a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation
is used, with the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm. It is a process of finding the
desired posterior distributions of parameters using a large number of iterations. In
the MH algorithm, given a current state variable, a new draw is accepted only when
it increases the posterior density (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, 2010).
3.4 Parameters and Steady States
As in Adolfson et al. (2007), both calibration and a Bayesian approach are used in
this section to set up the values of the parameters and the steady state variables.
3.4.1 Calibration
The quarterly discount factor (β) is set to 0.995 such that the steady state real
gross interest rate (R¯) is 1.005. The annual capital depreciation rate is 10% (δ =
0.025). Following Coenen et al. (2010), the elasticity of substitution between home
intermediate goods (ε) is 6. The home central bank’s policy rule follows Taylor
(1993) which means γP = 1.5 and γY = 0.5, and as in Gertler and Karadi (2011) the
monetary policy smoothing parameter (ρR) is 0.8. The price stickiness parameter
ξ is 0.75, and the long-run level of net exports of each country (N¯X and N¯X
∗
) is
assumed to be zero.
In the home entrepreneur sector, the steady state external finance premium
(R¯K/R¯D) is 1.005 as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The home banks’
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Table 3.2: Parameters and Steady State Calibration
Parameter Value Description Parameter Value Description
β 0.995 Discount Rate µ 0.20 Monitoring Cost
ε 6.0 Elasticity of Substitution ρFX -0.29 Exchange Rate
ξ 0.75 Price Stickiness γ¯ 0.24 Financial Openness
α 0.42 Home Openness Π¯ 1.007 Inflation Rate
ζ 0.97 Survival Ratio R¯K/R¯D 1.005 Finance Premium
γP 1.5 Taylor Rule α
∗ 0.053 Foreign Openness
γY 1.0 τ 6.336 Foreign Mass
ρR 0.8 γF 0.023 Overseas Loans
funding rate premium on the risk-free rate (R¯D/R¯) is 1.0025 at the steady state,
and that of the foreign banks is set to unity. Following Unsal (2013), the lenders’
monitoring cost parameter (µ) is 0.20. The idiosyncratic risk (ω) is log-normally dis-
tributed with the standard deviation 0.17. As in Faia (2007) the survival probability
of an individual entrepreneur (ζ) is 0.97.
Calibrating some parameters and the steady state values in the home economy,
South Korean data are used. The steady state inflation rate (Π¯) is set to 1.007
based on the CPI during 2000-2015, and thus the steady state nominal risk-free
interest rate (R¯N) is roughly 1.012. From the regression results using the exchange
rate and the foreign reserves data from 2000:Q1 to 2015:Q3, ρFX = −0.29 in the FX
intervention rule. The degree of openness of the home economy (α) is 0.42 based on
the average level during 2000-2014. From the foreign loans ratio during 2000:Q1 to
2015:Q3, home financial openness (γ¯) is set to 0.24.
For some of the foreign economy parameters, the US data are used. The share
of the overseas loans in the total loans (γF ) is 0.023, and the steady state ratio of
D¯∗P/B¯
∗
P is assumed to be unity
29. The mass of the foreign economy (τ = 6.336)
and foreign openness (α∗ = 0.053) are determined such that at the steady state
29During 2000:Q1 to 2015:Q3, the average amount of the total loans of the US private depository
institutions is $7196.2bn, and the loans to the rest of the world is $161.9bn (Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System). Also, the average amount of the US Treasury Securities held by
domestic agents is $7725.6bn (US Department of Treasury).
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Table 3.3: Parameter Estimates using Bayesian Approaches
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Type Mean St.error Mode Median Mean 5% 95%
ν beta 0.33 0.03 0.309 0.317 0.318 0.268 0.368
σ gamma 2.00 0.30 1.784 1.809 1.814 1.513 2.115
χ gamma 2.00 0.30 2.298 2.366 2.367 1.891 2.846
θ gamma 1.50 0.30 0.675 0.688 0.690 0.649 0.733
µA gamma 0.20 0.05 0.187 0.193 0.197 0.120 0.280
µ∗A gamma 0.20 0.05 0.044 0.047 0.049 0.032 0.065
µiv gamma 4.00 0.80 1.792 1.882 1.901 1.471 2.338
µγ gamma 4.00 0.80 3.689 3.702 3.762 2.477 5.062
εA inv.gamma 0.10 - 0.061 0.064 0.065 0.049 0.078
εm inv.gamma 0.10 - 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.016 0.022
ε∗m inv.gamma 0.10 - 0.037 0.041 0.042 0.029 0.054
ε∗A inv.gamma 0.10 - 0.077 0.082 0.083 0.065 0.100
ε∗qeA inv.gamma 0.10 - 0.177 0.182 0.183 0.150 0.217
G¯∗/Y¯ ∗ = 0.2 - following Gertler and Karadi (2011). Table 3.2 summarizes the
calibrated values of the parameters and the steady state values.
3.4.2 Bayesian Estimation
A Bayesian estimation is performed for the parameters that are not calibrated and
for the second moments of exogenous shocks. These parameters are: (i) the share of
the capital income in production (ν), (ii) consumer’s preference parameters (σ and
χ), (iii) the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods (θ), (iv) the
home and the foreign assets adjustment costs (µA and µ
∗
A), (v) the home investment
adjustment cost (µiv), and (vi) the home entrepreneurs’ cross-border reallocation
cost (µγ). The Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm is used with 50,000 draws. Five
series of data are used30: output, imports, investment and the real exchange rate of
South Korea, and total loans in the US. The sample period is between 2000:1Q and
2015:Q3.
30Data sources are presented in the appendix 3.A.5.
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Regarding the prior distributions, the share of capital in the production (ν) is
assumed to have a beta distribution with a mean 0.33. The coefficient of relative
risk aversion of households (σ) and the inverse of the elasticity of the labour supply
(χ) are both 2.0, as in Kolasa and Lombardo (2014). The home (µA) and the foreign
assets adjustment cost parameters (µ∗A) are both 0.2 in the prior assumption. The
prior mean of the entrepreneurs reallocation cost (µγ) is set to 4.0. As in Christoffel,
Coenen and Warne (2008), the prior means of θ and µiv are set to 1.5 and 4.0,
respectively. Table 3.3 illustrates the prior and the posterior distributions.
According to the results of the Bayesian estimation, the posterior mean of ν is
0.32. Regarding consumer’s preference, σ is 1.81, and χ is 2.37. The elasticity of sub-
stitution between home and foreign goods (θ) is 0.69. The home assets adjustment
cost (µA) is 0.20, and that of the foreign economy (µ
∗
A) is 0.05. Finally, the posterior
mean of µiv is 1.90 and that of µγ is 3.76. The appendix 3.A.6 illustrates parameters
identification, prior and posterior distributions, and the convergence statistics.
3.5 Impulse Responses: Foreign QE Shock
3.5.1 Bayesian Impulse Response Analysis
There is a positive shock on ψ∗ in the equation (3.3.51), as the foreign central bank
injects liquidity into the financial market (QE). Figure 3.6 illustrates the Bayesian
impulse responses to the foreign QE shock. The figure describes the mean response
(solid line), and 5 and 95 per cent significance bands (dotted lines).
The foreign quantitative policy directly boosts foreign banks’ liabilities (funding),
and thus their assets (loans) are also enlarged. This raises the amount of the loans
to the home entrepreneurs (LF ). In the foreign economy, as more funds are available
for the entrepreneurs, the amount of capital stock rises - accompanied by an increase
in foreign output. As a result, the foreign capital return declines, and consequently
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Figure 3.6: Effects of Foreign Country’s QE: Bayesian Estimation
the foreign banks’ return on loans falls; under the zero profit condition of the foreign
banking sector, the foreign banks’ funding rate (R∗D) also declines.
In the financial sector, foreign QE affects the home economy through the changes
in cross-border capital flows. As the amount of home entrepreneurs’ foreign borrow-
ing increases and the foreign interest rate (R∗D) falls
31, capital stock of the group J
home entrepreneurs (KJ) rises. This also leads to an increase in aggregate capital
stock. The rise in capital stock is accompanied by an increase in investment. The
31The optimality condition (3.3.35) suggests that a decline in R∗D,t raises the cut-off value ω
J
t+1.
This has an upward pressure on KJt+1 through the equation (3.3.39).
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unanticipated increase in investment raises the asset price (Q). As this enlarges the
balance sheet of the entrepreneur sector, entrepreneurs’ net worth (NW ) increases,
and thus the external finance premium (REP ) declines32. As the foreign nominal de-
posit rate (R∗ND) falls sharply, the home currency appreciates following the modified
uncovered interest rate parity - a fall in S.
Foreign QE affects the home economy more broadly as it lowers the home interest
rate. Since the foreign funding rate declines, the foreign banks’ required return
on the loans to home entrepreneurs falls - following the zero profit condition. As
the foreign borrowing becomes cheaper, the number of entrepreneurs using foreign
loans (γ) rises. This strengthens the effect of the increase in the average foreign
borrowing of the group J entrepreneurs (LF ). As the home entrepreneurs’ debt
repayment depends on the capital return, the gross return of capital in the home
economy (RK) also falls33. As a result, the foreign QE effects are not confined to the
agents borrowing from the foreign economy. Since the capital return is common to
all entrepreneurs, the fall in RK lowers the home banks’ returns on domestic loans.
Consequently, under the zero profit condition the home banks’ funding rate (RD)
also declines. The drop in RD then leads to an increase in the amount of home
loans (L). These cross-border effects of QE through capital flows can be explained
by the portfolio balance channel. As the demand for assets increases and the yields
on domestic assets decline in the foreign economy, foreign funds flow into the home
economy - increasing foreign agents’ assets (loans). As a result, the home interest
rate also falls.
Foreign QE affects the home economy also through the trade flow channel. As
the foreign aggregate demand rises, the amount of home exports (Y ∗H) increases.
32As in BGG (1999), net worth inversely depends on the external finance premium following
the equations (3.3.35) and (3.3.39).
33In the equation (3.3.30), a decline in the foreign bank funding rate (R∗D,t) lowers the required
capital return next period (RKt+1). The fall in the capital return then leads to a decrease in the
home banks’ funding rate (RD,t) through (3.3.29). Figure 3.6 depicts R
K
t+1 instead of R
K
t .
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The resulting expansion of output is initially driven by a rise in employment (N),
and as a result the real wage increases - putting upward pressure on the marginal
cost and home inflation. The exchange rate channel of foreign QE34 appears to be
dominated by the trade flow effect.
3.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The effects of a parameter value change or model modification on the international
spillovers of QE are investigated in this section. All other parameters are fixed at
the calibrated or estimated levels. There is a positive 1%p shock on ψ∗.
Financial Accelerator
The financial friction leads to larger fluctuations of economic variables in response
to shocks - the financial accelerator (BGG, 1999). The relationship between foreign
QE effects and the financial accelerator is illustrated in Figure 3.7, comparing two
cases: with and without the financial friction. In order to focus on the effects of the
home friction, in this experiment the level of the domestic friction is relatively high
and that of the cross-border friction is low 35. The model without the friction is
described in the appendix 3.A.4. Without the friction, the amount of entrepreneurs’
net worth and the external finance premium (REP ) become zero.
In response to foreign QE, the unanticipated rise in home investment is accom-
panied by an increase in the asset price; with the financial friction, this boosts home
entrepreneurs’ balance sheets and net worth. Since net worth is inversely related
to the external finance premium, as in BGG (1999), REP declines. The fall in the
premium then stimulates investment - magnifying the foreign QE effects. Compared
to the case without the friction, home investment and capital stock rise more with
34Through the exchange rate channel of foreign QE spillovers, the home currency appreciation
negatively affects home exports (Lavigne, Sarker and Vasishtha, 2014).
35In this experiment, µI = 0.45 and µJ = 0.05 in the model with the friction.
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Figure 3.7: Foreign Country’s QE with/without Home Financial Friction
the financial friction in response to the foreign QE shock. Eventually, home banks’
domestic loans (L), home output, and inflation are subject to more considerable
fluctuations. The financial accelerator is through the home credit changes, rather
than the foreign loans (LF ) variations.
Different Foreign Assets Adjustment Cost
As the foreign central bank injects liquidity into the banking sector and the foreign
deposit rate declines, foreign households reduce their deposits holding. When the
assets adjustment cost (µ∗A) is low, the foreign households can reduce deposits easily.
However, when the assets adjustment cost is high, the foreign households would not
change their portfolios much; the decline in deposits would be small. This is well
represented by Figure 3.8.
When the foreign assets adjustment cost is higher (µ∗A = 0.20), the amount of
foreign household deposits (D∗) drops less. Combined with QE, this leads to a
greater increase in foreign banks’ total funding (D∗B); the home economy’s foreign
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Figure 3.8: Foreign QE with Different Foreign Assets Adjustment Costs
borrowing (LF ), home investment and capital stock then increase more significantly.
As a consequence, the cross-border QE effects on the home economy become stronger
with the higher foreign assets adjustment cost.
The assets adjustment cost is greater when market liquidity is not enough or
substitutability between assets is low; agents have considerable difficulty in finding
trade counterparts in the market, and thus pay more to reallocate their assets. The
result in this section implies that, as the foreign financial market suffers from low
liquidity, the international effects of foreign QE become more significant.
Different Home Investment Adjustment Cost
Figure 3.9 (a) indicates the role of the home economy’s investment adjustment cost
(µiv). Since the international spill-over effects of foreign QE are through the changes
in home investment and capital stock, as home investment adjustment is easier, the
effects of foreign QE become stronger. Home investment and capital stock rise more
with the lower cost (µiv = 2) than the other case (µiv = 8). The increase in capital
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Figure 3.9: Effects of Foreign QE with different Parameters
stock is mainly supported by the group I entrepreneurs’ capital stock change. The
effects on home output and net worth are not substantial.
Different Financial Openness of Home Economy
Figure 3.9 (b) compares the foreign QE effects with different levels of home financial
openness. Home financial openness is represented by the steady state mass of the
home entrepreneurs funded by foreign banks (γ¯ ∈ (0, 1)). With a higher value of γ¯
(=0.40), the propagation channel of foreign QE in the home economy is stronger.
Investment, the asset price, and capital stock in the home economy increase more
than the other case (γ¯ = 0.20). Moreover, home output rises more rapidly in
response to the foreign QE shock. The amount of entrepreneurs’ net worth keeps
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a higher level and the home interest rate (RD) falls more with greater financial
openness. This result is in line with Dedola and Lombardo (2012) and Goldberg
(2009) which emphasize the role of financial integration enhancing the international
transmission of shocks.
3.6 Conclusion
The cross-border effects of QE on other economies have been widely investigated in
empirical papers. However, there are not enough studies that incorporate the inter-
national QE effects into general equilibrium frameworks. This chapter investigates
the propagation channels where foreign QE affects the home economy, with a focus
on the cross-border capital flows.
The impulse response analyses suggest that capital stock, investment and the
asset price of the home country rise in response to a foreign QE shock. As the for-
eign nominal interest rate falls sharply, the exchange rate declines (home currency
appreciation). This explains the findings of the empirical studies investigating the
international effects of QE. Foreign QE has far-reaching effects on the home econ-
omy as it lowers the home capital return; this reduces the home interest rate, and
the amount of home loans increases. As the increase in the foreign aggregate de-
mand boosts home exports, home output expands. The rise in employment raise
the wage and inflation. The home financial friction strengthens the spill-over ef-
fects of foreign QE through the financial accelerator. The rise in the asset price
boosts entrepreneurs’ net worth, which lowers the external finance premium. Home
investment, capital stock and output then increase more than the case without the
friction.
Foreign QE has stronger international effects when the foreign financial market
faces a higher assets adjustment cost. The cost causes the foreign private sector
to reduce deposits sluggishly in response to QE. As a result, the amount of foreign
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banks’ loans to home entrepreneurs increases more. This boosts home investment
and capital stock more significantly. Moreover, the international effects of foreign
QE are stronger with a lower home investment adjustment cost and a higher degree
of home financial openness.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Steady State
R¯ = R¯∗ = β−1
A¯ = 1
γ¯ = 0.24
R¯k/R¯ = 1.005
r¯K = R¯
k − (1− δ)
M¯C = M¯C
∗
= (ε− 1) /ε
W¯ =
[
1
νν(1− ν)1−ν r¯
ν
KM¯C
−1
] 1
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Y¯ = Y¯H + Y¯
∗
H
¯˜Y ∗H = Y¯H/τ
(1− α∗) Z¯∗ = Y¯ ∗F
Y¯ ∗ =
(
N¯∗
K¯∗
)1−ν
K¯∗
m¯ = R¯k
[
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Q¯ = 1
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I¯∗ = δK¯∗
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R¯N = R¯N∗ = Πβ−1
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3.A.2 Log-linearized Equations
Yˆt = Aˆt + νKˆt + (1− ν)Nˆt (3.A.1)
Yˆ ∗t = Aˆ
∗
t + νKˆ
∗
t + (1− ν)Nˆ∗t (3.A.2)
M̂Ct = −Aˆt + νrˆK,t + (1− ν)Wˆt (3.A.3)
M̂C
∗
t = −Aˆ∗t + νrˆ∗K,t + (1− ν)Wˆ ∗t (3.A.4)
Nˆt − Kˆt = rˆK,t − Wˆt (3.A.5)
Nˆ∗t − Kˆ∗t = rˆ∗K,t − Wˆ ∗t (3.A.6)(
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Πˆ∗t+1
)
− Et
(
Πˆt+1
)
+ Et
(
∆Sˆt+1
)
(3.A.27)
∆Ŝt = ρFX
[(
BˆFt − Rˆ∗t
)
R¯∗−1 − BˆFt−1
]
(3.A.28)
RˆN,t = ρRRˆN,t−1 + (1− ρR)
(
γP Πˆt + γY Yˆt
)
+ ηˆt (3.A.29)
RˆN,t = Rˆt + Et
(
Πˆt+1
)
(3.A.30)
Rˆ∗N,t = ρRRˆ
∗
N,t−1 + (1− ρR)
(
γP Πˆ
∗
t + γY Yˆ
∗
t
)
+ ηˆ∗t (3.A.31)
Rˆ∗N,t = Rˆ
∗
t + Et
(
Πˆ∗t+1
)
(3.A.32)
R¯−1
(
Bˆt − Rˆt
)
− Bˆt−1 =
(
R¯∗−1 − 1) SˆR,t + R¯∗−1 (BˆFt − Rˆ∗t)− BˆFt−1 (3.A.33)
τG¯∗Gˆ∗t = τB¯
∗
[(
Bˆ∗t − Rˆ∗t
)
/R¯∗ − Bˆ∗t−1
]
+B¯F
[(
BˆFt − Rˆ∗t
)
/R¯∗ − BˆFt−1
]
(3.A.34)
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R¯k
(
Qˆt−1 + Rˆkt
)
= r¯K rˆK,t + (1− δ) Qˆt (3.A.35)
φˆt = Qˆt + Kˆt+1 − N̂W t (3.A.36)
K¯Kˆt+1 = (1− γ¯) K¯IKˆt+1 + γ¯K¯JKˆJt+1 + γ¯
(
K¯J − K¯I
)
γˆt+1 (3.A.37)
L¯Lˆt = K¯
I
(
Qˆt + Kˆ
I
t+1
)
− ¯NWN̂W t (3.A.38)
L¯F
(
LˆFt + SˆR,t
)
= K¯J
(
Qˆt + Kˆ
J
t+1
)
− ¯NWN̂W t (3.A.39)
1
φ¯I
φˆIt =
R¯k
R¯D
[
Γ
(
ω¯I
)
− µIM
(
ω¯I
)] [
Et
(
Rˆkt+1
)
− RˆD,t
]
+
R¯k
R¯D
ω¯I
[
Γ′
(
ω¯I
)
− µIM ′
(
ω¯I
)]
ωˆIt+1 (3.A.40)
1
φ¯J
φˆJt =
R¯k
R¯∗D
[
Γ
(
ω¯J
)
− µJM
(
ω¯J
)] [
Et
(
Rˆkt+1
)
− Rˆ∗D,t + SˆR,t − Et
(
SˆR,t+1
)]
+
R¯k
R¯∗D
ω¯J
[
Γ′
(
ω¯J
)
− µJM ′
(
ω¯J
)]
ωˆJt+1 (3.A.41)
Et
(
Rˆkt+1
)
− RˆD,t =
(
R¯k
R¯D
)
µI ω¯I
[
ηI + ω¯If
(
ω¯I
)]
ωˆIt+1 (3.A.42)
Et
(
Rˆkt+1
)
− Rˆ∗D,t − Et
(
SˆR,t+1
)
+ SˆR,t =
(
R¯k
R¯∗D
)
µJ ω¯J
[
ηJ + ω¯Jf
(
ω¯J
)]
ωˆJt+1 (3.A.43)
Qˆt + Kˆ
I
t+1 = φˆ
I
t +
ˆNW t (3.A.44)
Qˆt + Kˆ
J
t+1 = φˆ
J
t +
ˆNW t (3.A.45)(
R¯kζ
)−1
ˆNW t =
{
(1− γ¯)
[
1− Γ
(
ω¯I
)]
φ¯I + γ¯
[
1− Γ
(
ω¯J
)]
φ¯J
}(
Rˆk + ˆNW t−1
)
+
{
(1− γ¯)
[
1− Γ
(
ω¯I
)]
φ¯I φˆIt−1 + γ¯
[
1− Γ
(
ω¯J
)]
φ¯J φˆJt−1
}
−
[
(1− γ¯) Γ′
(
ω¯I
)
ω¯I φ¯I ωˆIt + γ¯Γ
′
(
ω¯J
)
ω¯J φ¯J ωˆJt
]
+γ¯
{[
1− Γ
(
ω¯J
)]
Φ¯J −
[
1− Γ
(
ω¯I
)]
Φ¯I
}
γˆt (3.A.46)
RˆEPt = Et
(
Rˆkt+1
)
− RˆD,t (3.A.47)
RˆND,t = RˆD,t + Et (Πt+1) (3.A.48)
Rˆ∗ND,t = Rˆ
∗
D,t + Et
(
Π∗t+1
)
(3.A.49)
µγ
γ¯
(γˆt+1 − γˆt) =
{[
1− Γ
(
ω¯J
)]
K¯J −
[
1− Γ
(
ω¯I
)]
K¯I
}
R¯K
(
Et(Rˆ
K
t+1) + Qˆt
)
−
[
KˆIt+1 − Γ
(
ω¯I
)
KˆIt+1 − Γ
′ (
ω¯I
)
ω¯I ωˆI
]
K¯I R¯K
+
[
KˆJt+1 − Γ
(
ω¯J
)
KˆJt+1 − Γ
′ (
ω¯J
)
ω¯J ωˆJ
]
K¯J R¯K (3.A.50)
Et
(
Rˆ∗K,t+1
)
= Rˆ∗D,t (3.A.51)
R¯∗KRˆ
∗
K,t = r¯
∗
K rˆ
∗
K,t (3.A.52)
Kˆ∗t+1 = Dˆ
∗
B,t − RˆD,t (3.A.53)
Lˆ∗t = Kˆ
∗
t+1 (3.A.54)
γˆt+1 + Lˆ
F
t = Dˆ
∗
B,t − RˆD,t (3.A.55)
Y¯ Yˆt = Y¯H YˆH,t + Y¯
∗
H Yˆ
∗
H,t (3.A.56)
Z¯Zˆt = C¯Cˆt + I¯ Iˆt + m¯mˆt (3.A.57)
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Y¯ ∗Yˆ ∗t = Y¯
∗
F Yˆ
∗
F,t + Y¯F YˆF (3.A.58)
Z¯∗Zˆ∗t = C¯
∗Cˆ∗t + I¯
∗Iˆ∗t + G¯
∗Gˆ∗t (3.A.59)
B¯F
[
R¯∗−1
(
Bˆt − Rˆ∗t
)
− BˆFt−1
]
= γ¯L¯F
[
LˆFt − R¯∗D
(
Rˆ∗D,t−1 + Lˆ
F
t−1
)]
− γ¯L¯F (γˆt+1 − R¯∗D γˆt)
+Y¯ ∗H
 P̂ ∗H,t
P ∗t
+ Yˆ ∗H,t
− Y¯F
(
P̂F,t
Pt
− SˆR,t + YˆF,t
)
(3.A.60)
L¯(1− γ¯)Lˆt − γ¯L¯γˆt+1 = Dˆt − RˆD,t (3.A.61)
Dˆ∗t = Dˆ
∗
B,t − ψ∗t (3.A.62)
m¯mˆt = (1− γ¯)µI R¯kK¯I
[
ω¯I2f
(
ω¯I
)
ωˆIt +M
(
ω¯I
)(
Rˆkt + Qˆt−1 + Kˆ
I
t
)]
+ γ¯µJ R¯kK¯J
[
ω¯J2f
(
ω¯J
)
ωˆJt +M
(
ω¯J
)(
Rˆkt + Qˆt−1 + Kˆ
J
t
)]
+ γ¯
(
µJ R¯KM¯JK¯J − µI R¯KM¯IK¯I
)
γˆt (3.A.63)
Aˆt = ρAAˆt−1 + εˆA,t (3.A.64)
Aˆ∗t = ρAAˆ
∗
t−1 + εˆ
∗
A,t (3.A.65)
ηˆm,t = ρmηˆm,t−1 + εˆm,t (3.A.66)
ηˆ∗m,t = ρmηˆ
∗
m,t−1 + εˆ
∗
m,t (3.A.67)
ψˆ∗t = ρqeψˆ
∗
t−1 + εˆ
∗
qe,t (3.A.68)
In the equations (3.A.42) and (3.A.43),
ηI =
∂
[
ω (1− Γ(ω)) (1− F (ω))−1 f(ω)
]
∂ω
| ω = ω¯I
ηJ =
∂
[
ω (1− Γ(ω)) (1− F (ω))−1 f(ω)
]
∂ω
| ω = ω¯J .
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3.A.3 Entrepreneurs’ Optimization and Leverage Ratio
The optimization problem of the equation (3.3.31) under the constraint (3.3.29) yields the
following Lagrangian function:
L = [1− Γ (ωIt+1(i))]Et (RKt+1)QtKt+1(i)
+λ
{
Et
(
RKt+1
)
QtKt+1(i)
[
Γ
(
ωIt+1(i)
)− µIM (ωIt+1(i))]−RD,t [QtKt+1(i)−NWt(i)]}
(3.A.69)
where Lt(i) = QtKt+1(i)−NWt(i). The first-order conditions with respect to ωIt+1(i) and
Kt+1(i) are as below:
Γ
′ (
ωIt+1(i)
)− λ [Γ′ (ωIt+1(i))− µIM ′ (ωIt+1(i))] = 0 (3.A.70)
Et
(
RKt+1
)
RD,t
{[
1− Γ (ωIt+1(i))]+ λ [Γ (ωIt+1(i))− µIM (ωIt+1(i))]} = λ.(3.A.71)
Combining the equations (3.A.70) and (3.A.71) yields the equation (3.3.33). Similarly,
optimization of (3.3.32) under the constraint of (3.3.30) leads to the first-order conditions
that yield the equation (3.3.34).
Combining the equations (3.3.12), (3.3.13), (3.3.29) and (3.3.30) leads to:
Et
(
RKt+1
)
QtKt+1(i)
[
Γ
(
ωIt+1(i)
)− µIM (ωIt+1(i))] = RD,t [QtKt+1(i)−NWt(i)]
(3.A.72)
Et
(
RKt+1
)
QtKt+1(j)
[
Γ
(
ωJt+1(j)
)− µJM (ωJt+1(j))] = R∗D,tEt (SR,t+1)SR,t [QtKt+1(j)−NWt(j)] .
(3.A.73)
Rearranging the equations (3.A.72) and (3.A.73) then yields:
Et
(
RKt+1
)
RD,t
[
Γ
(
ωIt+1(i)
)− µIM (ωIt+1(i))] = 1− NWt(i)QtKt+1(i) (3.A.74)
Et
(
RKt+1
)
R∗D,t
[
Γ
(
ωJt+1(j)
)− µJM (ωJt+1(j))] = Et (SR,t+1)SR,t
[
1− NWt(j)
QtKt+1(j)
]
.(3.A.75)
The equations (3.A.74) and (3.A.75) can be rewritten by the equations (3.3.39).
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3.A.4 Model Description without Home Financial Friction
Without the financial friction in the home economy, there is no agency problem between
lenders and borrowers; home and foreign banks can take all the remaining income of home
entrepreneurs in case of default without any auditing cost. Therefore, home entrepreneurs
do not set up the cut-off values of idiosyncratic shocks. From the equations (3.3.33) and
(3.3.34), when µI = µJ = 0,
Et
(
RKt+1
)
= RD,t and Et
(
RKt+1
)
= R∗D,t
Et (SR,t+1)
SR,t
. (3.A.76)
Without default, there is no borrowing limit which depends on the amount of home en-
trepreneurs’ net worth; home entrepreneurs can borrow optimal amounts of funds without
using net worth. From the equations (3.3.12) and (3.3.13) then the following equations
hold:
Lt = QtK
I
t+1 and SR,tL
F
t = QtK
J
t+1. (3.A.77)
Also, the non-default loan rates of home and foreign loans would satisfy RL,t+1 = RD,t
and RFL,t+1 = R
∗
D,t due to the zero profit condition of home and foreign banks.
Combining the equations (3.A.76) and (3.A.77) then suggests that the expected profit
is zero in the home entrepreneur sector, since the expected value of the individual shock
is unity36. Thus, there is no incentive to change the share of the group J entrepreneurs
(γt+1); γt+1 is assumed to be fixed at its steady state level (γ¯). Therefore the lending
market clearing conditions (3.3.98) and (3.3.99) are transformed into
(1− γ¯)Lt = R−1D,tDt and γ¯LFt = τγFL∗t . (3.A.78)
Also, since there is no auditing cost (mt), the equation (3.3.93) becomes
Ct + It + g
(
It
It−1
)
It = Zt. (3.A.79)
36The expected income of capital is Et
(
RKt+1
)
QtKt+1, which can be rewritten as
Et
(
RKt+1
)
SR,tL
F
t for the group J by (3.A.77). Since the expected debt repayment becomes
R∗D,tEt (SR,t+1)L
F
t , the expected income is equivalent to the expected repayment by (3.A.76).
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3.A.5 Data Source
Country Data Source (code)
South Korea Output (GDP) Datastream (KOGDP...D)
Inflation (CPI) Bank of Korea: ECOS
Real Exchange Rate Datastream (KOQCC011H)
Nominal Exchange Rate Datastream (KOXRUSD.)
Investment Datastream (KOGFCF..D)
Imports Datastream (KOIMNGS.D)
Total and Foreign Loans Bank of Korea: ECOS
Foreign Reserve Datastream (KOEXAUHDA)
US Total Loans Federal Reserve: Financial Accounts
Overseas Loans Federal Reserve: Financial Accounts
Treasuries Outstanding Datastream (USSECMNSA)
Country Portfolio Assets Other Assets Portfolio Liabilities Other Liabilities
Argentina AGI3B9AAA AGI3D9AAA AGI3B9LAA AGI3D9LAA
Brazile BRI3B9AAA BRI3D9AAA BRI3B9LAA BRI3D9LAA
Chile CLI3B9AAA CLI3D9AAA CLI3B9LAA CLI3D9LAA
China CHI3B9AAA CHI3D9AAA CHI3B9LAA CHI3D9LAA
Czech CZI3B9AAA CZI3D9AAA CZI3B9LAA CZI3D9LAA
India INI3B9AAA INI3D9AAA INI3B9LAA INI3D9LAA
Indonesia IDI3B9AAA IDI3D9AAA IDI3B9LAA IDI3D9LAA
Israel ISI3B9AAA ISI3D9AAA ISI3B9LAA ISI3D9LAA
Mexico MXI3B9AAA MXI3D9AAA MXI3B9LAA MXI3D9LAA
New Zealand NZI3B9AAA NZI3D9AAA NZI3B9LAA NZI3D9LAA
Philipines PHI3B9AAA PHI3D9AAA PHI3B9LAA PHI3D9LAA
Poland POI3B9AAA POI3D9AAA POI3B9LAA POI3D9LAA
South Africa SAI3B9AAA SAI3D9AAA SAI3B9LAA SAI3D9LAA
South Korea KOI3B9AAA KOI3D9AAA KOI3B9LAA KOI3D9LAA
Thailand THI3B9AAA THI3D9AAA THI3B9LAA THI3D9LAA
Turkey TKI3B9AAA TKI3D9AAA TKI3B9LAA TKI3D9LAA
Note: Datastream codes for International Investment Position (IMF-IFS)
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3.A.6 Bayesian Estimation Results
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Figure 3.10: Identification and Convergence Diagnosis
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